Military Intelligence

October-December 1986

the KGB Connection

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COVER: This issue's cover dramatizes the close relationship between the KGB and the Kremlin, as discussed in the feature article. Cover design by Thomas Daley.

from the Commander

Maj. Gen. Julius Parker Jr.

The mission of the Training and Doctrine Command is to "prepare for war." The intelligence portion of the task is the responsibility of the Intelligence Center and School. We cover the full range of subjects for all MI soldiers aimed at the tactical level and, to some extent, the operational level of war. However, I want to focus this article on two courses that constitute a small portion of our officer training responsibility. Designed to upgrade the knowledge of those selected for command and staff positions at battalion through corps levels, they are the Pre-Command Course (PCC) and the Senior Officer Tactical Intelligence Orientation Course (SOTIOC).

The PCC is an important adjunct to pre-command training. It is taught in three phases. Phase I consists of a home study and read-ahead packet. Phase II, a two-week phase at Fort Leavenworth, concentrates on leadership, the art of command, systems which support airland battle doctrine, and training to fight the division and corps battles. Phase III is a two-part, branch-intensive phase presented at the home of MI. The first week focuses on significant intelligence issues while the second week addresses MI command-specific issues. Our purpose during Phase III is not to attempt to teach an officer how to command because, at this point in an officer's career (Lt. Col., Col.), the basic framework and tenets which dictate an officer's philosophy of command are already well engrained.

Our purpose, then, is threefold. First, we attempt to confirm or supplement the student's current knowledge base. Second, we provide an update detailing the latest information concerning the "Intelligence System," which extends from the FLOT to the national level. Included are the intelligence cycle, intelligence organizations, equipment systems, doctrine, tactics, training, training management, combat developments, and threat capabilities and vulnerabilities. Third, we provide first-hand interaction with a variety of key commanders and staff officers. This interaction involves commanders and staff officers from combat arms and MI units, division and corps G2s, major Army and joint command deputy chiefs of staff for intelligence, INSCOM commander and staff, DA ACSI and staff, and the Intelligence School commandant, command sergeant major and staff. This phase also embraces command-specific (SIGINT/EW, CI/HUMINT, Aerial) systems proficiency that is presented at either Fort Huachuca or Fort Devens, depending on the type of command involved. Our objective is to ensure that our commanders are intimately familiar with the systems organic to their respective commands, to include operational, training and maintenance requirements. Moreover, as needed, we tailor certain aspects of our PCC to the OPMS specialty of the student body to maximize interest and motivation.

SOTIOC, a one-week course, is designed to further the officer's professional development. This is accomplished with selective presentations geared to division and corps G2s or designees and other key intelligence positions in division and corps G3 elements and CEWI units. Our main focus is warfighting, which includes the dynamics associated with the roles of the G2, the intelligence staff, weather support, terrain analysis teams and CEWI units, in the execution of airland battle doctrine. When possible, SOTIOC is scheduled as the first week of the two-week PCC, to promote discussion and sharing of experiences. Attendees must possess a TOP SECRET security clearance with access to sensitive compartmented information.

In summary, the PCC and SOTIOC have been specifically designed to satisfy a critical training requirement that cannot be obtained elsewhere. They are the best methods available for keeping MI commanders and staff officers abreast of our doctrine, organizations, systems, training techniques and requirements, combat developments and emerging technologies. Finally, those of you occupying the key MI positions throughout the Army are reminded of my charge to you, in which I said, "You are, in effect, an extension of the commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, for the purpose of ensuring that our branch is properly organized, trained and equipped and that our how-to-fight doctrine, tactics and techniques are sound." Inherent in that charge is the requirement to "communicate" with me. I look forward to hearing from you. ***Toujours en avant*-Always Out Front!**

HOME OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

from the CSM

CSM Robert H. Retter

As we come to the close of another year, I'd like to take this opportunity to reflect on a few of the important actions we have undertaken at the home of Military Intelligence. It has been a year of change and hopefully, a year in which we have made great strides in shaping the future of the Military Intelligence Corps, as pertains to force structure and our role in support of Combat Arms. Change, of course, does not always come easy. That has been most evident in our restructure actions. We continue to strive to create a workable grade structure that will allow our soldiers the opportunity to progress through the ranks in a reasonable time without encountering the roadblocks that now exist in several of our military occupational specialties. Because of the overages in our higher grades, the regrading actions will necessarily cause a slowdown in senior NCO promotions for a period of time. Although regrettable, this slowdown will help realign our grade imbalances and bring us in line with directed, DA design norms.

Another initiative taken this year was the designing and implementation of our pre-assignment orientation course (PAOC) for sergeants major and command sergeants major who have been designated to fill G2 and CSM positions throughout the MI branch. This course, designed along the lines of the pre-command course (PCC) for lieutenant colonels and colonels, represents an opportunity for our senior NCO leadership to acquaint themselves with the MI community. This is necessary in some cases because the sergeant major or command sergeant major may have been serving a tour of duty outside MI branch or may be joining MI for the first time. The course offers an overview of past, present and future MI-related topics. Several hours are taught concurrently with the PCC, which not only translates to savings in training time and money but also allows for the exchange of ideas and philosophies among the senior MI leadership. As we approach our second year of the PAOC, we are confident that the course will continue to be an example of our efforts to provide current and thorough information to the senior NCOs who have been selected to assume great responsibilities and in whom we place great trust.

Our greatest achievement of the year is the approval to teach a consolidated advanced noncommissioned officer course (ANCOC) at Fort Huachuca. This achievement was accomplished through the efforts of numerous subject matter experts from both the Fort Huachuca and Fort Devens training centers. They designed an ANCOC that would meet the diversified training needs of our MI soldiers. We are now prepared to bring CMF 33, 96 and 98 soldiers together, in one location, for ANCOC. In addition to the obvious fiscal advantages, this action represents the first time in the history of the MI branch that all of our soldiers, at least once in their careers, will come to the home of MI for training. More importantly, ANCOC students will have the opportunity to interact among themselves and gain a better understanding of how the different specialties fit into the total intelligence process. We are, after all, dedicated to the same goal: to provide the combat commander with the most sophisticated and timely intelligence available.

The consumers of our product will expect us to deliver the same high-quality intelligence as in the past. No matter how many changes occur in our force structure, how many new systems are added to the inventory, or how many new training strategies are introduced, our charter remains the same: to collect, analyze and disseminate the vital intelligence that will help win the AirLand battle.

LEAD BY EXAMPLE

Behind the Lines

Charles C. Colton once remarked, "Knowledge is twofold and consists not only of the affirmation of what is true but of the negation of that which is false." This statement is particularly applicable to the recent ***Army Times*** report that ***Military Intelligence*** and 40 other branch journals will be cut. However, the Army Periodicals Review Committee has authorized Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to set up alternative publications that will be called professional development bulletins. TRADOC is establishing criteria that must be satisfied by the branch journals in order to qualify for publication. The new bulletins must address professional development, training and education. Surviving journals may undergo a format change. I am confident that our branch journal will continue to exist, since the philosophy of ***Military Intelligence*** is in compliance with TRADOC's criteria.

In this issue, the ROTC Prospectus discusses information about our branch and its areas of concentration, the impact of the MI Corps activation on the intelligence community, and career opportunities for potential Military Intelligence officers. Additionally, the Prospectus serves as a guide for keeping the intelligence community abreast of current officer training developments at the Intelligence Center and School. In light of the dramatic changes in our doctrine and structure, this will prove to be a useful reference for all concerned.

Another feature of this issue is an article that contends the KGB is in charge of the Soviet Union and is engineering a return to Stalinism, as opposed to capitalism. Mikhail Gorbachev, in his summit appearances to date, has "appeared" personable, open to dramatic change, and willing to discuss major political issues. However, the Soviet Union, despite their recent openness with the West, has apparently publicized only those items they were forced to publicize by international pressures. To date, there have been no truly significant changes in Soviet policy, foreign or domestic. Although the policies and more open philosophy of Gorbachev certainly seem to favor warmer ties with the West, we, as Military Intelligence professionals, must closely scrutinize his actions. A Soviet turn to capitalism or a Soviet return to Stalinism are extreme positions. Currently, the Gorbachev Politburo is fluctuating in between. Only time will tell toward which extreme the Soviets will lean.

William A. Knight

Editor

feedback . . .

Dear Editor:

As a result of the public disclosure of U.S. efforts to achieve contact with "moderate" Iranian elements, the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) staff and the U.S. intelligence community have come under rather intense fire from a number of different quarters. It would seem appropriate, therefore, to mitigate some of this criticism by attempting to put this issue in a clearer perspective. Hopefully, in a small way the scale of criticism might be balanced.

The history of clandestine operations in the United States is older than the Constitution itself. Indeed, these operations played a large role in General Washington's successes, often against superior forces. What today would be termed unethical was widely practiced in an effort to gain necessary intelligence on behalf of "necessary security." The founding fathers implicitly recognized the need for this. This is not meant to condone abuses of civil liberties. The Congress and American public should be rightfully concerned about such abuses.

Contrary to popular belief, the majority of daily intelligence and foreign policy activities are not of the "James Bond" variety. Nevertheless, despite our impressive technological advances, the need for human intervention still persists and probably will remain with us as long as we have a need for intelligence. Recent press reports have raised intense criticism about the manner in which U.S. covert operations are conducted. By necessity, intelligence organizations do not publicly admit or deny such involvement. Not because they feel immune to such criticism, but because public disclosure of their activities can compromise sources, as well as endanger the personnel who are involved in these operations. As George Washington wrote in 1777: "The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent and needs not be further urged—all that remains for me to add is that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon secrecy, success depends in most enterprises of the kind, and for want of it, they're generally defeated, however well planned and promising."

The Romans maintained "that if you want peace, you must prepare for war." This statement remains as true today as ever. There always has been, and to some extent there continues to be, a reluctance by the American public and Congress to support any foreign involvement. In this context, the collection of intelligence and covert actions during peacetime seems especially suspect. Some feel that the collection of intelligence contradicts the ideals of a democratic society. In an era of post-Watergate, this syndrome is even more pronounced, but it is certainly not a new reaction. In 1929, Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson ordered the cessation of the American cryptology effort, because, he explained, "Gentlemen do not read other people's mail." In 1940, however, while serving as secretary of war, he reversed himself and personally reviewed every piece of "magic." The morality of means somehow became lost in the expediency of preparing for war. If World War II were to take place today, Franklin D. Roosevelt would probably be impeached before he could complete his third term. The various covert actions undertaken by his administration to support the British war effort would dim today's headlines by comparison. But then, as now, we elected a president to protect our national security interests and I, for one, am glad we fought the Germans in Europe instead of Atlantic City. Many Americans feel that America has a divine mission to make the world free for democracy. And in that pursuit we are obliged to be more proper and moral than any other country. Because of this ostensible sense of propriety, some of our methods have come under scrutiny. Two questions come into play here: First, why should intelligence operatives be involved in these operations at all? Second, why the need for these "nefarious" operations?

The first question can be answered simply: the second is more complex. First, intelligence operatives are at times directed to undertake covert actions, simply by virtue of their established cover. The issue of necessity is a more difficult question to answer. On one hand, covert operations by the United States certainly violate the principle of non-intervention, and in some cases, go beyond international treaties and covenants. Moral implications are also present; certain covert actions involve the manipulation of people. On the other hand, in a strictly defensive posture these actions become more justifiable when we examine the nature of the game we are forced to play. We must be able to detect the opposition's moves and be able to combat them. John Barron, in his book **The KGB**, *vividly details the extent to which the Soviet Union will go to disrupt our foreign policy. Former secretary of state Dean Rusk has said: "We cannot rise above the struggle, rather we must get down into the gutters of these back alleys and fight it out." It is naive to expect that the other side will not use "covert action" if we desist. Can we afford not to compete?*

One of the perennial questions of all times has been: Does the end justify the means? With regard to covert actions, we may note that the morality of means and ends is dependent upon the political position of those sitting in judgment. In a hot war, the end seems to justify the means. Churchill, prior to World War II, was what many considered the world's leading anti-communist. In 1942, when asked how he felt about teaming up with Stalin, Churchill remarked: "I have only one purpose, the destruction of Hitler. If Hitler invaded Hell, I would make at least a favorable reference to the devil in the House of Commons."

The less important the end to be desired, however, the more one can afford to engage in an ethical evaluation of the means. But, we are living in an increasingly complex world where time is often essential. There are very few clear cut issues left anymore. Obviously, then, the decision to use covert action is a very delicate one. A seemingly innocuous incident in Angola, Nicaragua, or the Middle East could conceivably precipitate World War III. The President, however, charged with the advice of the NSC, must make these decisions. For all the negatives associated with covert action, the alternatives may well be to do nothing and thus be "frozen out" of the action, or, to send in the Marines. Neither option may be viable.

The above discussion does not intend to answer any questions for the reader. The subject of morality and ethics is a personal issue. As a hypothetical case study, the reader might place himself on the NSC and answer the following questions: In 1939, if by assassinating Adolf Hitler you could have prevented World War II, would you have attempted it? Does the end justify the means? Note: the NSC was not created until 1947.

Lt. Col. Earl J. Boyce
U.S. Air Force

(Continued on page 56)

Gorbachev's Detente:
THE KGB CONNECTION

by Dr. Michael W. Johnson

The news from Russia continues to be so extraordinary that it prompts this discussion of the changes in leadership since the death of Leonid Brezhnev in 1982. The KGB takeover of the Communist Party marks a shift in Soviet history as significant as the Bolshevik takeover engineered by Lenin in 1917. Although the ramifications of this upheaval are far from certain, actions taken by the Politburo of Mikhail Gorbachev do not confirm the sanguine views of Western thought.

Westerners believe that the Soviets, due to a deteriorating economy, must turn to capitalism. There seems to be no room for the opinion that the Soviets are returning to Stalinism. This opinion is even more likely to be dismissed because of the Reagan-Gorbachev summits. Although no significant agreements were announced, it is widely perceived that the cause of peace was advanced. Nevertheless, the KGB most likely set up the summits to conclusively demonstrate American intransigence. With American unreasonableness established, Gorbachev and his KGB associates on the Politburo can advance their own agenda.

Politics is affected by an interaction among personalities. Of the Politburo's members, including Gorbachev, eight out of the 12 are KGB operatives. These men owe their career and position to Mikhail Suslov and Yuri Andropov, two of the most unprincipled characters in Soviet history. To expect these individuals to open the floodgates of reason and redirect the economy toward capitalism is patently ridiculous.

The Soviet Politburo is apparently coalescing behind an individual who will not hesitate to use military and police force against any combination of external or internal opponents.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.

Communique of the Central Committee

On October 14, 1964, a plenary session of the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was convened. It approved N.S. Khrushchev's request to be released from the duties of first secretary, member of the Presidium of the CC of the CPSU, and chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Following his release, the session elected Brezhnev as first secretary of the CC of the CPSU.[1]

During the summer of 1964, it became clear to many members of the ruling circle that Krushchev was unfit to rule. Unsure of the extent of Krushchev's network of spies in Moscow, various Politburo members met throughout the summer, in the baths of Pyatigorsk and the dachas of Stavropol, to plot his ouster. Although Soviet scholars stress that the mechanics of his downfall are unknown, it appears that the Northern Caucasus provided the shelter for detailed planning and possibly the plan's inception. Certainly the plotters knew of the remoteness of the area and its lack of communications, for they either encouraged or sent Krushchev to the Black Sea resort of Sochi in early October while they finalized his ouster.

When Krushchev returned to Moscow in mid-October, he was forced to resign. The terse communique that announced his resignation attributed his departure to advanced age and failing health. Obviously, he never learned of the plotting in Stavropol. Nor did he hear of the fairly open moves to unseat him in early October while he vacationed in the area. The remoteness of Stavropol Kray was the principal factor in making the coup a success. The lesson was not lost on the men who engineered Krushchev's ouster. When Brezhnev and Alexis Kosygin were in power, they moved rapidly to ensure no one would go undetected while plotting *their* overthrow. The individual who took charge of neutralizing and sanitizing Stavropol and Pyatigorsk was Suslov.

Suslov was clearly one of the least known of the Soviet leaders. Yet, this man was a critical player for nearly three decades. Russian scholars believe he was the prime force behind Krushchev's ouster and the Politburo's first choice to replace him. Suslov, however, declined the office of general secretary and opted to remain the power behind the throne. This did not prevent him from delivering the key address denouncing Krushchev to a secret session of the CC. It was evident throughout Brezhnev's rule that Suslov was the second most powerful man on the Politburo.

How he came to his power is disarmingly simple. Suslov was one of Stalin's deputies when Stalin liquidated 5,000,000 peasants in the collectivization of Soviet agriculture and 7,000,000 more in the Great Purges of 1936-38.[2] Indeed, Suslov was one of Stalin's best butchers of humanity, and as such, Stalin involved him in the most demanding liquidations. Starting in Moscow on the Communist Party's Central Control Commission, Suslov spent 1933-34 in the Urals and Ukraine directing purges and then returned to Moscow for bigger fish from 1934-37. Since more than 3,000,000 peasant farmers (kulaks) perished in the Ukraine alone, it is probably safe to assert that Suslov, although by no means acting alone, was responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of men. Also, it is not a coincidence that Suslov returned to the Control Commission just before the infamous murder of Sergei Kirov which opened the floodgates of terror. The Kirov Affair marked the beginning of the Great Purges[3] which resulted in liquidations that have not been replicated in history, not even in the gas chambers of the Third Reich.

In 1925, Stalin wrote that the 'new type' of leader should be feared as well as respected. In Suslov, Stalin found a loyal and talented subordinate. The end of the decade found Suslov in Rostov-on-Don near the Black Sea, to rebuild the party leadership after Stalin liquidated the previous party cadre. World War II changed Suslov's role from rebuilder to protector.

The Nazi invasion's principal objectives were the Crimean oilfields, where Suslov was stationed. Suslov organized partisan forces in Stavropol Kray to oppose the Nazis. In 1941 Stalin initiated a purge in the North Caucasus which liquidated 1,500,000 Crimean Tartars, Kalmyks, Chechens and others who were suspected of being sympathetic to the Germans. Suslov's masterful supervision of Gen. Ivan Serov's deportations of these nationalities earned him Stalin's approval.[4]

Patronage determines the course of an individual's career in the Communist Party. It is the *sine qua non* of Soviet politics. Stalin was the acknowledged master of the party's intricate patronage system. His ability to place his supporters into various party and governmental agencies, while simultaneously undermining the appointees of his opponents, was the reason he survived so long. His rule was an ongoing tutorial for those subordinates he favored and promoted. Consequently, Stalin's lieutenants played his game well. And the best player was Suslov.

The Battle of Stalingrad marked the crest of the German advance into Russia. By 1944, the Russians were attacking the Germans from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The relentless Soviet advance gradually moved onto foreign soil. The recapture of Lithuania by the Red Army required an administrator who could ruthlessly exterminate any vestiges of Nazi influence and simultaneously ensure that Lithuanian nationalism was crushed. Once again, Suslov received the call, and 23 percent of the population fell to Stalin.[5]

In Estonia and Karelia, which borders Finland, the Finnish communist Otto Kuusinen was engaged in a similar task. According to biographers, one of his proteges was a young man named Andropov who was leading partisan forces against the Finns in Karelia. Actually, as head of the Karelio-Finnish Komsomol, the Communist Youth Organization, Andropov never saw combat. Instead, he led the participation in forced labor construction and resettlement programs. Andropov probably made Suslov's acquaintance during this period. In the years immediately following World War II, Suslov became a key director of the Organization Bureau (Orgburo) of the CC. Andropov was the Orgburo's representative in Karelia.[6]

From 1941 to 1950, Andropov remained in Karelia. In 1951, he was promoted to the position of inspector of the CC. It was in this position and later as chief of the inspectorate that he maintained intimate contact with Suslov. As an inspector, he worked for the Orgburo. Thus, their association was cemented in the early 1950s when both men were in Moscow. By now, Suslov was moving to full Politburo membership.

The event in Andropov's life that gained Suslov's confidence was his ambassadorship to Hungary. Andropov paved the way for the Red Army to crush the Hungarian Revolution in 1956. The uprising in Hungary was the turning point in Andropov's career; his handling of this event firmly established him as Suslov's protege. Andropov promised Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy and some of his cabinet members safe conduct when they agreed to allow Soviet intervention. Afterwards, they were arrested and executed. This act was noticed by Suslov, who was in Hungary throughout the Soviet repression of the unrest.[7] The support of Sus-

MAP OF THE CAUCASUS



Andropov paved the way for the Red Army to crush the Hungarian Revolution.

lov, a full member of the Politburo since October 1952, meant everything to Andropov's career.

In June 1957, Suslov supported Khrushchev's assumption of sole leadership of the party and state. Suslov's support earned him an unassailable position on the Politburo; he used it to great effect when he led the opposition sacking Khrushchev in October 1964.

Once Brezhnev and Kosygin had consolidated their positions, Suslov strove to ensure the Politburo's permanence and his continued prominence. By 1967, he was the only member of the Politburo who was closely connected with Stalin. Consequently, he had sole access to Stalin's personal dossiers on party members. Indeed, Suslov's political strength was a result of his possession of these dossiers.

Although the dossiers guaranteed Suslov's position on the Politburo, they could not guarantee protection against a coup similar to the one he had mounted against Khrushchev. Therefore, Suslov had Brezhnev elevate Andropov to head of the KGB in May 1967. In this position, Andropov fed Suslov KGB information until the latter's death. Also, Suslov knew that Andropov would be able to devise a way to monitor the activities of vacationing Politburo members. Suslov never knew how correct his assessment would prove to be.

The Rise of Mikhail Gorbachev

Gorbachev was born and raised in Stavropol Kray. He graduated from Moscow Law School in 1955 and returned to Stavropol where he rose to the Komsomol's highest ranks.[8] He most likely came to the attention of Suslov and Andropov while in law school since the Orgburo approved all matriculating students.

Andropov began his familiarization with Komsomol organization and operations in 1937. During the Great Purges, Stalin frequently promoted promising zealots to key party positions. The Komsomol provided a steady stream of replacements; the Orgburo sought to develop and control the youthful exuberance emanating from the Komsomol. It is possible that Gorbachev was recruited, while at school in Moscow, to infiltrate and dominate the Komsomol in Stavropol.

The rise of Gorbachev's star was influenced by Suslov and Andropov. Gorbachev's continuing promotions were also blessed by the KGB's Surveillance Directorate's Sixth Department which is responsible for the recruitment of potential KGB agents.[9] The Komsomol provides the KGB with over 90 percent of its recruits.

It appears that Gorbachev's association with Fedor Kulakov, the party first secretary in Stavropol, was not totally responsible for Gorbachev's promotion to first secretary of Stavropol Kray in 1970. Several Sovietologists argue that Kulakov's promotion to Moscow in 1965 allowed him to advance Gorbachev's name as his replacement.[10]

In addition, there is a tendency to discount reports that Andropov and Gorbachev met at Pyatigorsk. Intended to tie Gorbachev to Andropov's legacy, this would have legitimized his subsequent rise.

Determining whose patronage Gorbachev enjoyed is paramount to predicting how Gorbachev will rule. If he can be tied to Kulakov's coattails, the West will view him as a specialist or bureaucrat, essentially free from the opprobrium of Stalin's crimes. Kulakov was spared from accusations because he was considered an agricultural expert. On the other hand, if Gorbachev's patron was Andropov, Gorbachev's hands might not be as clean. The evidence overwhelmingly points in this direction.

The Politburo's primary agricultural appointee, a *lawyer* by profession, survived six consecutive years of poor harvests without suffering political damage. Kulakov was unable to survive the disastrous crop failures of the early 1970s, which eventually resulted in massive Soviet purchases of American grain. Yet, after Gorbachev's elevation to party secretary in charge of agriculture, this is precisely what occurred.

It is interesting to speculate about who supported Gorbachev after Kulakov's demise and who the patrons are of the Politburo men who rose up the ranks with Gorbachev. This speculation, although not definitive, overwhelmingly points to a linkage between Gorbachev and Andropov/Suslov. It simply is not plausible, in light of the known facts, to give primary credit to Kulakov's patronage during Gorbachev's career.

Andropov's appointment as head of the KGB in 1967 cleared the way for Gorbachev's elevation to party chief of Stavropol Kray in 1970. The fact that Kulakov was in Moscow since 1965, at Brezhnev's direction, did not harm Gorbachev's cause. As party ideologist, Suslov would have had final say on the promotion of a Komsomol leader to a regular party position. This appointment would have fit Suslov's pattern during the 1970s, and it ultimately benefited Andropov.

This pattern of patronage was exposed when Brezhnev died. Suslov enabled Andropov to come to power by systematically destroying Brezhnev's power base. Brezhnev's proteges were not even remotely capable of competing with Suslov. None of the leaders of the Brezhnev Politburo were taught the

game by Stalin. As they jockeyed for position while Brezhnev was dying, Suslov undermined them with his knowledge of their failures that were documented by Andropov. Indeed, just before his death, Suslov initiated an attack on corrupt Politburo members.

Suslov's greatest ally in Brezhnev's final years was the decline of the Soviet economy. The ossification of the bureaucracy was exacerbated by its corruption, which made it possible for a Stalin-type leader, who would use the evidence of corruption as a vehicle to purge the Politburo, to arise. Although this might be beneficial initially, it could eventually lead to a tremendous concentration of power in one individual. A far better solution would be to expose the corruption and let a temporary ruler deal with it. This would prevent the issue from being used in factional combat. At the same time, the interim nature of the general secretary's position would not allow him to create a personality cult as Stalin did. Andropov was the perfect candidate for this role.

It is highly likely that the Politburo had access to Andropov's medical records as they deliberated about Brezhnev's successor. The fact that he held the dossiers on all the Politburo members was a threat that was lessened by his poor health. The consensus that was created by Suslov in the years prior to his death held, and his legacy was Andropov's appointment as the general secretary. The others probably agreed to this transfer because they thought the alliance between Konstantin Chernenko, Brezhnev's longtime aide, and Defense Minister Dimitri Ustinov was strong enough to withstand any assault by the KGB. Unfortunately, they were wrong.

One of Lenin's greatest fears was that the communist revolution might be subverted by the military or secret police. As a result, the Soviet leadership created a system of checks and balances between the military and the internal police. After Stalin, this dyad became a triad as the Ministry of the Interior, with its police force, was created simultaneously with the KGB from the NKVD (Stalin's secret police run by Beria). Brezhnev realized that he had to keep Suslov out of this organization; he placed at its head his brother-in-law from Dnieper who became known as the Dnieper Mafia. After gaining power, Andropov immediately charged Shchelokov with corruption, removed him from office, and replaced him with Vasily Feodorchuk, the number two man at the KGB.[11] Feodorchuk promptly launched a purge which swept most of the Brezhnev appointees from the organization and replaced them with KGB-types. In essence, Andropov succeeded in reuniting the domestic police (MVD) under KGB control.

Andropov did not stop with the Ministry of Interior. To truly hold power, he had to dominate the Politburo. As deaths reduced the Politburo to its lowest number since Stalin, Andropov had plenty of room to make appointments. He responded by elevating three associates to full membership on the Politburo. One of these men was Geidar Aliyev from Azerbaijan, the Soviet Socialist Republic (S.S.R.) southeast of Andropov's home in Stavropol Kray. Aliyev, a well-kown KGB chief of the S.S.R., was elevated to party chief due to his success in smashing the last vestiges of opposition to Soviet rule among the Azerbaijanis.

The second individual was Vitaly Vorotnikov, the premier of the Russian S.F.S.R. (one of the 15 states comprising the Soviet Union). Brezhnev had him transferred to Cuba in 1979, for he sensed that Suslov was elevating Andropov's group to power.[12] It is well-known in the West that the majority of Soviet diplomats are actually KGB agents. In the case of Soviet ambassadors to satellite countries such as Cuba, virtually all are KGB-types. It is highly probable that Vorotnikov proved the rule rather than the exception.

Feliks Dzerzhinsky, the first head of what is today, the KGB.

The final Politburo promotion went to Mikhail Solomentsev, the director of heavy industry. Actually, his particular ministry was directly responsible for nuclear weapon production; he was considered to be a leading expert on the defense industry. He was a strong critic of Krushchev and supported Suslov in the tense days of 1964. He was rewarded with a position overseeing defense production on the CC Secretariat in 1966. Given KGB control of all facets of Soviet nuclear weapons and forces, Solomentzev is probably a KGB member. He had long been involved with the Stalinist leadership and gained his first recognition while using forced labor to implement the Virgin Lands Program in the late 1950s.[13]

A review of Andropov's brief tenure as general secretary reveals that his rule had an impact totally out of proportion to its duration. The most important event was the successful evisceration of the MVD and its subordination to the KGB. While it took Stalin almost seven years to accomplish this feat, it took Andropov only seven months! The second distinguishing feature was that he elevated three proteges to full Politburo membership. Third, these three men consisted of one known and two probable KGB operatives. The fact that historically it was unusual for a KGB member to sit on the Politburo made this feat even more noteworthy. Finally, Andropov made history by being the first head of the secret police to reach the top. Not even Beria made it that far.

Gorbachev benefited from Andropov's rule, for he was positioned by Andropov to be his successor. Most likely, Gorbachev came to Moscow in 1978 at Suslov's call. Also, 1978 marked the beginning of Brezhnev's final slide. For almost two decades, Gorbachev passed intelligence information to Andropov who in turn gave it to Suslov. The fact that Gorbachev was a lawyer did not affect his appointment as head of Soviet agriculture. The widening agricultural breakdown, evidenced by mounting crop failures from 1978 on, did not hurt Gorbachev's position in the least. This fact alone is evidence that he had powerful support at the top—and this does not mean the support of a dying Brezh-

nev. Furthermore, if Gorbachev had even rudimentary knowledge of covert intelligence operations, he would have kept personal copies of the information he was forwarding to Moscow. Had he done so, he would have had considerable leverage over those on the Politburo who did not look favorably upon him.

The single most distinguishing factor of Chernenko's rule was his inability to promote any of his proteges to the CC. This failure clearly highlighted the temporary nature of his rule. Contemporary humor on the streets of Moscow held that Chernenko was nothing more than a conduit between Brezhnev and Andropov.

A man is often judged by his associates. Since he assumed the position of general secretary, Gorbachev has elevated two known and two probable KGB operatives to the Politburo. Eduard Shevardnadze, MVD chief and later party chief of the Georgian S.S.R., and Viktor Chebrikov, the KGB chairman, are the known KGB men. Yegor Ligachev and Nikolai Ryzhkov are the two probables. Ligachev was the party chief of Tomsk in Western Siberia. This was the site of some of the harshest attempts to induce forced laborers to open the land to cultivation for the Virgin Lands scheme of Khrushchev. More importantly, he was in charge of the construction of Siberia's largest petrochemical complex in Tomsk. This critical military installation was probably controlled by the KGB since the bulk of the laborers were inmates of the Soviet slave labor camps. These camps were commonly referred to as the GULAG Archipelago after the publication of Alexsandr Solzhenitsyn's monumental expose of the same title. Ligachev's reputation as a strict disciplinarian gives additional credibility to this claim. Finally, Ligachev was elevated to the Politburo, as well as CC secretary in charge of all personnel appointments. It is highly unlikely that this important post would be given to anyone other than a KGB-type.

Ryzhkov is even more intriguing, especially since his elevation to the post of prime minister. He replaced Brezhnev's ally Nikolai Tikhonov who was sent into retirement by Gorbachev. In his post as head of the government and chairman of the council of ministers, Ryzhkov is responsible for the Soviet economy. This is an interesting assignment considering he is an engineer with no formal background in economics.[14] There is little in his biography to substantiate his selection to the post. In fact, the Soviets have purposely withheld much of his biography, to include his birthdate and place. He spent considerable time in the Siberian city of Sverdlovsk which is a key city for nuclear weapon and military vehicle production. Sverdlovsk-39 is a KGB-run, top-secret, atomic research center.[15] Ryzhkov's association with the huge, Uralmash military vehicle factory and his appointment in 1975 to the post of first deputy minister of heavy industry, strongly point to his involvement in military/KGB affairs. This position is responsible for the production of Soviet military equipment. Apparently, Ryzhkov won his job because the KGB needed someone who understood the economic requirements of state security and military forces. A look at Ryzhkov's two closest subordinates provides additional evidence.

Vsevolod Murakhovsky is Ryzhkov's first deputy. Born and raised in Stavropol, he is a Komsomol and KGB associate of Gorbachev.[16] More importantly, Nikolai Talyzin, a communications specialist and former minister of communications, is the new head of the Soviet Central Planning Agency. In this capacity, he was involved in the invasion of Afghanistan; he was in Kabul when the Soviets invaded. Talyzin directed the blackout of all Afghan communications and their replacement with Soviet communications. This man is a critical link in KGB control of the Soviet population.

Gorbachev has numerous friends in the KGB whom he has elevated to the Politburo. His rise to the position of general secretary of the Communist Party represents the demise of the Communist Party and the takeover of the movement by the KGB.[17] *The KGB now runs the USSR.*

Implications of KGB Leadership of the USSR

This is a critical period for the Soviet Union because they are beset by massive economic failures and challenged abroad by a dramatic change in the world balance of power. The Soviet economy is a black hole. The country is imploding upon itself. Their choice is to assume an increasingly capitalistic approach or return to Stalinism. China has evidently chosen the path toward capitalism, although the jury is still out. The Soviet leadership has opted for a return to Stalinism.

The Soviets tend to decrease population to meet food supply, while the United States and other democracies tend to increase food production to meet population demand. Stalinism permitted the superindustrialization of the Soviet economy by seizing agricultural surplus and converting it into capital. Unfortunately, the cost was measured by the loss of tens of millions of lives. Wind, water and chemical erosion of soil cultivated under the Virgin Lands Program guarantee that the USSR will face increasingly severe crop shortfalls for the remainder of this century.

The collapse of the Soviet economy precludes the continuing purchase of foreign grain without creating massive debt. At the same time, extensive reliance upon foreign suppliers will undermine the legitimacy of the regime and potentially hold it hostage to foreign demands. It is unlikely the KGB will run these risks.

The present leadership is laying the groundwork for a serious retrenchment in the standard of living. It has initiated a drive to increase productivity by cracking down on absenteeism and alcoholism. This drive for discipline is widely misinterpreted in the West as the start of economic liberalization.

The duo of Ryzhkov and Talyzin fail to bring to their positions, as masters of the Soviet economy, even the faintest suggestion of any expertise in economics. Rather, their appointments tend to confirm the suspicion that the KGB is attempting to control the economy as it enters a critical decline. This will ensure that KGB and military programs continue unhindered by funding constraints.

The rise of China is the most pressing external development facing the Soviets. They are girding to meet the challenge of the Chinese demand that they abide by the Treaty of Nerchinsk signed in 1689. This agreement gave China all of Eastern Siberia, though the Russians subsequently violated it by crossing the Lena River and settling to the Pacific.

The gap between American military capabilities and Soviet capabilities is increasing despite numerical differences. The Soviets risk having obsolete military forces by the end of the century, if not the decade. Their massive investment in military hardware during the 1970s might soon be inconsequential as the Reagan military buildup continues. In the face of an increasingly pessimistic outlook, the Soviets may be

pushed into a "use it or lose it" position with their military machine.

There is a naive belief in the United States that Soviet economic troubles require the Soviets to turn inward and repair their economy. The widely held view is that the Soviets cannot afford a war. This is compounded by the equally myopic view that the United States is ripe for peace. The opinion is that budgetary problems, Reagan's desire to establish his place in history as a peacemaker, and defense spending have put the United States in its best position to bargain.

There is absolutely no evidence that the Gorbachev Politburo will move the economy toward capitalism. All available evidence indicates that promoting labor discipline is the beginning of a major purge of Soviet society and the Communist Party by the KGB.

The position of leading USSR apologists is best carried in the magazine ***Foreign Affairs***, published by the Council on Foreign Relations. This journal contends that Gorbachev and his cronies are actually proteges of Kirilenko, Kulakov's patron, and are therefore from an element of the Communist Party which fervently desires economic reform. Kirilenko, however, was removed from the Politburo by Andropov within days after Brezhnev's death. Kirilenko's followers were quickly purged.

The majority opinion in the West is that the summit conferences will help move the United States and the USSR toward peace and permit the United States to ease up on defense spending. It is quite probable, however, that the summits were arranged to allow the KGB to demonstrate to its internal audience that the United States is intransigent on questions of arms control and disarmament.

The only conclusion which can be drawn from the KGB takeover of the Politburo and Soviet society is that a massive internal purge is in the making. Its terror will most likely be deflected from public awareness by a simultaneous foreign military involvement which may alleviate some of the economic pressures facing the regime as well. ★



GORBACHEV AND HIS TEACHERS

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Solidarność
Who is Running Poland?

by Maj. Ralph L. Longmire

Since the declaration of martial law in 1981, the military faction within the Polish Communist Party (PCP), led by Gen. Jaruzelski, has held the reins of power in Poland. Military officers currently hold key positions within the PCP and the government at all levels. Although a major shake up within the Polish government occurred in early November 1985, the military faction continues to be "in charge" and is likely to be, for the foreseeable future, the only institution able to guarantee the Poles and the Soviets any degree of stability.

Between August 1980 and December 1981, the emergence and liberal expansion of the Solidarity Trade Union movement riveted world attention on Poland.[1] However, with the martial law crackdown and subsequent "normalization" throughout Poland over the past three years, political control has been the subject of intense debate in open source media reporting, as well as in scholarly journals. Virtually all sources agree, however, that the Polish military has been vaulted to a position of unprecedented importance for a communist Eastern Bloc nation. Indeed, the Polish United Workers' Party (PCP) has gone through a major internal "house cleaning" operation that has generated much speculation concerning control.

The Polish people possess a remarkably strong military tradition and the military has long played a major role in Polish national life. Furthermore, during periods of domestic unrest, the government has utilized the military to quell disturbances and restore order; the most recent examples are the 1970 and 1981 crises. However, it was not until the Solidarity upheavals of 1980-1981 that the military assumed an overt political role. In February 1981, the government, crippled by factional disputes, economic chaos and the growing demands of the Solidarity labor movement elevated Jaruzelski, the minister of defense and a professional soldier, to the position of prime minister.[2] Jaruzelski's appointment represented two firsts in the 40-year history of the Communist Bloc regimes. It was the first time a professional military officer assumed the top governmental position in a Communist country and the first time a prime minister retained the defense portfolio. Eight months later, Jaruzelski was named PCP secretary, thus holding the four offices of prime minister, first secretary of the PCP, chairman of the Council of Ministers and minister of defense[3] (figure 1).

The current role of the military in government is largely a by-product of its role during the period of martial law from December 1981 through July 1983. On December 13, 1981, facing continued demands by Solidarity, a fractured PCP and a harsh winter further straining an exhausted economy, Jaruzelski declared martial law throughout Poland. A Military Council of National Salvation (WRON), composed of 21 military officers and chaired by Jaruzelski, was set up to govern the country (figure 2). The military assumed control of the media and key industries. They imposed censorship, closed borders and banned all union activities. Military officers were placed in charge of operational groups that supervised local government in more than 2,000 cities. The military had, in effect, stepped in to restore order with the apparent blessing of the PCP Politburo. The military had replaced the PCP as the supreme political authority. As Mikhail Suslov, the leading Soviet ideologist reportedly told Josef Czyrek, the Polish foreign minister, "It is not viable for the bayonet to be leading the party."[4]

Over the next year, the PCP was purged under the watchful eyes of Jaruzelski and the military resulting in a gradual restoration of order throughout Poland. Exact figures on the extent of the purges vary, but open press reports indicate mass purges within the PCP. For example, in March 1982 alone, the PCP expelled 44,500 members. In mid-June 1985, PCP membership including candidates stood at 2,112,000, thus marking the fifth consecutive annual decline from the 3,150,000 members and candidates registered in June 1980.

In December 1982, laws were introduced which permanently legitimized many of the martial law emergency measures. Martial law was formally lifted after 19 months in July 1983. Today, the military remains deeply involved in the government of Poland. Despite the fact that Jaruzelski had



NOTE: The First Secretary actually oversees Secretariat of the Central Committee

Polish Communist Party Organization

Figure 1

stated that the armed forces would be withdrawing to the "second line of political life after martial law," the retreat has been far from total. Generals currently hold the sensitive cabinet posts of minister of defense, minister of administration and local economy, minister of internal affairs, and minister of mining and energy[5] (figure 3). A general has also been installed as chairman of the Supreme Chamber of Control, the parliamentary body responsible for overseeing government operations. Another general is director of the prime minister's office, and an air force general is director of the Polish Air Lines.

Within the PCP itself, three of the 20 Politburo members are generals, and the important post of personnel director of the Central Committee (CC) is held by a general officer. The PCP's International Department and its political school are also headed by generals. At the lower echelons of government, senior officers continue to serve as governors in one-fifth of Poland's regional districts; these include the main industrial centers of Warsaw, Gdansk and until recently, Katowice. Gen. Roman Paszkowski was replaced as governor of Katowice in May 1985 by Tadeusz Wnuk who had served as Paszkowski's vice governor since 1979. Additionally, military teams frequently conduct surprise inspections of local and regional government offices and industries to ensure compliance with directives.[6]

At the highest level of government, a National Defense Council (KOK) has replaced the Military Council of National Salvation (WRON) (figure 4). KOK has ultimate control of the military and internal security forces and can willfully declare martial law and extend military control over economic and social organizations. Jaruzelski heads the KOK and was also named commander of the armed forces in the event of war. He recently gave up the defense portfolio to his colleague, Gen Siwicki, but as of late 1984, he had assumed direct supervision of the PCP apparatus responsible for the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the powerful internal security services.

Provincial Defense Committees (WKOs), acting as local counterparts of the omnipotent KOK, have been established in all provinces with substantial military representation.[7] Polish press coverage of WKO meetings, held since the formal lifting of martial law, tends to confirm the current balance of political power between the PCP and the military. These reports corroborate official interpretations publicized in November 1983, when legislation was passed redefining and upgrading the powers of the KOK and the WKOs. They were given responsibility for making decisions concerning political and public policy issues that were formerly made by the PCP apparatus. The broadening of the WKO mandate is thus a natural corollary to the enhanced status of the KOK; it underscores the supremacy of the military over the PCP.

Meetings of the KOK, in contrast to cabinet or Politburo meetings, are vir-

tually never reported in the press. Conversely, meetings of the WKOs are routinely reported, and national political and military leaders often attend WKO sessions to include KOK representatives. Notwithstanding the sketchy information on the identities of KOK and WKO members, press reports on the agendas of WKO meetings confirm the broad scope of their jurisdiction over matters of general public policy. It covers everything from proper maintenance of public utilities and industrial manpower planning to civil defense and drug abuse. The WKOs are not merely policy review boards or oversight bodies; they make policy decisions and have the authority to ensure their decisions are carried out.[8] Also, provincial governors are nearly always identified as WKO chairmen, while the deputy chairman is at times identified as chief of the provincial military headquarters staff.[9] Provincial PCP first secretaries are only mentioned as having merely participated or been in attendance.

NAME	Year of Birth	War-time Service	Train-ing	BRANCH	RANK	Pre-Martial Law Post
Wojciech Jaruzelski	1923	PSU PAP	SMS PMS	A	Army General	Head PUWP, Premier, Minister of Defense
Florian Siwicki	1925	RA PSU PAP	SMS	A	Lt. General	Deputy Minister of Defense, Chief General Staff
Tadeusz Tuczapaki	1922	NA	SMS PMS	A	Lt. General	Deputy Minister of of Defense
Eugeniusz Molczyk	1925	PSU PAP	SMS	A	Lt. General	Deputy Minister of Defense, Chief Inspector, Training
Lugwig Janczyszyn	1923	PSU PAP	SMS PMS	N	Admiral	Commander of Navy
Czeslaw Kiszczak	1925	NA	PMS	A	Major General	Military Intelligence
Tadeusz Hupalowski	1922	PSU	PMS	A	Major General	First Deputy o' General Staff
Czeslaw Piotrowski	1926	UND	PMS	A	Major General	Chief of Military Research and Deputy Inspector of Technology
Jozef Baryla	1924	PSU	PMS	A	Major General	Chief of Mail Political Board
Wlodzimierz Oliwa	NA	PSU	PMS	A	Major General	Commander, Warsaw Military District

Figure 2

Military Council of

The military faction of the PCP is an integral part of the overall civilian PCP apparatus and is governed by party statutes. "Naturally, this means that party members serving in the army can play a full part in the life of the civilian party."[10] At the same time, the military enjoys a certain degree of autonomy. It has its own political apparatus of full-time functionaries who are responsible for carrying out party political work in the military. This organization, known as either the Chief Political Directorate or the Main Political Administration (MPA), is organized as shown in figure 5. Members of the MPA form their party committees at various command levels, from regimental up to and including the Ministry of Defense. These committees compare to area and factory party committees of the civilian PCP faction.

The MPA is subordinate to the Ministry of Defense but is guided by directives of the PCP CC. "The MPA, in fact, functions as a *sui generis* general staff of the political army and now probably ranks higher than the general staff, as a result of the army's newest political role."[11] The MPA has under it numerous directorates for each of the services and military districts, as well as political departments for each division or equivalent, political sections for each regiment or equivalent, and subsections for each battalion. "It controls all the political activities of army personnel in, as well as outside, the army."[12] Party organizations in the military have the power to examine all aspects of life in military units in order to prevent shortcomings.

The enhancement of the military's political role also entailed a considerable influx of armed forces personnel into positions that would probably otherwise be occupied by civilians, especially at the highest levels of government. The progressive military penetration of lower party bodies is perhaps politically more significant. However, the majority of these officers have been nominated from MPA-controlled organizations or military and technical academies. Therefore, "Within the party organization has emerged a new, cohesive group defined through common experience, easy identification and strong esprit de corps."[13]

Whether ascendancy of the military faction within the PCP will herald a permanent change in Polish government is still uncertain. In part, this uncertainty reflects a continuing lack

NAME	Year of Birth	War-time Service	Train-ing	BRANCH	RANK	Pre-Martial Law Post
Henryk Rapacewicz	NA	NA	NA	A	Major General	Commander, Warsaw Garrison
Jozef Uzycki	NA	NA	NA	A	Major General	Commander, Pomeranian Military District
Tadeusz Krepski	NA	NA	NA	AF	Major General	Commander, Air Force
Longin Lozowicki	NA	NA	NA	AF	Major General	Commander of National Air Defense
Michal Janiszewski	1926	NA	PMS	A	General	Chief of Secretariat of Minister of Defense
Jerzy Jarosz	NA	NA	NA	A	General	Commander, First Mechanical Division - Warsaw
Tadeusz Garbacik	NA	NA	NA	NA	Colonel	NA
Roman Les	NA	NA	NA	NA	Reserve Colonel	NA
Jerzy Klosinski	NA	NA	NA	NA	Lt. Colonel	NA
Miroslaw Hiermaszewski	NA	NA	NA	AF	Lt. Colonel	NA
Tadeusz Makarewicz	NA	NA	NA	NA	Colonel	NA

PAP: Postwar Anti-Partisan
PMS: Polish Military Schools
PSU: Polish Forces, Soviet Union
NA: Not available
RA: Red Army
SMS: Soviet Military Schools
UND: WW II Underground

National Salvation (WRON)

of information about the way decisions are made within the leadership. Specific power relationships among the KOK, the MPA, the WKOs and the PCP Politburo and Secretariat are also unclear.

Although these relationships continue to evolve as Jaruzelski consolidates power, certain PCP leaders have most likely retained considerable influence in the decision-making process and, more importantly, over certain military functionaries and organizations—to include the MPA. Although the MPA is considerably more prevalent in the government than in the past, to characterize this as conflict between the military and the PCP or to imply that the rule of the Party has been negated in an absolute institutional sense is an overstatement. The current situation in Poland more likely reflects the dominance of the military faction within and over the remainder of the PCP. When considered in this light, the greater role of the MPA becomes clear: It is another tool by which the current PCP military leadership exercises yet one more level of control, over so many redundant ones, on the Soviet pattern.

Equally important in the equation of power are the attitudes of the current military leaders toward the PCP's role and functions. Commenting on the role of the military in quelling workers' protests in December 1970 demonstrations, Jaruzelski, then a deputy Politburo member and minister of defense, told the workers that the decision to use the troops was made by the political leadership. He explained why it was faithfully carried out: "Do you want an army . . . that would take over power for itself, that would change the authorities in a manner similar to that of Latin America or Africa? Or an army that would refuse to follow this or that decision taken by the country's legally elected leadership and would abolish that leadership? No! Our Polish soldier will always defend people's power, whatever it may be, and will always defend the party."[14] There is certainly little reason to assume that Jaruzelski thinks differently today—especially since he now heads the PCP. Gen. Jozef Baryla, current chief of the MPA, recently wrote quoting Jaruzelski: "The party in the entire armed forces has always been equal to its tasks. History has clearly confirmed this. Today confirms it also. We are also convinced that tomorrow will confirm it as well."[15]

The pervasive role of the Polish military in the government is a precedent in the Soviet bloc. However, the military has not replaced the PCP. Rather, the military faction within the PCP has vaulted to a position of preeminence. Polish officers have a vested interest in preserving their special privileges and status in the government and society, since 85 percent are PCP members. Control of military PCP members remains vested with the MPA of the Ministry of Defense which is comprised of its own corps of approximately 1,000 specially trained officers. Officers from the MPA are primarily occupying key government positions; the party apparatus remains intact.[16]

Although Jaruzelski recently gave up his position as Polish prime minister, he retained his position as secretary of the PCP and, in reality, relinquished no real power. Furthermore, he assumed the title of chairman of the Council of State thus making him titular head of state. As aptly stated by ***The New York Times***, "Jaruzelski stepped down today as head of government,



— — — Selects candidates for Sejm.

[1] Polish United Workers' Party
[2] United Peasant Party
[3] Democratic Party

Figure 3 **Polish Civilian Government Structure**

stepped up as head of state, and stood where he was as head of the Communist Party."[17] The new prime minister, 56-year-old Zbignew Messner, is an economist by trade whose chief responsibility will undoubtedly be to continue to shore up the Polish economy. However, in conjunction with Messner's appointment as prime minister, sweeping changes have taken place within the civilian government in what has been termed "Jaruzelski's Night of the Long Knives."[18] Jaruzelski either removed or reshuffled five vice premiers and 13 cabinet members in the most extensive shake up since he took power. A total of nine cabinet members were removed, and four ministers' posts were established through consolidation: minister of construction, town and country planning and municipal economy, minister of agriculture, forestry and food economy, minister for environmental protection and natural deposits, and minister of materials and fuel management.

In creating the aforementioned positions, Messner appointed three new deputy premiers and nine new ministers. Although the long term significance of this reorganization is yet too early to judge, the immediate outcome of the shake up appears to have strengthened both Jaruzelski's own authority and that of the PCP moderates, as well as the PCP military faction. It is key to this analysis to point out that all three army generals from the Jaruzelski cabinet (plus Siwicki as defense minister) were retained.[19] The most important change was the removal of Stefan Olszowski, a known political hard-liner, from his position as foreign minister and member of the Politburo and his replacement by Marian Orzechowski, 54, a former PCP CC secretary, university rector and alternate member of the Politburo since 1983. Additionally, Deputy Premier Mieczyslaw Rakowski was demoted and replaced by Marian

(Continued on page 58)



Figure 4

Polish Defense Organization



Figure 5

Polish Military Political Organization

Soviet Psychotronics — a state of mind

by Capt. Richard Groller

Today, science fiction concepts are becoming reality on a regular basis. The rising curve of technical innovation has increased world anxiety about improvements in the means for waging war. It is not surprising that in many scientific circles, the investigation of psychotronics or parapsychological (PSI) phenomena and its potential military applications is presently occurring.

For many years, the general premise in this country regarding PSI phenomena has been, "First, prove to me that it exists, then I'll believe it." Counter to this has been the basic Soviet premise regarding PSI phenomena which is, "We believe that something exists that has no normal, rational explanation—let us investigate it." Given this information, most evidence places U.S. research into psychotronics between 25 and 50 years behind Soviet research. According to Ostrander and Schroeder, Soviet psychotronics programs are run primarily by the Soviet military and the KGB for eventual use in military or quasi-military operations. [1] Consequently, serious consideration should be given to the study of these areas, especially in the realm where they would have the most immediate applications—C³I.

Noted author Donald A. Wollheim echoes the sentiments of those in the United States who are involved with parapsychological research today: "It is less than 500 years since an entire half of the world was discovered. It is less than 200 years since the discovery of the last continent. The sciences of chemistry and physics go back scarcely one century. The science of aviation goes back 40 years. The science of atomics is being born. And yet we know a lot. *We know little or nothing.* Some of the most startling things are unknown to us. When they are discovered, they may shock us to the bone."[2]

Dr. Robert G. Jahn, dean of Princeton's School of Engi-

neering, expresses his feelings on the subject: "Certainly no field of scholarly endeavor has proven more frustrating, abused and misunderstood than the study of psychic phenomena. Dealing as much with impressionistic and aesthetic evidence as with analytical substance, and carrying subjective and numenistic overtones, it has been incessantly prostituted by charlatans, lunatics and sensationalists, categorically rejected by most of the scientific establishment, and widely misunderstood by the public at large. Interspersed with this, and greatly encumbered by it, a pattern of legitimate effort to comprehend and utilize the purported phenomena has evolved to a point where some dispassionate assessment of its accomplishments can be attempted."[3]

The attitudes of key members of the scientific community and the press have effectively curtailed serious research in this sector. In fact, the slogan coined by Jack Anderson, "Millions for defense, but no cents for nonsense," helped to eradicate the one military program that was under study.[4]

During the last 20 years, the U.S. government has sponsored a few projects in the realm of the paranormal, to include the Air Force Cambridge Research Labs ESP experiments, the Navy's controversial Nautilus experiments, and NASA's ESP experiments in space with astronaut Edgar Mitchell. This latter experiment occurred in February 1971, during the Apollo 14 flight to the moon. Mitchell made 150 separate attempts to project his thoughts from inside the space capsule back to an individual on earth. The results of the Apollo 14 experiments have been well-documented and are published in the ***Journal of Parapsychology***.[5] Further documentation of Mitchell's experiments can be found in the Univ. of Calif. newsletter.[6] To quote Mitchell: "Extrasensory perception is not a matter of belief. There is a great deal of serious scientific work being done in it, and it has been established over the last 30 years that it is a matter of probability, and the probabilities have been established beyond chance. I think it is an important work. This happened to be an opportunity (Apollo 14 lunar mission) to do another little step—a piece in the scientific puzzle of what man's all about."

The results of U.S. federally-funded efforts have, so far, been spotty at best, with little funding and almost constant criticism. A 1978 study polled 200 prominent U.S. parapsychologists: Over 82 percent agreed that the U.S. government should become involved in paranormal research.[7] Current free-world private research into PSI phenomena is being conducted at several American and Western European universities and numerous private foundations[8] with an estimated total budget of approximately $2,000,000. Of late, the most successful efforts have been accomplished by the British in the area of PK (Psycho-Kinesis)[9] by Jahn concerning PK and ESP, and by doctors Hal Puthoff and Russell Targ of Stanford Research Institute (SRI) in the area of perceptual communications channels.[10]

The latter two investigations used rigid protocols and engineering techniques (all three men are electrical engineers with strong backgrounds in physics) in an attempt to prove that the phenomena tested was legitimate, demonstrable and repeatable. The Puthoff and Targ experiments dealt primarily with a phenomenon known as remote-viewing, a human information-accessing capability possessed by certain individuals who can "access and describe, by means of mental processes, information sources blocked from ordinary perception and generally accepted as secure against such access. In particular, the phenomenon . . . investigated most extensively is the ability of a subject to view remote, geographic locations up to several thousand kilometers distant from his physical location."[11]

"Most evidence places U.S. research into psychotronics between 25 and 50 years behind Soviet research."

Jahn is in the process of conducting a series of PK and Random Event Generator (REG) experiments, which have been the most widely used and most productive facilities for experimentation with low-level PK.

Future tests are also being designed by Jahn to see whether PK effects atomic-scale, random systems involving "the information storage on a microelectronic chip, the spontaneous decay of phosphorescent surfaces, laminar to turbulent transition in a fluid stream, atomic and molecular resonators, and resonant acoustical or electrical cavities." For more specific information concerning the experiments, see ***Proceedings of the IEEE***, Vol. 70, No. 2, February 1982. Other American PK studies, especially those of Mr. Jack Houck,[12] provide the basis for the experiments done in the area of metal bending.

Soviet research into psychotronics is another matter entirely. Serious Soviet government-directed research into PSI phenomena began in 1961 when, under the direction of Dr. Leonid L. Vasiliev (corresponding member of the Soviet Academy of Medicine, chairman of physiology at the Univ. of Leningrad, and holder of the Lenin Prize),[13] the Parapsychology Laboratory at the prestigious university was opened. This was the first of 20 labs with an annual estimated budget in excess of $21,000,000. The research came about in response to the empassioned and uncompromising plea of Vasiliev to the Soviet hierarchy that, "The discovery of the energy underlying ESP will be equivalent to the discovery of atomic energy."[14]

With the death of Vasiliev in December 1965, the task of continuing research was assumed by Dr. I.M. Kogan, chairman of the Bio-information Section of the Popov Radio and Technical Institute in Moscow. "Kogan's systematic parapsychology research could be of potential value to the overall Soviet cybernetic research and development program. Efforts being made to optimize sensory inputs in the interest of *controlling* the quality of *human motor activity* are well known, as is the ultimate Soviet goal of achieving a perfect cybernetic man. It is of interest that both conventional psychology and parapsychology programs are headquartered in Moscow. Although depicted in the personnel and institute section, the trend toward decentralization is probably no coincidence, and supports the view that the program should not be taken lightly."[15]

The Soviets and the United States use different terms for parapsychology. In recent years, the Czechs have begun using the term "psychotronics" which has become widely used by both East and West as a generic term for all aspects of PSI phenomena.

All of the Soviet and Czech research

is significant, particularly the work done with the Soviet psychics Kulagina, Vinogradova and Ermolayev. "Scientists report that Kulagina has been able to stop the beating of a frog's heart in solution and re-activate it! This is perhaps the most significant PK test done and its military implications in controlled offensive behavior, if true, are extremely important."[16]

The search for the unknown energy source behind PSI phenomena led the Soviets to the development of Kirilian photography. Named after its inventors, Semyon and Valentina Kirilian, it is a technique of photographing with a high-frequency electrical field involving a specially constructed high frequency spark generator, tuned up and down between 75,000 and 200,000 electrical oscillations per second. When this technique is applied to animate matter, one sees a bioluminescent effect, termed *bio-plasma* by the Soviets. Scientists at the Kazakh State Univ. at Alma-Ata have discovered that illnesses tend to appear in advance as a disordered play of flares from the bio-plasma long before they manifest in the physical body. The Soviets may be attempting to link Kirilian photography with computers, among other things, to instantly analyze the spectra of colors appearing in the vari-colored flares from the living body. Notably, some U.S. research has been done in this field as well. The most significant use of Kirilian photography, however, will probably be in the area of PK, where hopefully it will uncover the mechanism of transmission.

In the area of telepathic research, the Soviets have a myriad of programs and theories. Originally, Vasiliev intended to conduct research and develop machines capable of monitoring, testing and studying telepathic communication. Different tacts have been taken to investigate the underlying theory behind telepathic transmission. One theory contends that telepathic impulses are radiated along the lines of information bits in a cybernetic system. Another hypothesis is based on the idea of time as energy, with speculation that telepathic transmissions may be propagated through a supposed time-energy system, rather than through the electromagnetic field.

The Soviets are reportedly training their cosmonauts in telepathy to back-up their electronic equipment while in outer space. One of these back-up schemes is known to involve coded telepathic messages flashed from Moscow to Leningrad. Further, cosmonauts are being taught to "distort time and to offset boredom in space" through mental conditioning.[17]

Dr. Genady Sergeyev of the A.A. Uktomskii Military Institute in Leningrad, a prominent mathematician for the Soviet military, works closely with Dr. L. Pavlova, an electrophysicist from the Univ. of Leningrad. Together they have devised important mathematical and statistical methods for analyzing the EEG which allowed parapsychologists to follow and depict the actions of telepathy in the brain.

According to observations made by Dr. Montague Ullman during a trip to the Soviet-bloc countries in the fall of 1970, Soviet bio-communications investigations are effectively combining the use of modern, sophisticated technology with basic pragmatic approaches. This was evident, he states, in their approach to long-distance, telepathy experiments where the results were analyzed in physiological (EEG data) and psychological task performance (transmission of data in Morse Code). Ullman further observed that the Soviet researchers attempted to confirm the existence of a new form of energy referred to as bio-plasma. They maintain it is characteristic of life processes and represents matter in the form of an integrated system of elementary charged particles. Such energy, through interaction with other systems, is thought to provide the basis for bio-communications.[18]



Another area of intense interest to the Soviet Union is the area of remote viewing. "The intelligence-gathering capability available through remote viewing or OOBE (out of body experience) travel is obvious. Henry Gris and William Dick report that test subjects, targeted against strategic sites in both the USSR and the People's Republic of China, were able to retrieve desired data via out-of-body travel. Furthermore, they claim the results were verified by independent agents. The strategic and tactical applications are unlimited. When finally developed, this capability could ultimately allow an operator to enter an enemy headquarters at will to observe plans and dispositions. On the battlefield, one could reconnoiter an area from the physical safety of his own chosen location."[19]

An indicator of the sensitivity and secrecy with which the Soviet Union handles parapsychology research was the arrest, in 1977, of American correspondent Robert Toth on charges that he had received secret parapsychological data from a Soviet scientist.

In a widely publicized article which appeared in ***The Washington Post***, John Wilhelm related how the CIA, the Pentagon and the Russians are probing the military potential of parapsychology. In this article, Ron Robertson, a security officer at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in Calif. stated that, using psychokinetic energy, it would take only the movement of one-eighth of an ounce, a quarter of an inch at a distance of one foot to trigger or disable a nuclear warhead.[20] If this is true, we are in serious trouble.

This commentary documents a clear case for research in the Soviet Union in parapsychology. It is significant because of the energy and resources being allocated and because of its military implications, especially in mind manipulation and controlled, offensive behavior. The sinister aspects of paranormal research appear to be surfacing in the Soviet Union.

DIA estimates of the strategic threat posed by Soviet PSI research are summarized by the conjecture that, in time, the Soviets may be able to learn the contents of top secret, U.S. documents, trace the movements of our troops and ships, and know the location and nature of our military installations. Additionally, the Soviets may be able to mold

the thoughts of key U.S. military and civilian leaders from a distance, cause the instant death of any U.S. official at a distance, and disable, at a distance, U.S. military equipment of all types including spacecraft.[21]

Indeed. some of these things may have been used against us already. According to a research report by Robert C. Beck, director of the Bio-Medical Research Associates of Los Angeles, the Soviets have been utilizing extreme low frequency radio waves modulated at pulse repetition rates of five to 15 Hz at powers up to 40 megawatts. Originally perceived as over-the-horizon radar, these frequencies have caused psycho-physiological reactions among many people. Beck goes on to state: "These frequencies fall precisely within the psychoactive range of neuronal synchronization or brainwave entrainment, where subjects experience states from increased anxiety to extreme disorientation and even unconsciousness. Reports of disorientation associated with these signals have been reported from Eugene, Ore., where residents have complained about odd atmospheric sensations causing headaches, dry throats, depression, high anxiety, irritability and loss of sleep. Apparently, these signals have originated from deep within the Soviet Union. Their true purpose has yet to be confirmed."[22]

The consequences of validating these concepts to the scientific/military community can have far reaching effects. In fact, they produce more questions than answers. "Is PSI ability a by-product of surrounding electromagnetic radiations, solar radiation, or is it induced by terrestrial magnetism? Can it be enhanced through hypnosis or drugs? Is there a means of testing for PSI ability? Or for developing it? Can it be jammed? Is the effect simply explainable in terms of a variation of radio-communications theory? Can information bits or coded messages really be transmitted by sending combinations of basic sensory images? Is foreknowledge and remote sensing possible? Is it group enhanceable?"[23]

In a post-nuclear exchange environment, with presumably the loss of satellite communications and its inherent high data rates, we probably would be reduced in many cases to reliance on manual morse and other low-data transmission modes. Therefore, the use of unjammable communications, albeit slow, would be extremely fortuitous. Such a system would also potentially offer its user the ability of remote sensing, psychic influencing of prime targets, and vast neutralization of enemy forces via deception, with the firm belief that their countermeasures would be effective.

"The Soviets are reportedly training their cosmonauts in telepathy to backup their electronic equipment while in outer space."

The impact that psychotronic weapons and other paranormal applications will make in the future is difficult to determine at the present time. It has been suggested that whoever makes the first breakthrough in this field will have a quantum-leap advantage over his opponent, similar to sole possession of nuclear weapons. Advances in this field will clearly add new dimensions to the battlefield. The Soviets and other Warsaw Pact nations have been working in this area of research for years, and their dedication to military application of these principles is more than amply demonstrated. When looking at the plight of Washington decision-makers with respect to psychotronics, it is sobering to remember the Manhattan project, "undertaken in fear of parallel Nazi efforts, was based on an unproven hypothesis in a highly theoretical branch of science. Nevertheless, two days before Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt committed vast and scarce resources to support the work of scientists who had no firm data in hand, to seek the exotic goal of loosing the electrical bonds of matter. As a result, what was literally science fiction until 1944 became brutal truth in 1945."[24]

"The United States developed the atomic bomb in World War II in approximately four and a half years; thus, the Soviet Psychotronic program is equivalent to roughly seven Manhattan projects. With this comparison, we can appreciate the fantastic capabilities that must have emerged from the sustained Soviet program."[25] To quote a top U.S. expert on Soviet affairs, "If the United States does not make a serious effort to move forward on this new frontier, in another 10 years it may be too late." ★

Footnotes

1. Sheila Ostrander and Lynn Schroeder, **Psychic Discoveries Behind the Iron Curtain**, Copyright 1970, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., pp. 253-55.
2. Donald A. Wollheim, ***Omni***, Letter for subscription service, 1984.
3. Dr. Robert G. Jahn, "The Persistent Paradox of Psychic Phenomena: An Engineering Perspective," ***Proceedings of the IEEE***, Volume 70, No. 2, February 1982, p. 137.
4. "Paranormal Pentagon," ***Discover***, Volume 2, No. 3, March 1981.
5. "An ESP Test from Apollo 14," ***Journal of Parapsychology***, Volume 35, No. 2, June 1971.
6. The University Explorer, "ESP—The Extrasensory Puzzle," ***Newsletter of the University of California***, (U.E. 2156), 23 May 1971.
7. James D. Bray, "Questionnaire Results on the Prospects for Soviet Development of Parapsychology for Military or Political Purposes," Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif., December 1978, p. 61.
8. U.S. Universities/Colleges: Chicago; Colorado; Columbia; CUNY; Delaware; Denver; Drexel; Duke; Finch; Harvard; Illinois; John F. Kennedy; Kent State; Michigan; Missouri; Mundelein; New Jersey Institute of Technology; New School for Social Research; NYU; North Carolina; Oakland; Pittsburgh; Princeton; St. John's; St. Joseph's South West Minnesota; Syracuse; UC/Berkeley; UC/Davis; UC/Irvine; UCLA; UC/Santa Barbara; Virginia; Wesleyan; West Florida; West Georgia; Wisconsin; Yale. Foreign: Amsterdam; Andhra; Argentina; Benares; Bonn; Cambridge; Chile; Copenhagen; Edinburgh; Freiburg; Ghana; Halifax; Iceland; Jung Institute; Leyden; London; Loyola; Lund; McGill; Munich; Mysore; New South Wales; Oxford; Paris; Peking; Rhodes; South Africa; Tasmania; Tel Aviv; Utkal; Utrecht; Waterloo; Zurich. Research Institutions: Amer. Soc. for Psychical Research, N.Y.; Ballistic Research Labs, Aberdeen, Md.; Foundation for Research on the Nature of Man, Durham, N.C.; Inst. for Noetic Sciences, San Francisco, Calif.; Menninger Foundation, Topeka, Kan.;

(Continued on page 58)

Army Intelligence Production and the Threat:

THE AIA TODAY

by Col. Michael M. Milam

Several studies led to a management consolidation of intelligence production at the Department of the Army level. In March 1984 the Army chief of staff directed the preparation of a Field Operating Agency (FOA) of OACSI to take command of the three intelligence production centers: Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (ITAC), Foreign Science and Technology Center (FSTC), and Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC), formerly Missile Intelligence Agency. The resultant FOA was designated as the U.S. Army Intelligence Agency (AIA).

Concurrent with the establishment of an FOA, the chief of staff directed that the ACSI establish a capability to orchestrate threat support to the combat development/materiel acquisition process. This tasking was instrumental to the establishment in 1984, and subsequent refinement in 1985, of the Threat Integration Staff Officer (TISO), as defined in AR 381-11, Threat Support to U.S. Army Force, Combat and Materiel Development. As designated DA threat integration coordinator on the ACSI's staff, the TISO is the OACSI counterpart to the Force Integration Staff Officer in ODCSOPS and the DA systems coordinator in ODCSRDA. The TISO is mission area oriented. He establishes and manages the DA threat coordination groups and coordinates DA and DIA approval of threat assessments developed by Army MACOMs and assisted by AIA. The TISO threat support is basically divided into the following mission areas: C^3 intelligence and electronic warfare, close combat and special operations, aviation, air defense, combined arms and fire support, combat support and combat service support. The union of AIA and the TISO, in a one-year period in 1985, has produced unique results in support of the Army Staff, the Army Materiel Command and TRADOC.

Within the larger intelligence production community, there are three major players: the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). DIA is supported by the Army, Air Force and Navy for

THREAT ANALYSIS CYCLE



Figure 1

delegated production. The Air Force Systems Command and its Foreign Technology Division is located at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio. The Naval Intelligence Command's Naval Intelligence Support Center is located in Suitland, Md.

The composite result of the Army chief of staff decision formalized the relationship between the TISO and the analysts in a threat analysis cycle (figure 1). Principal users identify their requirements to the analytic community for integration with friendly tactics, doctrine, systems and technologies. The analytic community either produces a threat to the given system or tasks the collection community, in order to satisfy an information gap. Once the threat analysis is produced, it is disseminated by a number of means to the users at national, operational or systems management level. Throughout the process, each level of command must attempt to satisfy subordinate intelligence needs. If they cannot, or for those needs where no information is available, they task AIA directly or through the TISO.

The definitive AIA mission is outlined in AR 10-86, Organization and Functions of the U.S. Intelligence Agency, the basic organizational charter. There are three missions further defined by three additional regulations. AIA produces and disseminates scientific and technical intelligence, all-source general intelligence and counterintelligence, to include counterterrorism analysis, per AR 381-19, Intelligence Support. The second of its missions is to provide threat support and projections, to include forecasting and trend analysis, to the Army at large. This responsibility is defined in AR 381-11. Finally, AIA is responsible for managing the Foreign Materiel Exploitation Program in accordance with AR 381-26, the governing regulation. Headquarters, AIA, is located in the national capital region. The agency is commanded by a brigadier general and a senior executive service deputy director. A small staff manages those aspects of DA staff coordination required of three subordinate centers and facilitates the interaction between customers and the three centers. The headquarters addresses problems involving the Army staff, DIA, CIA and NSA (figure 2).



Figure 2

MSIC is located in Huntsville, Ala. FSTC is in Charlottesville, Va., and

AIA ORGANIZATION



Figure 3

ITAC is located at the Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. There are a total of 1,518 people authorized in AIA (figure 3), complemented by 23 strategic Military Intelligence Detachments (MIDs) of the Army Reserve. Each of these detachments consists of approximately 10 intelligence personnel who perform analytical work, in conjunction with their coordinators in the centers. The MIDs concept is well entrenched in ITAC and FSTC. AIA is beginning to examine the feasibility of implementing it in MSIC.

AIA has demonstrated unique analytical capabilities. It has responded to quick reaction tasks from the Army leadership and other consumers in ways previous arrangements could not accommodate.

HQ, AIA is responsible for the centralized management of the funding of production initiatives through the General Defense Intelligence Program as administered by DIA. The automation initiatives, existing in all three centers, are now combined under one network. HQ, AIA, is responsible, through MSIC, for the establishment of a simulator and surrogate support program to enhance testing of new systems, specified by TRADOC, against Soviet threat systems.

In terms of personnel and analytic expertise, all three centers are different. The headquarters develops a single, Army intelligence production and dissemination program that focuses on priority defense needs, reduces unnecessary requirements and tasks, and improves the intelligence end product. The headquarters serves as the Army focal point for dissemination of intelligence from DOD and non-DOD agencies. It provides intelligence support required to assess the impact of international technology transfer. The headquarters also assesses the priority of production requirements, the level of required effort, the capabilities and activities of the centers, and brings together the analytic expertise of the three centers to guarantee consumer satisfaction. The headquarters staff recommends policy to the ACSI which deals with intelligence production and dissemination within the Army. It determines Army counterintelligence production and manages a system for the accomplishment of that production. And lastly, it coordinates the development and application of automated data processing and communications into the production and dissemination process.

The essential analytical capability of AIA is located in its three centers. The current locations should not change, based on the automation network initiative which will electronically colocate the three centers.

FSTC is responsible for improving user community knowledge of current, projected, and assigned foreign-ground-force systems and related sciences and technologies. This enables materiel combat and force developers to make informed choices and support national intelligence efforts. FSTC implements the Army Foreign Materiel Exploitation Program for the agency. From that exploitation, it provides data to the research, development and acquisition community, as well as the intelligence community, for the inclusion in intelligence data bases and for direct application by materiel developers. Lastly, it provides translations, analysis of technical sensor data, and automated data storage.

MSIC plans, organizes, coordinates and controls the production, maintenance and dissemination of all-source intelligence that pertains to the guided missile and space weapon systems, subsystems, components and activities. The principal functional areas for which MSIC is responsible include foreign antiballistic missiles, antisatellite technology, strategic air defense, tactical air defense, short-range ballistic missiles and antitank guided missiles. Also, within the last year MSIC has become involved, as a result of congressional interest, in space defense initiatives which could ultimately impact on the strategic defense initiatives being programmed by DOD.

Additionally, MSIC provides a unique form of threat support with the Army Development and Acquisition of Threat Simulators (ADATS). The ADATS supports TRADOC and system program managers in the operational test phases of new U.S. systems by providing a visual and technological replication of the battlefield threat.

ITAC produces forecasts and probability assessments of global, political and military developments which may threaten U.S. national interests and result in the employment of U.S. forces. It also produces assessments of current to 20-year capabilities and vulnerabilities of foreign military forces which either represent potential threats or allies to U.S. Army operations. It produces comprehensive studies on all facets of selected, non-allied, non-Warsaw Pact countries. ITAC additionally provides national and departmental level imagery exploitation support to the U.S. Army. ITAC is also the lead center in AIA for the production of the Army's keystone threat document known as the Soviet Battlefield Development Plan (SBDP). The SBDP is an intelligence product directed and validated by OACSI, coordinated by HQ, AIA, and executed and authored by the three centers. It is the threat counter-



Figure 4

part document to the TRADOC Battlefield Development Plan that projects the 20-year forecast of the Soviet threat. Under AR 381-11, threat starts with the SBDP. With recent international involvement in counterterrorism, ITAC has grown in its capability for counterterrorist analysis and trend forecasting. This is an effort to work with elements of DIA and ensure the safety of U.S. military personnel at home and abroad.

In 1985, AIA improved the resource management of the Army production elements addressed in the General Defense Intelligence Program. This included the three subordinate centers and the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center, a joint service production center at Fort Detrick, Md.

Specific intelligence threat analysis support has been provided to a score of agencies and projects. ODCSOPS and ODCSRDA were supported for the Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) assessment. An Army intelligence base-case-scenario variant for the Soviet Western Theater of Military Operations was published as a supplement to the SBDP for the force and materiel developers. The VCSA-directed study that evaluated Soviet smoke capabilities and other battlefield documents which affect the capability of U.S. Army systems on the battlefield was produced. Terrorist threat assessments were developed for the security of personnel and facilities. Stylized Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) and projected foreign force capabilities and vulnerabilities data were published for the Army Study and Army Modeling Improvement Programs (TASP/AMIP). Assistance in validating the array of foreign forces in AMIP hierarchy models was also provided. Finally, system-specific threat assessments were developed for Special Access Programs.

The singularly long-term impact program initiated in 1985, the Automation Master Plan, involved all three of the production centers. The AIA Master Automation Network will be a system-high computer network linking intelligence analysts' work stations at MSIC, FSTC, and ITAC with large, general purpose, data-base computers located at each center. These, in turn, will be linked with a large-scale scientific computer at MSIC and with each other. The system will provide for high-speed communication channels, workstations, additional disk storage for interactive graphics capability, software conversions of models, and simulations to machine independent code. It will also provide for message processing, artificial intelligence, DODIIS compatibility (compartmented mode), communication interface, a standard, data-base management system and a secret-level data base for consumers (figure 4).

Consumer capability and internetting will permit extraction of potentially valuable information from the mass of data being collected, permit correlation of data, and help identify key, analytically-significant indicators, as well as detailed trends and projections. With the increase in volume and complexity of data, new and innovative techniques and hardware must be exploited to reduce the time analysts must spend in performing basic data search and correlation functions. The payoff to the Army will be the ability of an analyst, anywhere in the entire net, to access the data base and use sophisticated techniques to answer questions and make projections. The Army's force and materiel developers, TRADOC and other consumers (e.g., Foreign Technology Division) will benefit from this organizational and informational synergy.

There were three objectives for 1986. The first was enhanced service to the customer. It included establishing an AIA briefing program and strengthening relationships with AMC, TRADOC, the newly formed Laboratory Command of AMC, the Strategic Defense Command in Huntsville, Ala., FORSCOM and its subordinate units. The second objective was upgraded mission capability. It included implementing automation initiatives begun in 1985, expanding the secure voice communications of the three centers, and improving the facilities of the centers (specifically at FSTC and MSIC). It addressed enhancing Reserve Component management and the use of the strategic Military Intelligence Detachments; it also directed modernization of a production process that is to be coherent, in the corporate sense, through the three production centers. Lastly, this goal focused on improving the 5-year planning procedures of AIA.

The last objective was to improve workforce productivity by recruiting, retaining and rewarding quality personnel and by expanding opportunities for personnel training, education and advancement.

Within the next two years, AIA will have the first level of connectivity of the three production centers through an automation communication network. Potential relocations include a new headquarters site and a new FSTC site. An expanded simulator facility at MSIC will almost be finished.

Organizationally, the agency is evolving across the spectrum of functions. Functional synergism is in fact being realized in a host of areas. Perhaps more importantly, the leadership of the Army, and the force and materiel developers that serve that leadership, are being better served by intelligence and threat analysis production. The agency produces, on a daily basis, more focused, associated intelligence threat documentation to serve Army needs.

In short, the concept envisioned by the earlier studies and ultimately approved by the chief of staff, Army, is a reality that is fulfilling the promise to better serve the Army with improved intelligence production without a greater drawdown in resources than the previous aggregate.★

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"A commander will find that, before the first move can be made against an enemy, he will have a lot of hard work gathering information. He should find out the lie of the country he is going to operate in, the nature, resources, numbers and arms of the enemy, the friendly tribes he may rely on to bar their country to the enemy, positions and strengths of the enemy towns and how approached and defended, what he may count on in the way of supplies, where the stores of food are kept, and so on."[1] —Lt. Col. W.C.G. Heneker, D.S.O., Bush Warfare, 1907.

COUNTERINSURGENCY INTELLIGENCE

by Capt. Raymond W. Levesque

Intelligence in low intensity conflict (LIC) has always played a key role in combat operations. This was as true in 1907 as it was in Vietnam where, according to Gens. Julian J. Ewell and Ira A. Hunt: "Our tactical operations were at all times oriented on the enemy. To maintain this orientation, all division tactical operations were undertaken with intelligence operating as the pivotal point. Intelligence was and remained the chief targeting device for employment of combat assets."[2] The value of intelligence was relearned during the war in El Salvador. The efficiency of government operations rose as more emphasis was placed on collection; the resulting intelligence was used to attack specific insurgent enclaves as opposed to employing general sweeps without focus.

Yet, while military chroniclers, historians and theorists emphasize the importance of intelligence, little is available on how intelligence collection and analysis has been organized or executed. The statement "acting on intelligence" is frequently given as the reason for the operation, but there is no amplification as to how the requirements were set, how collection was integrated, what assets were used, or how the information was analyzed to determine whether an action was desired or required.

In Vietnam, the United States fought guerrillas who basically followed Maoist theory in a Phase III (war of movement) insurgency. In El Salvador, the United States was training the Salvadoran military for Phase II (guerrilla warfare) insurgency operations against guerrillas who, until mid-1984, essentially followed Cuba's FOCO model of guerrilla war.

Before intelligence officers can effectively carry out their mission, there are some basic operational and intelligence considerations that should be

addressed.

That intelligence drives operations is the guiding principle behind all counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. It is sometimes easy to lose sight of this basic fact because of the historical requirements of pattern analysis. Yet, when analyzing trends, the goal is to forecast future insurgent actions so the friendly commander can act first.

Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is critical in LIC. Because information is so perishable and insurgents carry out low-level, decentralized operations, friendly forces must act quickly to take advantage of the situation. A complete picture of the enemy situation may not be available; intelligence developed through IPB must supplement what is known.

A basic understanding of the terrain is needed. Analysts must know the details of individual trails, bridges and buildings so that, as the information is collected, it can be compared to the base. Changes in the area's features, such as new trails or repaired buildings, are then more easily identifiable and can indicate an insurgent presence.

During the enemy evaluation function of IPB the analyst must gain an appreciation and understanding of the enemy's politics, strategy, tactics and organization. Each of these will have a direct bearing on his local operations.

Knowing the current phase of insurgency will have an impact on how effective various collection assets will be and how to focus collection efforts. For example, HUMINT will dominate collection efforts in Phases I (latent stage) and II, while SIGINT will increase in effectiveness in the later stages of Phases II and III.

Also, the intelligence officer must understand COIN strategy and tactics. A basic fact of guerrilla war is that he will adapt to various COIN tactics. Ewell and Hunt stated that: "A general tendency which we could never overcome was the ability of the enemy to protect himself against damaging tactics after some months. This required operational reviews after which the trends were apparent and we generally had determined the reasons." Then they could change their COIN tactics to inflict more damage.[3] By understanding COIN operations and their effects on the enemy, the intelligence officer will be better able to determine when the insurgent is adapting and make recommendations on how to best hurt the enemy.

The intelligence analyst must understand LIC's unique requirements. Oddly enough, as obvious as this is, it is easy to overlook the complicated nature of the simultaneous, multiple missions tactical units engaged in COIN operations have to carry out. Even at battalion level, one company's mission may be to defend the battalion base area, another may be operating in an insurgent enclave, and a third may be securing a major road. Obviously, the battalion S2 will find himself in a position where he must support three different types of operations. Thus, the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and specific information requests (IR) will be different for each.

For example, the company defending the battalion's base will need to know the likely insurgent avenues of approach, where patrols should be sent to give the best area coverage, and likely areas from which the insurgents can assemble to attack. The company operating in the insurgent enclave will need detailed information on the layout of camps, trails into and out of the area, and expected resistance. The company providing road security will need to be aware of ambush or roadblock sites used in the past, mine capabilities, and any current information that indicates enemy movement within striking distance of the road.

This can become a complicated task for the battalion or brigade S2 unless additional personnel are assigned. He must keep up his pattern analysis to predict future actions, maintain more than one collection or reconnaissance and surveillance plan, and ensure he has adequate collection assets, mostly HUMINT at this level, to cover each mission.

The IR must be as specific as possible to ensure collection assets know what is required of them. Ground surveillance radar (GSR) operators should cover specific avenues of approach. Remotely emplaced sensors (REMS), if available, need to be placed to provide early warning. HUMINT collectors, including patrols, need to be keyed to providing information that may impact on the mission, such as villager reports of insurgents moving toward the road. Photographic readouts of an insurgent enclave can indicate insurgent observation posts or defensive positions. Specific targets must be requested to ensure a timely response since imagery systems can cover a great deal of terrain and provide photo interpreters with volumes of film.

"Intelligence in low intensity conflict has always played a key role in combat operations."

The methods used for collection management in COIN operations do not vary from those found in conventional war. The difference is emphasis. In addition, collection and analytical assets, to include personnel, need to be redistributed to lower levels. By its very nature, counterinsurgency will be fought by small unit commanders; at that level, intelligence must be acted on immediately. The 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam found that when the enemy shifted to evasive tactics, "He only needed an escape envelope of 10 to 15 minutes." It is apparent that a commander must act quickly to take advantage of the situation. The higher the level at which a collection asset is located, the slower the dissemination will be and, therefore, the slower the response.

An example of the relative timeliness of dissemination is noted in figure 1.[4] When compared to human resources, technical assets provided information faster. But timeliness is only part of the problem. The Ewell and Hunt study went on to show that HUMINT reports had the greatest confirmation rate. Of 8,172 all-source reports between March 1, 1969, and April 30, 1969, only 2,559 received attention. Of these, 709 were confirmed, meaning there was tangible evidence indicating the validity of the report (Figure 2).

This does not question the reliability of technical assets. It does demonstrate that intelligence collected by these assets is perishable and must be acted on quickly. In fact, technical assets provided the vast majority of the reports: "The quantity of sensor data was so much greater that the number of confirmed personnel reports (237) was only half of the number of confirmed sensor reports (472)."[5]

The problem of confirming sensor reports still exists. For example, SLAR

in a LIC environment is generally not effective. The inability of SLAR to differentiate between insurgent and civilian traffic causes analysts to best guess whether the moving target indicator (MTI) is significant. In areas without "free fire zones" evaluations are loosely based on the location of the MTI and the time of day.

This indicates that the analyst must understand the strengths and weaknesses of his collection assets in LIC. He needs to be able to use one asset to cue another. The study also indicates that analysis is critical to determine future insurgent intentions; an all-source analytical effort is required to complete the picture.

HUMINT is perhaps the most important type of intelligence in Phase I and II COIN intelligence. This includes agents, PWs, friendly patrols and document exploitation.

The running of agents, not normally a division function, was a slow process. Yet: "The division nets had one major advantage over other agent operations—the ability of the division to target nets on specific missions. The nets also gave us the advantage of having a finger on the pulse of the population."[6] The population itself is an important information source. The farmer who spots a moving insurgent column can contribute much to COIN operations.

But HUMINT operations are manpower intensive and often require a great effort. In Malaya, the special branch of the police operated as low as district or village level. This simplified agent handling and made it easier for villagers to contribute information.[7] Another problem identified in Vietnam was that the Viet Cong infrastructure was difficult to break. "It was difficult to do what was essentially police and detective work with American soldiers. In sum, we were not able to break into another culture and into the communist organization. We sensed that a quantum increase in qualified interpreters would have helped."[8]

This problem of breaking down cultural barriers even extended to PWs. "Although we (9th Infantry Division) did well with prisoners of war, the average South Vietnamese Army division did much better. Ralliers and presumably prisoners of war preferred to turn in to Vietnamese units,"[9] but the reliability of PWs and deserters caused the division to emphasize the necessity of both.

This lesson was learned in Malaya and again in El Salvador. In Malaya, surrendered enemy personnel (SEP) and captured enemy personnel (CEP) became increasingly useful sources of information. A SEP could be turned around in a few hours and lead a government force back to the communist terrorists.[10] The Salvadoran military also learned this lesson; some of the most valuable cache discoveries were due to defectors.

Patrols by friendly forces are also important. In the 1960s, Colombia's Plan Lazo, the military's COIN plan, relied heavily on patrols.[11] A similar case existed in Vietnam: "The more contacts, the more prisoners; the more prisoners, the more valid the intelligence."[12]

A good example of friendly reconnaissance assets being used as the prime source of information occurred during Operation Pegasus, the relief of Khe Sanh. Intelligence was initially "very vague and expressed in generalities." The 1st Cavalry Division's reconnaissance squadron, 1/9 Cavalry "was almost the only means available to pinpoint enemy locations, antiaircraft positions, and strongpoints that the division would try to avoid in the initial assaults. 1/9 Cavalry developed targets



Figure 1

Source	Percent of Overall Confirmation
Intelligence/Civic Action	19.0
Agent Reports	15.0*
PW/Deserters	11.4
Special Intelligence	7.0
SLAR**	4.5
IR**	4.4

* Figure degraded because one brigade used only contacts for information.

** Equipment discrimination and time lags were not suited to small, soft, elusive targets.

Figure 2

for 632 sorties of tactical air, 49 sorties for specially fused bombs to clear landing zones, and 12 B-52 Arc Light strikes. No aircraft were lost due to antiaircraft fire or enemy artillery," during the initial assaults.[13]

SIGINT in COIN intelligence does not carry the emphasis it does in conventional war. "In the early stages, there is often a lack of uniform communication procedures; this prevents the development of an extensive EEOB and electronic technical data base." Another problem is the diversity of communications equipment: "Equipment available to the insurgent will range from the most primitive to the most modern. Even equipment not generally available in the armed forces of major world powers, like spread spectrum and frequency hoppers, can be easily obtained."[14] This was certainly the case in El Salvador in 1983 and 1984 where, not only were the insurgents using a few captured radios, they "obtained on the world market a large number of amateur radio, 2-meter band, hand-held FM transceivers."[15]

The importance of SIGINT increases as the insurgents move through Phase II and into Phase III. Unfortunately, the increase in the value of SIGINT indicates an increase in insurgent capabilities. This is because their communication procedures are standardized and their organization requires improved communications.

The host country is also a valuable source of information. In Malaya and the Philippines, joint intelligence centers with military, civilians and police were established.[16] In Vietnam, continuous liaison with friendly Vietnamese forces at all levels was essential. Each brigade of the 9th Infantry Division set up a liaison team with the Province Intelligence Operations coordination center and the battalions did the same at district level.[17] In working with friendly forces, where the United States does not have ground forces in action, as in El Salvador, there is a greater reliance on the host country for tactical information.

Other systems that play a part in developing the intelligence picture include PHOTINT and ground sensors. PHOTINT provides basic intelligence for the data base. However, unless photo interpreters are focused on a particular target area and are properly trained to analyze the unique aspects of an insurgency, the readouts may not be timely enough for the ground commander to use on a day-to-day basis.

The U.S. Army is currently developing remotely emplaced sensors and a remotely piloted vehicle (RPV), both of which hold great promise in COIN intelligence. However, to be used most efficiently they will need to become division, if not brigade, level assets for COIN operations.

As with intelligence analysis in any environment, no single bit of information is 100 percent reliable; it must be corroborated by another source when possible. This is especially important in COIN operations where, without a free fire zone, one may find civilians and insurgents travelling in the same areas or even along the same trails. The analyst must treat each piece of information as an indicator and try to verify it. A ground patrol is often required to verify or act on the information. However, in reality, conclusions may have to be drawn with limited information, and the commander may still have to act despite the lack of information.

Pattern analysis is another area that has increased emphasis in COIN intel-

"HUMINT is perhaps the most important type of intelligence in Phase I and II COIN intelligence."

ligence, since trends evolve over time. Indicators of a local insurgent attack may evolve over days while a change in strategy or logistics may evolve over months.

Proper pattern analysis can only be accomplished after the data base has been established and after IPB has been completed. The analyst must identify logistics routes, insurgent camps in his area of operations, power lines and other potential sabotage targets, bridges and local lines of communication. Once the analyst is familiar with the area of operations, he can begin to overlay activity as it is reported.

Long term trends that could require months to detect could include a change in strategy or basic changes in the insurgent group's operational procedures. Other trends to detect could include a comparison of light data to insurgent operations or evaluating the times insurgent attacks are carried out.

As complicated as intelligence is in any environment, the differences between the intelligence process in conventional war and COIN intelligence must be understood. The importance of HUMINT and the need for augmentation of counterintelligence, interrogator and interpreter assets cannot be overstated. Decentralized, small-unit enemy and friendly operations mean intelligence collection and analytical assets must also be decentralized for immediate action in response to information. It takes time; enemy trends are protracted since insurgencies tend to last years and sometimes, decades. ★

Footnotes

1. W.C.G. Heneker, **Bush Warfare** (London: Hugh Rees Limited, 1907), p. 181.
2. Julian J. Ewell and Ira A. Hunt, Jr., **Sharpening the Combat Edge: The Use of Analysis to Reinforce Military Judgement**, Vietnam Studies (Washington: GPO, 1974), p. 96.
3. Ibid., pp. 158-162.
4. Ibid., pp. 93-97.
5. Ibid., pp. 102-103.
6. Ibid., pp. 100-101.
7. Douglas S. Blaufarb, **Fourteen Points: A Framework for the Analysis of Counterinsurgency** (BDM/W-84-0175-TR, BDM Corporation, July 31, 1984), p. D 15.
8. Ewell, p. 162.
9. Ibid., p. 161.
10. Blaufarb, p. D 11.
11. Ibid., pp. A9-A10.
12. Ewell, p. 105.
13. John J. Tolson, **Airmobility: 1961-1971**, Vietnam Studies, (Washington: GPO, 1973), p. 172.
14. FM 34-3, *Intelligence Analysis*, 1986 , pp. 9-11.
15. Tom Kneitel, "Communications of the Guerilla Fighters In El Salvador," ***Popular Communications*** (Aug. 1983), p. 8.
16. Blaufarb, p. III 6.
17. Ewell, p. 102.

*Capt. Raymond W. Levesque graduated from the Univ. of Arizona in 1978. A graduate of the MI Officer's Advanced Course in 1986, he has attended the Defense Language Institute for Latin American Spanish. His past assignments include: S2, 1/8 Cav, 1st Cav Div; Editor, **Military Intelligence** and chief, El Salvador Analytical Cell, J2, USSOUTHCOM. He is currently an instructor and author for the Low Intensity Task Group at USAICS, Fort Huachuca, Ariz.*

ATTENTION READERS

Bound in this issue of ***Military Intelligence*** is the 1987 Military Intelligence Prospectus. It introduces the branch, outlines current career opportunities and provides a summary of what a future in MI can offer. This insert is designed for readers not familiar with the MI officer corps.

The staff of ***Military Intelligence*** encourages its readers to share this insert with others who may have an interest in a military career.



1987
Military Intelligence Prospectus

From the Commander

As chief of the Military Intelligence Corps, I am very proud of the worldwide intelligence organizations and the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School. It is of paramount importance to the continued success of MI to acquire the best and brightest to serve in our officer corps.

This Prospectus is designed to highlight the MI mission and provide information about our corps; and is specifically oriented at officer training and opportunities. Approximately 70 percent of the officers in any given year are ROTC graduates; this percentage remains fairly consistent within the MI Branch as well. The ROTC Prospectus is designed to ensure that you understand our mission and our capabilities.

The officer professional development philosophy I established for the MI Officer Corps is predicated on the assumption that MI must increase its high-technology officer population to facilitate the transition of the MI Corps into the next century. The relatively high level of sophistication of MI systems under development, coupled with the constant enhancements produced by emerging advanced technology, demand an officer corps capable of effective management in this area.

Recent trends reveal that approximately 25 percent of the total available senior ROTC cadets constitute the Army's potential, high-technology population. Cadets with high-technology degrees who are selected for active duty form a group of potential officers who are eagerly sought by every branch with an established high-technology requirement. Only a few cadets will become MI officers, unless a very strong request for MI is made by the individual cadet.

In light of these facts, liberal arts majors will continue to serve as the backbone of the Army Officer Corps; this is the current situation in MI. Efforts to acquire technologically proficient officers will continue, while we provide educational opportunities for our liberal arts officers. Those students, therefore, who are interested in MI should attempt to acquire skills in computer operations, mathematics and statistics. These skills will enhance your competitiveness for both active duty and branch selection for MI.

MI offers a career path with innumerable challenges and rewards. MI soldiers serve at every echelon, from maneuver battalion through the national level. Our mission is time-critical and essential to the defense of the United States. If you meet the stringent qualifications, then join us and serve ***Toujours en avant*** - **Always Out Front!**

Julius Parker Jr.
Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding

Symbols of Military Intelligence



The Unit Crest

The tactical and strategic phases of intelligence are symbolized by the checked background representing a chessboard on the crest worn by the staff and faculty of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School. The three divisions of the field denote the collection, production and dissemination of intelligence. Wisdom and silence are symbolized by the sphinx. The lamp of knowledge symbolizes enlightenment, and military leadership is represented by the sheathed saber.

Intelligence School Patch

The diamond-shaped U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School patch has a silver-gray border surrounding a blue field with a yellow demisun and flaming torch in the center. The colors blue and gray represent the Military Intelligence branch, while gold signifies achievement. The torch represents education and the sun depicts light and guidance with its seven rays spreading wisdom and strength.

The Military Intelligence Corps

The chief of staff, Army, has approved the establishment of the Military Intelligence (MI) Corps as part of the U.S. Army Regimental System. The primary objective of the MI Corps is to promote cohesiveness within the MI community.

The corps will activate on July 1, 1987, the 25th anniversary of the MI branch. The activation of our corps is a momentous occasion for MI. Activation ceremonies will occur at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., and at all MI units. Unit and individual involvement in the MI Corps activation plans will further develop a sense of esprit and build a solid traditional foundation for intelligence professionals. The chief of MI encourages all intelligence professionals to become involved in this activation.

The commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS), has been designated as the chief of the MI Corps. The chief of staff, USAICS, will be the adjutant of the corps and the command sergeant major, USAICS, will be the corps sergeant major. As part of the Army's regimental/corps activations, Headquarters, Department of the Army has approved the appointment of an honorary colonel, honorary sergeant major and distinguished members. The primary mission of these special appointees is to perpetuate the history and tradition of the MI Corps.

Affiliation with the MI Corps, as with all corps and regiments, will be designated by the wear of a distinctive MI Corps insignia. Soldiers will affiliate during their unit's activation ceremony, while officer basic course students and branch transfer officers will affiliate during graduation ceremonies.

The Branch

The Army officer corps is divided into specific branches. The Military Intelligence Branch has an assigned numerical designator of 35. It is further divided into sub-categories, or areas of concentration, designated by additional letters. Each of these specialized areas offers the MI officer diversified training in intelligence related matters, which will be explained in further detail. There also exist several specific skills which may be acquired.

Strategic Intelligence

Strategic intelligence officers are assigned the designation of 35B, which is only available to qualified 35D tactical intelligence officers. Candidates will attend the 10-week "common core" segment of the MI Officer Advanced Course (MIOAC) at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., which emphasizes the development and sustainment of common Army skills required of all officers. Following successful completion of the graduation criteria, the officers will attend a 36-week course of instruction at the Defense Intelligence College in Washington, D.C. The training focuses primarily on the operations and structure of the national intelligence system. Officers will employ their knowledge of all-source intelligence collection and analysis in support of strategic and operational planning and policy writing. Assignment possibilities include positions within the Defense Intelligence Agency, Army Intelligence Agency and with overseas, theater-level staff.

Imagery Intelligence

Imagery intelligence officers, designated as 35C, receive intensive training which focuses on planning, execution and exploitation of airborne reconnaissance and surveillance operations. The employed methods, or platforms, of photography, radar, infrared or electro-optical systems are used in several services at both tactical and strategic levels. Imagery intelligence officers may be assigned to joint, combined or single-service positions.

Tactical Intelligence

The tactical intelligence officer is designated as 35D. This particular area of concentration is the foundation upon which intelligence training for newly-branched officers is based. First and foremost, the tactical intelligence officer must become intimately familiar with opposing forces doctrine, organization and equipment. He must diligently study enemy thought processes and understand the threat decision-making cycle, as applied to levels of conflict and organization. The MI officer must also understand friendly maneuver operations and the maneuver commander's intelligence requirements. He must be able to expertly task collection resources and analyze their products. Although 35D positions are concentrated at echelons of battalions through corps, tactical intelligence expertise is critical at all levels.

Human Intelligence

Counterintelligence and human intelligence are represented by two distinct areas: counterintelligence (CI) officer (35E) or human intelligence (HI) officer (35F). CI officers are trained to serve at tactical, non-tactical and strategic levels. Their primary mission is to neutralize hostile foreign intelligence efforts to conduct espionage, sabotage and subversion against the U.S. Army. HI officers receive assignments involving the development, conduct and supervision of sensitive collection operations to satisfy national and theater-

level intelligence requirements.

Signals Intelligence

Signals intelligence officers carry the designation 35G. Training includes technical instruction in the intercept and analysis of hostile enemy radio and radar transmissions and emissions. Officers also receive extensive instruction in the tactics of electronic warfare (EW). Assignments are highly technical and range from the tactical to the highest strategic and national decision-making levels.

There are two additional fields available to qualified MI officers: space operations and special electronic mission aircraft (SEMA) aviation. The creation of the U.S. Army Space Agency (USASA) in August 1986 offers increased challenges for our branch. Potentially, any MI officer may find challenging opportunities in these new technical arenas. The MI lieutenant who applies for aviation training and is accepted will transfer to Aviation Branch. The aviation officers who receive SEMA training may attend the MI Officer Advanced Course with a concentration in either imagery intelligence (35C), tactical intelligence (35D) or signals intelligence (35G). These aviators will serve in aviation-related assignments throughout their careers.

Assignment Opportunities

There are approximately 4,900 positions worldwide to which intelligence officers may be assigned. Approximately 60 percent of MI positions are within the continental United States. The Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence (CEWI) structure enables the officer to gain experience at the tactical level, while national level agencies offer strategic experience. The following chart depicts the current MI position requirements by area of concentration at major activities.

	35B	35C	35D	35E	35F	35G
U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command	05%	16%	26%	12%	00%	17%
U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM)	30%	11%	10%	42%	84%	27%
DOD Joint and Special Activities	02%	33%	44%	20%	00%	31%
U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR)	41%	21%	03%	06%	11%	06%
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Cmd (TRADOC)	03%	08%	11%	05%	00%	15%
Other	18%	11%	06%	15%	05%	04%

Career Progression

During the first four years, all MI officers will become fully qualified in tactical intelligence through training and experience gained in the Officer Basic Course and a subsequent field assignment. Following this assignment, the officer will attend the Officer Advanced Course and receive training in another area of concentration. At approximately the five year mark, each officer will declare primacy in one area. This will ensure consistent assignments in his particular specialty. Career goals and the primacy designation will play a major role in the determination of successive tours with increasing responsibility. After eight years of service, a relatively small selection of officers will receive a functional area, e.g., foreign area officer, research and development or automation. Selections will depend on the needs of the Army and the MI Corps policy, in addition to qualifications and preferences of the officer.

The goal of career development after the eight year milestone is to become fully qualified in MI areas of concentration and applicable functional areas, which is acquired through training and appropriate assignments. As an officer progresses through the ranks, he can qualify and be selected for the types of jobs listed. This list is not all inclusive.

Lieutenant	Electronic Warfare Platoon Leader; Executive Officer, MI Company (CEWI); Assistant Brigade S2; CI Platoon Leader.
Captain	Aerial Reconnaissance Liaison Officer; Battalion S2; Brigade Electronic Warfare Officer; MI Company Commander; Field Station Signals Intelligence Officer; Division/Corps Intelligence Staff Officer; Instructor.
Major	Chief, CI Analysis Section; C2/J2/G2/S2 Staff; MI Brigade Staff; Instructor; S3/XO, MI Battalion; Field Station Operations Officer.
Lieutenant Colonel	Assistant Army Attache; Commander, MI Battalion: Signals Intelligence/EW Staff Officer; Intelligence Advisor; Division G2; C2/J2/G2 Staff; DIA/DA Staff.
Colonel	Commander, MI Brigade; Army/Defense Attache; NSA Staff Director; Commander, Field Station; C2/J2/G2 Staff; DIA/DA Staff Division Chief.

Advanced Civil and Military Schooling

The first step in advanced schooling for the majority of MI officers is the Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course (MIOAC). This 20-week course combines a 10-week common core with a 10-week "track" designed to provide training in the 35C, 35E or 35G areas. In conjunction with MIOAC, 35B and 35F officers receive area of concentration training outside USAICS. After completion of MIOAC, selected students will remain for approximately two weeks to attend an Assignment Specific Module (ASM), which is designed to provide detailed training in a specific area. Those currently available at USAICS follow.

Collection Management Course

This 10-day course provides in-depth training in tactical all-source intelligence collection management duties. It prepares students for assignments with the collection management and dissemination sections of the division or corps Tactical Operations Center Support Elements. Graduates will be able to identify

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

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Military Intelligence Readership Survey Results

A readership survey was provided in the April-June 1986 issue of *Military Intelligence*. Although the response was not overwhelming, the input represented a wide range of readers. Embassy personnel, DA-level staff and shipborne Marines contributed to this survey. The response from our readers plays an important part in the progress of *your* branch journal. The editorial staff of *Military Intelligence* would like to thank all who participated.

Listed below are the most notable results (Some totals will vary due to multiple answers/no answers):

Your organization:

74% Army 5% Navy 4% Marines 2% Air Force 15% Other

Your status:

51% Active 10% Government Civilian Employee
12% Non-Military Civilian 17% Other

Your branch:

71% Military Intelligence

Rank or Grade:

1% E1-E3 15% E4-E6 7% E7-E9 7% W1-W4 28% 01-03 24% 04-06
2% GS 6-GS 9 5% GS 10-GS 13 1% GS 14-GS 16 10% Does not apply

Education:

15% Some College 31% 2-Year Degree/4-Year Degree 51% Graduate work/degree

Location:

82% Continental United States

Where do you usually get your copy?

48% Subscription 39% Office/Unit

How difficult are the articles in MI Magazine to read?

12% Sometimes difficult 75% About right
11% Sometimes too easy 2% Much too easy to read

How do you rate MI Magazine as a branch journal?

45% Excellent 42% Good 10% Average

Our readers want to see more articles on the following subjects:

Tactical Intelligence - Strategic Intelligence - Training - OPFOR
Low Intensity Conflict - Terrorism/Special Operations

The input from the survey is important to the staff of *Military Intelligence*. It provided a direct input of readership wants, from as wide a range of readers as was possible. We hope the branch journal will continue to evoke a response from our readers.

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Military Intelligence Writer's Guide

Book Review Policy

Book reviews are considered to be an integral part of the presentation of information of professional interest to the MI community. The normal policy of Military Intelligence magazine is to publish reviews of books which have appeared in print over the previous year. Book reviews which are more than one year old are only published in cases where useful subject matter might not otherwise have been brought to the attention of our readers. Such reviews are considered on a case-by-case basis. Reviews of current books are more likely to be published. A limited number of books are received directly from publishers and are available for review. If you are interested in reviewing one of these books, please contact the editorial staff. Unsolicited reviews are also welcome and encouraged.

Feedback

"Feedback" is the reader's column, *your* column. Letters printed in Feedback can be on any subject that relates to intelligence, as well as suggestions, criticism, praise or anything else the readers of Military Intelligence magazine may find of interest. Letters do not have to refer to a previously printed article or letter from the magazine to be used in Feedback.

Letter policy: All letters to the editor must be signed. Names may be withheld if requested. Letters should be typc-written and double spaced. The editor reserves the right to shorten letters. Letters are normally edited for style, grammar, spelling and punctuation. Please include a phone number (Autovon preferred) and a complete return address on the letter itself.

Features

Military Intelligence magazine is oriented toward active Army, reserve and civilian intelligence personnel throughout the Army and Department of Defense intelligence communities. When writing an article, consider the readers. They range from privates to general officers to civilians, and they all have one thing in common: They work in or have an interest in military intelligence.

SUBJECTS: We are interested in all subjects relating to the diverse fields of military intelligence including Army doctrine and policies relating to intelligence, tactical and strategic intelligence, organization, weapons and equipment, foreign forces, electronic warfare and intelligence collection (SIGINT, HUMINT, IMINT). Historical articles should have contemporary value. If you have an idea for an article, contact us and explain your theme, scope and organization. It will save both of us time and will facilitate our planning.

STYLE: Military Intelligence magazine prefers concise and direct wording in the active voice. Every article should have a beginning that catches the reader's attention, a body containing the crux of the article, and an ending which concludes or summarizes. Keep the article as simple as possible. Avoid unfamiliar terms, unexplained abbreviations, and poorly constructed sentences. Don't submit a manuscript unless you are completely satisfied with it. Read it over three or four times and then let a friend read it. It is not uncommon to revise an article several times before submitting a finished manuscript. Don't waste the reader's time with meaningless or repetitive phrases or words. We edit all articles. However, a polished article is more likely to be accepted than a hurried, mistake-riddled effort. Save yourself time and effort; be your own editor. We do not normally allow writers to review how their articles have been edited.

ACCEPTANCE: We make no prior commitments on acceptance until we have thoroughly studied each manuscript. All manuscripts must be original, previously unpublished works. Authors submitting articles are responsible for informing the staff of Military Intelligence magazine of simultaneous submission and/or acceptance by other publications.

FORMAT: We prefer articles from 1,000 to 2,500 words in length. We will publish shorter or longer articles depending on quality. Develop your ideas and stop. Send clean, **doublespaced** manuscripts **typed** on one side of the sheet. Your name, length of manuscript, address and phone number (Autovon preferred) should be typed on the first page. We prefer one original and one copy. Cite your references and enclose all quoted material in quotation marks. If possible, credit should be given within the article as footnotes are burdensome and use valuable space.

GRAPHICS: Artwork in the form of black and white glossy photographs, maps, sketches or line drawings can enhance the attractiveness and effectiveness of your article. If you have an idea for artwork or know where we can get it, let us know.

CLEARANCE: All service members and Department of Defense civilians must clear articles through their local security office prior to submission. A signed statement of clearance must accompany the article. Certain categories of articles, as outlined in AR 360-5, must be cleared through the Office, Chief of Public Affairs, Department of the Army. Your local information officer can assist with this.

BIOGRAPHY: Enclose a brief biographical sketch, including important positions and assignments, experience or education which establishes your knowledge of the subject and your current position and title. Photos of authors are no longer used in Military Intelligence magazine.

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If you are interested in a subject, chances are that others will be too. Pick a subject, thoroughly research it, and think all your ideas through. Write with enthusiasm, but be natural. Don't adopt a different style.

For more information, contact the editor by writing to Commander, USAICS, ATTN: ATSI-TD-MIM, Fort Huachuca, Ariz. 85613-7000, or call Autovon 879-0674/0675 or commercial (602) 538-0674/0675.

intelligence requirements, develop missions for assigned systems to satisfy them, and develop an effective collection strategy for intelligence operations.

Special Security Officer Course

This eight-day course trains students to perform duties within the special security officer system. It concentrates on personnel, document and physical security, and tactical Special Security Office (SSO) operations.

Security Manager Course

This 13-day course trains students to perform as security managers. The course is designed to provide background in the hostile intelligence threat, assets available to counter this threat, and security operations and education requirements in the areas of document, physical, personnel and information security.

Intelligence in Terrorism Counteraction Course

This 10-day course trains students to recognize, analyze and brief the terrorist threat. The course is divided into three phases: terrorist threat, terrorist strategies, tactics and indicators, and terrorism counteraction intelligence.

Army education requirements are extremely diverse. Selection for military or civilian advanced schooling after MIOAC depends on the officer's career phase. Promotable captains and junior majors with proven abilities may be selected for the Command and General Staff College. The professional development model established by the MI Branch and the particular career goals of the officer also impact on advanced schooling. Every officer should review professional literature such as ***Military Intelligence*** magazine, MI proponency literature and Department of the Army publications to monitor career development items. Educational opportunities are in the following three categories:

Courses for which an officer does not apply. Consideration and selection is a result of normal career development: the Basic Course, the Advanced Course and the Combined Arms Services Staff School (CAS^3).

Courses for which an officer may be selected with or without applying. Some examples include the Defense Language Institute for a specific assignment, various National Security Agency courses and advanced imagery analysis training.

Courses for which an officer must formally apply to qualify for selection. Included are the advanced degree programs, the Defense Intelligence College Postgraduate Intelligence Program and the Army Great Skills Program.

Within the U.S. Army, as a result of wide-spread and diverse international obligations, a significant number of personnel are required to perform a variety of functions using a foreign language. The foreign language skill is most often used to interact with allies and better understand foreign military capabilities and intentions.

The MI Corps continually seeks new ways to refine the language management system. Part of this program involves language-related initiatives designed to improve the manner by which Army linguists are recruited, trained and employed.

Foreign language skills are valuable for all MI soldiers. Our enlisted soldiers receive priority for training. The majority of MI officers who acquire language skills do so independently or as a result of native language capability. Cadets who select the MI Branch as their career field should acquire their foreign language skills prior to commissioning.

Military Intelligence offers many challenging opportunities for those embarking on a military career. The formation of our Corps will provide a sense of esprit and unity for all affiliated MI professionals. The expanding areas of specialization and automation will certainly guarantee intellectual stimulation and enhancement. The education and experience which our branch provides its officers will enable each member to tackle the rising challenge of emerging technologies in a career that will prove to be exciting, satisfying and rewarding.

The 1987 Military Intelligence Prospectus is intended to acquaint Reserve Officer Training Corps cadets with the key issues, structure and focus of the Military Intelligence Corps. Additional information can be obtained by telephoning:

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Training Locations

Fort Huachuca

Fort Huachuca, Ariz. located outside Sierra Vista, is approximately 15 miles north of Mexico in the Huachuca Mountains. (Huachuca, used by the Sobaipurei Indians to describe the area, means "***place of thunder***" or "***place of wind and rain***.") Established in 1877 to protect settlers and travelers, it became the advance headquarters in the campaign against Geronimo in 1886 and played a key role in the Indian Wars.

Fort Huachuca's symbol is the ***Buffalo Soldier***. So named by the Indians, these black soldiers distinguished themselves in the Indian wars of the 1870s and 1880s. In 1916, Buffalo Soldiers joined Gen. "Black Jack" Pershing on his futile expedition to capture Pancho Villa in the hills of Mexico.

In recognition of the history of the Army in the Southwest, Fort Huachuca sponsors B Troop, 4th US Cavalry, Memorial, which recreates an 1885 cavalry unit in parades and historical reenactments, throughout the state of Ariz. Its 30 mounted troopers, with authentic uniforms and equipment, commemorate the unit which played a key role in the 1886 capture of Geronimo.

In 1971, The United States Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS) was established at Fort Huachuca, joining the US Army Communications Command and the 11th Signal brigade. Elements of USAICS are the U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens (USAISD), and subordinate detachments at Pensacola, Fla. and San Angelo, Texas.

Fort Huachuca facilities provide personnel with a variety of services and recreational opportunities.

Fort Devens

Fort Devens, located outside the city of Ayer, Mass., is named in honor of Maj. Gen. Charles Devens, a native of Massachusetts who served in the Union Army during the Civil War as U.S. attorney general under President Rutherford B. Hayes.

Fort Devens was established as a temporary training camp during World War I and grew with America's rapid buildup of the Army following the war. Today, Fort Devens trains regular Army units and supports Reserve Components throughout the New England area.

The U.S. Army Security Agency Training Center and School became the U.S. Army Intelligence School (USAISD), Fort Devens, October 1979. Fort Devens is also the home of the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Army Readiness Region I, Headquarters Command, U.S. Army Garrison, and the 39th Combat Engineer Battalion.

To further enhance unit pride and troop morale the School Brigade maintains a special voluntary activities program. The 14th Continental Army, which marches and drills with fife and drum in authentic Revolutionary War regalia, is best known for these activities and is a regular participant in parades and other events in the New England area.

Fort Devens is located 30 miles northwest of Boston, Mass., and 12 miles south of the New Hampshire/-Massachusetts border. The post offers a variety of entertainment, recreation and athletic activities.

Personnel stationed at Fort Devens are truly *in the heart of the nation's heritage*. Historic Lexington, Concord, Salem, Boston and Cambridge are minutes from Fort Devens.

Two subordinate USAISD detachments coordinate Army affairs and training at the Air Force and Navy cryptologic schools.

1—The Air Force 3480th Technical Training Group, Goodfellow Air Force Base, San Angelo, Texas. Students receive advanced individual training in traffic analysis and cryptology. Graduates of the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, Calif., are also trained at Goodfellow as radiotelephone interceptors and transcribers.

2—The Naval Technical Training Center. Corry Station, Pensacola, Florida. Personnel are trained in basic and advanced non-Morse collection techniques.

Most graduates of these programs usually return to Fort Devens for mission-specific training.

Travel

The requirement for intelligence professionals on every continent, in every corner of the world, provides unique travel opportunities for the military professional. An officer in the MI Corps can expect to serve overseas at least once in his career. Travel with the military can prove to be a once in a lifetime experience for a new officer.

Military Intelligence in History

To prepare for the upcoming battle, Joshua secretly sent two men into Jordan and said "Go, view the land, especially Jericho."

The Chinese philosopher and writer, Sun Tzu, wrote in **The Art of War**, "If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear a hundred battles."

Little happened in Rome that Hannibal didn't know about through his system of espionage—he had an excellent information collection system.

In Ceasar's time, each Roman Legion of 3,000 to 6,000 men had 10 **speculators** assigned to intelligence duties.

Gen George Washington, who completely understood intelligence planning and operations, appointed Lt. Col. Benjamin Tallmadge as his first intelligence staff officer. Combat intelligence, double-agent operations and excellent deception plans helped the Americans win the American Revolution.

U.S. Army officers including Capt. Meriwether Lewis, Lt. William Clark and Lt. Zebulon Pike produced a series of outstanding topographical maps of the American West that were later used in numerous military operations.

The Union and the Confederacy both used a variety of intelligence methods and operations during the Civil War, including the interception and decoding of telegraphic messages, aerial observation with balloons, counterintelligence, reconnaissance patrols and agents working behind enemy lines.

Col., later Maj. Gen. Ralph H. Van Deman, the father of American Military Intelligence, organized the MI branch prior to World War I and directed its operations that included aerial photography, communications security, signals intelligence, combat intelligence and counterintelligence both in Europe and the United States.

Although the famous Office of Strategic Services (OSS) under Maj. Gen. William (Wild Bill) Donovan provided intelligence support, the U.S. Army trained and used combat intelligence personnel in all areas to support the signals intelligence, technical intelligence, counterintelligence and imagery intelligence operations that were essential for victory.

Imagery intelligence played a major role in the Korean War and the interpretation of this imagery was vital to ground commanders. Additionally, intelligence was provided from signals intelligence sources and from agents who operated from behind enemy lines.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, reconnaissance aircraft provided the photographic intelligence necessary to prove the existence of Soviet missiles in Cuba.

Vietnam provided the impetus for the continued development of combat surveillance aircraft and many types of sophisticated electronic sensing systems, both manned and unmanned.

During the recent invasion of Grenada, intelligence operations of all types provided the joint command with detailed information on the Cuban soldiers. Army interrogators who questioned the captured Cubans provided additional intelligence data to the commanders.

Army intelligence specialists use computer technology, artificial intelligence devices and sophisticated electronic systems to prepare for all types of possible conflicts, to include terrorist incidents, low intensity conflict and full-scale war. Yet these highly trained and motivated soldiers work behind the scenes daily to prevent any type of conflict, using their skills as intelligence specialists to gather and interpret data for senior Army leaders and national decisionmakers.

Operational Intelligence in the U.S. Army

by Lt. Col. Lanning M. Porter

U.S. Army intelligence doctrine which recognizes an operational level of war intelligence requirement separate and distinct from tactical or strategic intelligence functions is presently being written. Previous doctrine stated that intelligence at the operational level of war was merely the "fusion" of tactical and strategic intelligence. The very proposition reflected a serious void in our military thinking.

Any number of historical case studies demonstrate the value of having an adequate operational intelligence perspective. Others reveal the disastrous results that can come from failure to do so. The following are some of the more notable examples.

Normandy

Certainly, the Allied invasion of Europe, over the beaches of Normandy in World War II, provides singular examples of operational intelligence properly used. The German intelligence perspective, on the other hand, revealed a number of shortcomings which ought to concern modern commanders, military intelligence planners, operators and doctrine writers.

Concerns for the weather and climatology data were crucial elements of the Allied invasion plan. Allied intelligence, using a variety of sources, to include ULTRA, had identified and located the German ground and air forces capable of reacting to the Normandy operation. The Allies also had learned that the Germans were not certain where the invasion would occur. The Germans had retained large forces facing the Pas de Calais beaches and were further concerned about the possibilities of an Allied invasion in Norway. These indicators suggested that the Allied deception plan for the Normandy landing was working. The Allies also knew that the enemy operational commanders would be Gens. von Runstedt, Rommel and Blaskowitz and knew something of their fighting styles.[1]

German intelligence was not doing so well. The Germans were convinced that the invasion would occur at Pas de Calais. They were not to be dissuaded. Von Rundstedt remarked after the war: "I thought the invasion would come across the narrower part of the Channel. The Somme-Calais area seemed to us so much better, strategically from your point of view—because it was so much closer to the Rhine." B.H. Liddell-Hart notes: "His (von Rundstedt's) reasoning suggested that his calculation was governed by a *preconceived view* based on the assumption that the Allies would take what was theoretically the best line, regardless of the practical difficulties. I remarked to him that, for the same reasons, it was likely to be the most strongly defended sector—surely a good reason why the Allies were likely to avoid it."[2]

While Allied deception was extensive and German agents had been turned by Allied counterintelligence, the Germans, according to Townsend, relied on indications of Allied intentions to invade at Pas de Calais. They neglected to analyze intelligence on location and strength, which would have shown Normandy as the only possible



Allied air superiority made the Normandy invasion possible.

invasion site.[3] Townsend also notes that the "intelligence system and philosophy of the Germans made the allied counterintelligence job easier than it would have been, had they ignored indications and looked for *essentials* in the only place they can be found; occupying space as real things, and not located in someone's imagination."[4] The Germans believed they could predict Allied intentions. They were fooled. The German lack of an adequate operational intelligence perspective allowed the Allied invasion to succeed and led ultimately to Hitler's defeat.

Kharkov

The third battle of Kharkov, while not as well known or studied as the Normandy invasion, provides additional insight into the successful and unsuccessful uses of operational intelligence. The battle was part of a larger campaign between German and Soviet forces on the Eastern Front during the months of February and March 1943. The Soviets had defeated the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad and were advancing toward the Don River in early 1943. They had managed to open a 200 mile gap in the German line from Voroshilovgrad to Belgorod and were pushing toward the industrial city of Kharkov. They intended to advance beyond that city, turn south, and trap von Manstein's army group between the Don and Dnieper Rivers and the Black Sea. Hitler was determined to hold onto this territory, known as the Donetz basin. Von Manstein, outnumbered by a ratio of eight to one, and with the benefit of experience and familiarity with past Soviet behavior, concluded correctly that the Soviets had the capability to trap and destroy his force. He also saw an opportunity to lure his enemy into taking extreme risks whereby he could, with inferior numbers, conduct a counterstroke and inflict a decisive defeat on the Soviet force. On Feb. 6, von Manstein flew to the Wolfschanze to confer with Hitler. After a four hour discussion, he convinced Hitler that it would be necessary to give up territory east of the Mius River. With little apparent intelligence on precise enemy plans or intentions, he began to move his forces into position to take advantage of what was to become a Soviet thrust toward a decisive defeat.

The Soviets, heady with recent successes and aware of their superiority in numbers, began to convince themselves that the Germans had only one alternative to certain destruction—withdrawal to the west of the Dnieper River. Stalin was certain of it. Gen. Vatutin, commander of the Southwest Front and Col. Gen. Golikov, commander of the Voronezh Front, reinforced this idea with similar estimates of their own. Soviet reconnaissance, picking up rearward movement of German units, tended to "confirm" the withdrawal of von Manstein's forces behind the Dnieper. This mistaken preconception was reinforced when Gen. Paul Hausser, disobeying orders from Hitler, pulled his SS Panzer Corps out of beleaguered Kharkov, relinquishing the city to overwhelming Soviet forces. Sensing the inevitability of a sure success, the Soviets quickly planned to press an attack by the Southwest and Voronezh Fronts, the principal feature of which involved a penetration by an operational group commanded by Gen. Popov and the Sixth Soviet Army.

On Feb. 12, German monitoring platoons produced their first decoded Soviet message traffic. They had intercepted radio traffic between Popov's and Vatutin's headquarters and those of their regimental commanders. This intelligence allowed von Manstein to follow Soviet movements and, indeed, to learn Soviet intentions. Von Manstein was aware that the spring thaw was rapidly approaching. Keeping an eye on his map and the enemy situation, he waited until the Soviet 6th Army and Armored Group Popov were fully committed before launching his counterstroke on Feb. 19. Using the mobility of his Panzer corps and other units, he was able to envelop the Soviet forces, cut their lines of communication, and destroy them piecemeal as they ran out of food and fuel. Ironically, the Soviets continued to be self-deceived by their interpretation of German battlefield movements. As late as Feb. 21, the Soviet 6th Army continued to receive such messages as, "Movement of enemy forces, discovered by aerial reconnaissance between Stalino and Prokovskoye, confirm our view that the enemy is continuing his withdrawal towards Zaporozhye."[5]

The Germans destroyed the Soviet 6th Army and Armored Group Popov and opened a 120 kilometer gap in the Soviet line. Von Manstein's forces continued their offensive, rolling over every force the Soviets placed in their way. They continued until they recaptured the city of Kharkov and were forced to halt, not by Soviet forces, but by the spring thaw and the accompanying mud. The Germans destroyed three Soviet armies and parts of a fourth, as well as Armored Group Popov. "52 divisions and brigades, including 25 armored brigades, had vanished from the situation map in Soviet headquarters."[6]

The reasons for von Manstein's success and Soviet failure can be found in their operational intelligence perspectives. Von Manstein used his knowledge of likely Soviet behavior to develop his estimate of Soviet capabilities and their likely courses of action. Nevertheless, he retained flexibility and used intelligence to locate and follow Soviet forces with the purpose of timing his counterstroke. The Soviets, on the other hand, became overly wedded to a preconceived notion about what German "intentions" *had* to be. Soviet intelligence analysis apparently did not consider the full gamut of German capabilities and it allowed subjective elements to drive the analysis such that it confirmed the preconceived ideas of Soviet leaders from Stalin down. Moreover, Soviet intelligence appears to have been too reliant on "Werther" and the "Lucy" Ring, a single, but usually excellent source located within the German High Command. This source had no access to the planning or the intentions of the Germans, as all the discussion and planning for this operation occurred in von Manstein's headquarters rather than Hitler's. Intentions were further misinterpreted, not only by the Ring, but by the Soviet leadership as well. In this case, the intelligence was generally good. The subjective perceptions of the intelligence were fatally flawed.

Kursk

The situation was quite different, just one month later, as Hitler began preparations for Operation Citadel, the German offensive against Soviet forces in the Kursk salient. The Lucy Ring alerted Moscow, almost as soon as the operation was conceived. Soviet marshals Zhukov and Vasilevsky at STAVKA and the Soviet Front command-

ers, Vatutin, Rokossovski, Malinovsky and Popov, perhaps having learned their lesson from the Battle of Kharkov, were very careful to combine information from Lucy with intensive reconnaissance of the German front line and intelligence from other sources to determine the extent of German capabilities. Both Rokossovski and Vatutin had concluded that the Germans were planning an offensive against the Kursk salient and both had sent their assessments to STAVKA by April 12, 1943. On that date, Zhukov and Stalin agreed that the main effort for the Soviet summer campaign would be concentrated in the Kursk area. Planning began for a Soviet defensive to destroy German forces before launching a counteroffensive to the west.

Hitler issued his operations order on Apr. 15. Details of the German plan became available to Soviet planners in May. Soviet efforts to build formidable defenses in depth proceeded apace. Central and Voronezh Fronts comprised a total force of 10 infantry armies, two tank armies and two air armies in the first line, with three tank corps, a cavalry corps and a rifle corps in reserve. Behind, in a second defensive line, was the Steppe Front with four infantry armies, one tank army and one air army with three cavalry, two tank and one mechanized corps in Front reserve. Huge amounts of artillery—some 19,300 guns and 920 Katyusha rocket mortars—were deployed forward to support the defense of the salient. The defensive system of the Central and Voronezh Fronts alone extended 110 miles from front to rear in six belts.[7]

The Soviets, probably because of Lucy, believed the German offensive would begin in May and were well prepared by the end of that month. When Hitler changed the date to June, then to July, the Soviets used the time to further improve their defenses and to train their troops.

At Kursk, the Germans deluded themselves into selecting the wrong course of action. They had no equivalent of Lucy in the Soviet headquarters and, therefore, knew little of Soviet plans. Von Manstein was sure that the Soviets would launch an offensive through the Kursk salient in an attempt to cut off and destroy his Army Group South. He and others initially interpreted reports of the massive Soviet buildup as a preparation for that offensive. He believed the Soviet plan could be disrupted by a series of German attacks in May, immediately after the ground had hardened following the spring thaw. It was not until July that von Manstein realized the extent of Soviet defensive preparations. At that point, von Manstein was unable to convince Hitler, von Kluge and others that the plan for the German offensive ought to be abandoned. They continued to believe that the Soviet buildup was in preparation for an offensive. Jeffrey Jukes describes the situation as follows: "The imaginative genius that had characterized German operations of 1939-41 had vanished, and the mechanical nature of Hitler's planning was fully visible. Only the belief that such a large force as theirs could not fail sustained them, and many of them no longer believed even that. For they knew that the Red Army of 1943 was not that of 1941, and many of them had watched with apprehensive sickness as the Soviet buildup in the salient grew larger and larger. They had tried to ward off the sickly feeling that the Russians knew what was coming, by arguing, as had Kluge and Manstein, that the Soviet concentration of force was there to launch an offensive. This could be disrupted only by going ahead with Citadel—an argument which could be dispelled by one look at the air photographs. Surely no army assembling for an imminent attack would spend three months digging itself into defensive positions over 100 miles in depth. But to admit this was to admit that the gamble had failed, in that surprise had been lost. So most of them kept their silence."[8]

The fact is that the Germans were almost totally ignorant of the massive Soviet defensive preparations for the defense of the Kursk salient until very late. Both Kluge and von Manstein believed that a German offensive could succeed, but that belief was based solely on their experience. The German attempt to double-envelop the Soviet forces in the Kursk salient ended in disaster.

This successful intelligence perspective on the part of the Soviets and the concomitant failure by the Germans led to the catastrophic loss of two German army groups which, in turn, allowed the Soviets to begin their relentless drive to ultimate victory.

Burma

Field Marshal Sir William Slim's operations in the Burma theater are particularly instructive. Slim had to worry about the war on land, sea and in the air. Slim's 1943-44 defeat of the Japanese in Burma depended on a thorough understanding of Burma's terrain and contiguous waters. To develop an appreciation for the terrain of

Field Marshal Sir William Slim commanded the British Fourteenth Army in the China-Burma-India theater.

his theater, Slim personally drew sketches of principal terrain features—in essence reproducing a topographic map from memory. He was forced to plan and time his major operations around the monsoons, which prohibited movement and operations for both Allied forces and the Japanese for months at a time.

Slim's estimative process contained some interesting features. He would begin by conferring with his brigadier general staff, major-general administration and Air Force counterpart to provide two or three courses of action based on their appreciation of the situation. These would be given to the staff for study and comment. The staff would propose other courses of action as well.

He explains further: "The results of the planners' examination of the proposals were put up to me as a short paper, largely in tabular form, and from it, I decided on the main features of the plan to be followed. At this stage I usually discussed with the intelligence officer whom I had selected to represent the Japanese command at my headquarters—a key appointment—what the enemy's reactions to this plan were likely to be. I was, of course, kept daily in the picture of the Japanese actions, intentions and dispositions, as far as we knew or could surmise them, but I intentionally waited until I had selected my plan before considering the enemy response to it, as I intended him to conform to me, not me to him. A consideration of these possible Japanese moves never, I think, caused a major alteration in a plan, but they did affect such things as the location and expected tasks of reserves."[9]

Slim, writing particularly of intelligence, outlined his concerns as an operational level commander: "I had throughout been conscious that, improving as our intelligence was since 1942, it was far from being as complete or as accurate as that in other theaters. We never made up for the lack of methodically collected intelligence or the intelligence organization which should have been available to us when the war began. We knew something of the Japanese intentions, but little of the dispositions of their reserves, and practically nothing about one of the most important factors that a general has to consider—the character of the opposing commander. I had all the information I could obtain about Lt. Gen. Kawabe, my opposite number, who as commander-in-chief, Burma Army Area, controlled all Japanese land and air forces in Burma. At this time, from what I had seen of his operations, I could only expect him to be, like most Japanese commanders I had met, a bold tactical planner of offensive movements, completely confident in the superiority of his troops and prepared to use his last reserves rather than abandon a plan."[10]

Slim commented on the need for the operational commander to think ahead: "It often happens that, when the first phase of a hard fought campaign has been successfully completed and the second is in full swing, the commander will be as much occupied in preparations for the next stage as with the actual fighting in progress. This was with me during the pursuit to and over the Chindwin. My mind and my time were largely filled with plans and preparations for the great battles that must follow the establishment of our bridgeheads over that river. Nor was I the only one so employed . . . an orgy of planning broke out at all levels."[11]

Slim, by his own admission, fell into the trap that many of his own contemporaries, on all sides and in all theaters, had experienced. He tried to predict enemy intentions. He was seldom, if ever, successful. After crossing the Chindwin River, Slim pursued the Japanese south. He divined that the Japanese intended to defend north of the great bend of the Irrawaddy and planned to attack them there. His forces were deployed and the attack nearly begun when he discovered, to his great surprise, that the Japanese were disposed not north of the Irrawaddy, but south. Miraculously, he was able to reconfigure his force, moving an entire corps from his left wing to his right over incredibly rough terrain. He managed to surprise and defeat the much larger Japanese force.

Slim was successful because he had trained his force and possessed superb subordinate commanders and staff. He had a very good operational intelligence perspective with the exception of his incessant attempts to predict enemy intentions—even after repeated failures to do so had caused him untold grief. Slim never appeared to recognize this as a shortcoming.

The Ardennes

Any number of operational successes and failures are evident in studies of the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes in December 1944. German efforts against the Allies were frustrated by Hitler himself. Charles V.P. von Luttichau, in **Command Decisions**, writes of Hitler's decision to proceed with the Ardennes offensive, despite good intelligence and the recommendations of his subordinate commanders to scrap or modify the operation. Luttichau states: "If the events to be recounted seem to defy military logic, it was in part because the founder of a Reich that was to last 1,000 years was a fanatic whose intuition had long since triumphed over sound reasoning."[12]

The failure of the Allies to detect German offensive preparations can be attributed to poor analysis and fixation on preconceived enemy intentions over capabilities. Certainly, Allied attitudes toward the intelligence and information which was available were as important as the intelligence and information itself. Eisenhower states he and Bradley understood the risk appearing in the Ardennes and chose to proceed with their ongoing offensive.[13] Russell Weigley suggests Bradley's own cautious nature caused him to mirror image and impute caution to the Germans.[14]

Patton, operating to the south of the Ardennes, accepted the intelligence, recognized the threat even though it was outside his area of operations, and directed his staff to begin planning for an attack north. The First Army G2, Col. Dickson, can be faulted because he accepted a flawed 12th Army Group intelligence estimate. Gens. Hodges and Middleton certainly were blithe with respect to any intelligence they received and apparently were not overly concerned with collecting any. Bradley and others thought that von Rundstedt was in command of German forces because he was the senior German general. They failed to recognize that Hitler was in command of the Ardennes campaign (in contrast to Kharkov). This may have affected the way the Allies interpreted the German build-up and subsequent offensive.[15] Charles MacDonald, writing about ULTRA, reveals one of the flaws in Allied thinking. He states: "What ULTRA had failed to do was to be specific, to say exactly why Hitler was shifting fighter

aircraft westward and building a large reserve with panzer and SS panzer divisions as its core. Allied commanders had come to expect ULTRA to be specific, to tell them not only what but when and where. When neither ULTRA nor their other intelligence sources told them those things, they failed to penetrate Hitler's masterful deception scheme to parade the assembly of Sixth Panzer Army in the north, while preparing secretly to attack in the Ardennes."[16]

He goes on to say: "Allied intelligence officers had committed the most grievous sin of which a G2 is capable. They had looked in the mirror for the enemy and seen there only the reflection of their own intentions."[17] The German counteroffensive ultimately failed, in spite of the successful deception, and despite the Allied failure to recognize the effort before it was launched. Nearly every Allied G2 and commander apparently reacted or responded to the same information in different ways. The failure was one of a collective lack of intellectual operational intelligence perspective.

Vietnam

More recently, the U.S. experience in Vietnam revealed some lessons about operational intelligence. Gen. Bruce Palmer cited a number of examples of faulty intelligence perspective. Concerning collection and analysis, he noted that the Army had no intelligence capability focusing on the ground war. In the early 1950s, the Army had developed a good order of battle on enemy forces in Southeast Asia. In the late 1950s, however, anticipating the loss of some analytical capabilities with the formation of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Army had shifted that responsibility to U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC) in Hawaii. DIA, with an Air Force officer in charge, showed little interest in the ground war. USARPAC, believing that MACV (organized in 1962) was collecting and analyzing enemy ground order of battle, ceased its work. It was not until 1965, when an experienced Army officer was assigned as J-2 MACV, that work on ground order of battle was resumed in earnest.[18]

However, this was simply a manifestation of a much larger problem. Since the major commanders in the field couldn't specifically define the kind of war they were fighting, and since a war had never been declared, there was little, if any, central direction given to the intelligence effort. Palmer notes that there was no unity of effort in intelligence collection, analysis or dissemination. Intelligence was fragmented among a number of agencies; it lacked centralized direction. CIA, DIA, the individual service security agencies and J-2 MACV had their own efforts and agendas. The theater commander lacked the coordinating authority. This fractured U.S. effort was mirrored in the South Vietnamese intelligence organizations, as each U.S. agency trained and worked with its host nation counterpart. The result was frequent disagreement on the most fundamental issues. For example, prior to the Tet Offensive in 1968, the various agencies could not agree on the numbers of main forces, guerrillas and part-time guerrillas (a difficult task in any event). The problem was ostensibly solved when the various parties met at CINCPAC headquarters where the appropriate compromises were made and enemy strength figures agreed upon.[19] Apparently no one recognized that deriv-



The Vietnam War forced a re-examination of operational intelligence doctrine.

Illustrations by Billy Joe Deacon

ing enemy strengths by conference, compromise and consensus, rather than by coordinated collection and confirmation, revealed a fundamental shortcoming needing rapid and forceful correction. Other problems centered around the requirement that information derived from signals intelligence (SIGINT) had to be corroborated by "hard" intelligence, e.g. a prisoner of war report or captured document, which often took months to obtain.

Much of the U.S. problem in using intelligence effectively in Vietnam was the result of conscious and unconscious enemy efforts to obscure their activity. Gen. William E. DePuy observed that: "The ambiguity of intelligence, engineered by our opponents, is a major deterrent to early and effective operational planning—not to mention early action."[20]

Central America

The operational intelligence perspective is just as applicable in LIC as it is in more conventional situations, with more complicated problems. Having an intelligence organization and structure that suits the commander's needs is part of that perspective. Currently, this is manifest at U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), which is responsible for U.S. military efforts in Latin America. SOUTHCOM has neither the intelligence structure nor the organic capability to support its own commander. With a number of crises in Central America, SOUTHCOM has been forced to rely on a number of *ad-hoc* solutions to its intelligence problem. These include borrowing tactical intelligence units and assets from CONUS to serve temporarily in the SOUTHCOM area and the formation of the Central America Joint Intelligence Team (CAJIT) at the Pentagon. Maintaining tactical intelligence units away from their home station is extremely costly, but the real issue is not expense. The vital question for the SOUTHCOM commander concerns the availability of borrowed intelligence assets when their parent unit receives a mission requiring its own intelligence resources. The ground, air and naval intelligence assets belonging to XVIII Airborne Corps, CINCLANT, and the Air Force will likely be taken away from SOUTHCOM should a crisis occur almost anywhere else in the world, since both LIC and SOUTHCOM fall relatively low on the list of military priorities. Likewise, the strategic assets dedicated to the present SOUTHCOM problem are temporary and could be removed at any time.

The CAJIT provides a nexus for all-source intelligence that is largely unavailable outside Washington, D.C. It was established to perform largely tactical and operational intelligence functions at the national level! It is interesting to ponder why it is easier to perform tactical and operational intelligence functions at the Pentagon than at the operational theater headquarters. Modern communications allow significant intelligence to be passed quickly between the CAJIT, SOUTHCOM and other intelligence consumers, but the CAJIT still does not belong to the operational commander. Without adequate assets of his own, the operational commander is forced to borrow or beg tactical or strategic assets to meet his operational intelligence needs.

Much work needs to be done to acquaint commanders and intelligence officers, at all levels of service, with the doctrinal requirements that must be in place to obviate a recurrence of a six year hiatus in collection and analysis, as occurred in Vietnam. Interagency and interservice agreements must be preestablished and functional so we will have a unity of intelligence effort when the next war—declared or undeclared—starts. ★

Footnotes

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6. Ibid., p. 221.
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14. Weigley, p. 463.
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18. Gen. Bruce R. Palmer, Jr., **The 25 Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam** (Lexington: Univ. of Kentucky Press, 1984), pp. 39-40.
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Tactical PSYOP – lessons learned

by Capt. Chris A. Pilecki

Military history is replete with examples of psychological operations (PSYOP) conducted in support of strategic goals. World War II provides the best example of the integration of psychological warfare into military planning and operations.

Less readily apparent, however, are examples of PSYOP in the tactical arena. It is extremely difficult to apply and evaluate PSYOP in terms of a purely tactical problem.

An initial difficulty presented by the subject of psychological warfare is definition. Most subject authors seem compelled to conduct a detailed discussion of key terms; such discussion reveals an underlying uncertainty about the proper scope of the subject. Consider these questions: Does psychological warfare consist of propaganda that is intended to persuade neutral countries or is it to reassure a domestic audience? Should the goal of PSYOP be to convert the target or to influence the target's behavior in specific circumstances? Effective use of the instrument requires an understanding of its capabilities and limitations, the susceptibility of the target to the planned action, and the extent to which the PSYOP action will serve military and political goals. Several notable PSYOP failures can be traced to an insufficient appreciation of these factors.

The most precise definition of psychological warfare can be extracted from those offered by Paul M.A. Linebarger and William E. Daugherty: "Psychological warfare consists of the planned use of propaganda with other operational measures of a military, economic or political nature . . . required to supplement propaganda. It is designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes and behavior of the enemy, neutral and friendly foreign groups . . . and to support the accomplishment of national aims and objectives."[1] This is supplemented by Terence H. Qualter's definition of propaganda: "The deliberate attempt by some individual or group to form, control or alter the attitudes of other groups by the use of instruments of communication, so that in any given situation, the reaction of those influenced will be that desired by the propagandist."[2]

There are several key items in these definitions. First, the use of propaganda must be *planned*. Virtually any form of communication can be used as a vehicle of propaganda. In a modern wartime environment, when the warring populations are likely to be more attuned to propaganda efforts due to their very volume,[3] military and political planners must remember that everything they do will be interpreted as propaganda. All planned actions must be viewed from the PSYOP perspective to ensure that they are in consonance with military and political goals. While it is impossible to anticipate all possible interpretations of an action or policy, failure to realize that they will have psychological implications will create additional difficulties. For example, in World War II, the Office of War Information (OWI) played no role in the formation of policies which influenced the effectiveness of its propaganda. In the words of James P. Warburg, "The unconditional surrender formula adopted by the Allies . . . tended to harden the German resistance. Allied propaganda was never able to interpret the formula to persuade the German people that they had less to fear from surrender." OWI had to trumpet American liberation propaganda after the United States conceded to Britain's preference for the reestablishment of pre-war, status-quo regimes in the wake of the Nazi retreat.[4]

"Military and political planners must remember that everything they do will be interpreted as propaganda."

Another key item in the definition of psychological warfare is the intent to *influence behavior in support of national objectives*. In World War II, the national objective—enemy surrender—was clear, yet not all PSYOP supported this goal. The theme of unconditional surrender may have actually prolonged the war. Propagandists discovered that attempts to induce individual surrender were less effective than measures which convinced the enemy soldier his position was hopeless and an honorable capture was possible. The practical objective—removal of an enemy combatant from the battlefield—was achieved in a way which allowed for the preservation of personal dignity.[5]

In Vietnam, national objectives were less precise, particularly those of the North Vietnamese army. PSYOP targeted against the Viet Cong was aimed at convincing them to return to the side of the Republic. It enjoyed considerable success, partly because a clear action—rallying to the government—was sought. No such target against the North Vietnamese army was available. The World War II lesson concerning direct surrender appeals was remembered, and few such attempts were aimed at the North Vietnamese soldier. Yet in the unconventional environment, the only other *action* to which American PSYOP could appeal was to convince them to stop fighting. To the communist mind, in the absence of other supporting action, propaganda alone could not justify a cessation of hostilities.[6]

The final item in our definition is that propaganda must be *supplemented by other operational measures*. In World War II, units which succeeded in surrounding an enemy force often looked to PSYOP to finally win the battle. Attempts were made to shame or intimidate the defenders into surrender or to induce mass defections. Martin F. Herz has shown the limited success of this strategy: "Ultimata do not seem to be a useful means of securing the surrender of surrounded troop units, nor do propaganda attacks against their commander appear to be psychologically profitable. On the other hand, when an attack against surrounded troops has scored successes, and when the precariousness of the enemy commander's position is being actively demonstrated, an approach that salves his honor might well be attempted."[7]

The point is broadly illustrated by the limited success of American propaganda against the North Vietnamese. The political limitations placed upon military operations against North Vietnam left American PSYOP "forced to use impersonal scraps of paper and radio broadcasts to penetrate the all-encompassing, intricate ideological shield thrown up around the North's population and armed forces." Having limited ourselves to reprisal bombing of North Vietnam and generally unable to conduct large-unit battles in the south, Americans hoped that somehow PSYOP could convince the Communists, with words alone, that they could not win.[8]

While propaganda is often viewed as the creative dissemination of lies, experience in both World War II and Vietnam has indicated that propaganda which is predominantly *truthful* tends to be most effective. "Much of the remarkable success of the Allied propaganda was the result of a basic adherence to facts," says Qualter. "Because it was difficult to pinpoint deliberate falsehoods, the Allied propagandists gained the confidence of their audience. The propaganda was received because it had an air of truth."[9] One tactic, employed effectively in World War II, consisted of dropping leaflets on enemy positions on which a simple map was drawn to show the existing tactical situation. If the enemy position was highly unfavorable, such an approach impressed upon enemy soldiers the valid reasons for surrender. If a bluff were attempted, the chances of future success dropped appreciably.[10]

In Vietnam, American impatience and exasperation with the South Vietnamese Ministry of Information resulted in an American takeover of the Republic's propaganda functions. Consequently, American propagandists tried to communicate with their targets on behalf of both the American and South Vietnamese governments. To its detriment, much ostensibly South Vietnamese propaganda carried a distinctly American flavor. This in turn fueled North Vietnamese counter-propaganda efforts.[11]

Closely tied to the issue of truthfulness is that of *credibility*. Allied radio propaganda, beamed at Germany in World War II, benefited from the Allied reputation for reliability, as well as the German default of credibility in their domestic broadcasting.[12]

Even a reputation for reliability will not ensure success for propaganda which fails to take into account the target's prejudices. This was aptly demonstrated by the partial failure of a leaflet used by U.N. forces against the Chinese Communists in Korea. The leaflet, which included a photograph of numerous Chinese casualties, intended to stress the power of U.N. forces and the international aspect of the U.N. presence; the Chinese had been killed in an engagement with Turkish forces. Appropriately captioned, the leaflet was disseminated to Chinese front-line troops. Only later was the leaflet shown to a panel of Chinese prisoners, who indicated their conviction that all Turkish forces in Korea had been killed in battle several months earlier. One prisoner queried, "Why did you spoil a good leaflet by telling a lie?" Although entirely truthful, the leaflet's effectiveness was negated by Chinese propaganda concerning the earlier battle, which made the U.N. claim unbelievable.[13] Although detailed information concerning the correlation between propaganda promises and the actual treatment received by defectors is not available, the relative success in inducing Viet Cong defections indicates that they believed the claims of good treatment at the reception centers.[14]

Timeliness is one of the most crucial factors that influences the success of tactical PSYOP. Propaganda which takes advantage of an immediate tactical situation can have a devastating effect. Pre-conditioning is key, since the decision to surrender is influenced by physical hardship, tactical reverses and a progressive psychological deterioration. Highly specific and imaginative propaganda aimed at the German garrison at Lorient in World War II was ineffective until tactical reverses reinforced the propaganda message.[15] On the other hand, tank-mounted loudspeakers were used to great effect to support attacks late in the war. As a result of a relay system, the tank commander could give precise information to a linguist at his headquarters, who would then broadcast a surrender appeal based on the current situation.[16]

Improved technology and the great availability of aircraft made U.S. propaganda operations in Vietnam especially timely. Preprinted leaflets and pre-recorded broadcasts were often delivered on target within two hours of the initial request. A quick reaction capability allowed for the creation of specifically-targeted leaflets within 24 hours. Unfortunately, "Although specialized 'quick reaction' messages were



Thousands of psychological leaflets were dropped over the skies of Vietnam.

more likely to persuade people to defect or surrender, because of their relevance to the experience and current situation of a specific target group, their use was the exception rather than the rule. The American military emphasized standardized, strategically oriented communications at the expense of the more effective and more difficult to produce 'quick reaction' messages. Success in convincing the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops to surrender suffered accordingly."[17]

American propaganda in Vietnam sacrificed specificity for consistency. The creation of the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) solved the problem of coordination among different agencies, yet the need to closely tailor propaganda to the specific target audience was apparently overlooked.

This need may be subsumed under the broader principle of *knowledge of the target*, the final subject of consideration.

A major factor limiting the effectiveness of U.S. propaganda in Vietnam was the implicit assumption that symbols relevant to Americans would be equally relevant to the Vietnamese. Barry Zorthian, director of JUSPAO from 1965-68, said: "Our basic experience in conflict usually involved only civilian populations of ethnic and cultural background that had some mutuality and relevance to our own experience. We really had no experience relevant to Vietnam from the viewpoint of psychological operations, let alone military tactics."[18]

Numerous examples are available. Americans hoped to turn communist thoughts towards home by distributing leaflets featuring voluptuous, bikini-clad women, not aware that the Vietnamese would find such appeals offensive. Leaflets overprinted with the ace of spades, intended as an omen of death, were disseminated before it was realized that the ace of spades—not present in a deck of Vietnamese cards—was meaningless. Perhaps most significant, the main thrust of the mass-produced, deliver-on-order leaflets with which Americans flooded Vietnam were future-oriented appeals to Vietnamese nationalism—to rally to the cause of the Republic and get on with the task of building the country. Culturally, however, Vietnam has little appreciation for "nation" in the Western sense. The Vietnamese seek harmony with whatever force is dominating life at a given moment. Thus, American propaganda failed to rouse any significant patriotic fervor. Much of the Americanized propaganda, issued in the name of the South Vietnamese government, allowed North Vietnam to stress the foreign invader theme in its counter-propaganda. Capitalizing upon their role in evicting the French from Vietnam, the Communists fused anticolonialism and anticapitalism into a potent propaganda force.

In summary, consider the psychological effect of all your actions. Anything can be viewed as propaganda. Design PSYOP so that the target's response will be some *action* that furthers your national objectives. The clear statement of national objectives is therefore necessary for tactical PSYOP. Don't rely on PSYOP to win battles. Tactical PSYOP is limited to providing the enemy soldier an honorable way out of a bad situation. Cherish our reputation for truthfulness and reliability. There are few more potent weapons than our enemy's preference for our news. Stress the timely application of measures relevant to the existing situation. Show the enemy that you understand him as an individual soldier. Finally, know your enemy. It is only by understanding his cultural background that you can ensure the credibility of your own propaganda and tailor your appeals to attack his psychological vulnerabilities. You will also learn about his abilities to exploit our weaknesses.

Of these guidelines, the last is perhaps the most crucial. We are only gradually coming to appreciate the vital importance of international studies, a trend the Army should encourage. We can no longer afford to misunderstand other nations. ★

Many different types of leaflets were dropped by the Allies during World War II.

Footnotes

1. Paul M.A. Linebarger, **Psychological Warfare** (Combat Forces Press, Washington, 1954), p. 40. William E. Daugherty, **A Psychological Warfare Casebook** (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1958), p. 2.
2. Terence H. Qualter, **Propaganda and Psychological Warfare** (Random House, New York, 1962), p. 27.
3. Robert W. Chandler, **War of Ideas: The U.S. Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam** (Westview Press, Boulder, 1981), pp. 27, 85. Michael Balfour, **Propaganda in War 1939-45** (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1979), Part II.
4. James P. Warburg, **Unwritten Treaty** (Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York, 1946), Chapters 11-13.
5. Martin F. Herz, "Mechanics of Surrender, Capture, and Destruction," Daugherty, pp. 392-96.
6. Chandler, pp. 92-94, 252.
7. Herz, "Ultimatums and Propaganda to Surrounded Units," Daugherty, pp. 397-403.
8. Chandler, Chapter 5. Murray Dyer, **The Weapon on the Wall: Rethinking Psychological Warfare** (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1959), pp. 35-38.
9. Qualter, p. 60.
10. Linebarger, p. 235 (Fig. 67).
11. Chandler, pp. 214-22. One particularly transparent example of American propaganda on behalf of South Vietnam was the printing of American document numbers on Vietnamese leaflets for a period of 2 1/2 years.
12. Balfour, pp. 120-21.
13. Daugherty, pp. 611-14.
14. Chandler, pp. 91-93.
15. David Hertz, "The Radio Siege of Lorient," Daugherty, pp. 384-92.
16. Linebarger, pp. 239-41.
17. Chandler, p. 88.
18. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

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TACPLAN
-An Intelligent Aid for Tactical Planning

by Stephen J. Andriole

Not long ago, Gen. Edward C. Meyer, former Army chief of staff, stated that, "The most demanding challenge confronting the U.S. military, in the decade of the 1980s, is to develop and demonstrate the capability to successfully meet threats to vital U.S. interests." Meyer's marching orders required the Army to reaffirm its commitment to operational and force planning and to formalize the processes by which plans are developed, assessed and implemented.

Around the same time, organizations such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Army Research Institute (ARI) and the Army War College (AWC) began to respond to some technology challenges issued by the office of the Under Secretary for Defense Research and Engineering (USDRE). Without much fanfare, Dr. William Perry challenged his R&D organization to computerize—where appropriate—as many defense processes as possible. Among the specific technology targets were cruise missiles, command and control (C2) and strategic and tactical planning (TACPLAN).

TACPLAN is an offspring of the marriage arranged by Meyer and Perry. It is a microcomputer-based, "intelligent" planning aid capable of supporting planning at the corps level.

Corps planning, like the planning that occurs at all command levels, is mission-directed, top-down and structured. Corps commanders and their staffs must take a number of steps before developing a concept of operations. They must first convert mission guidance into sets of goals and subgoals that are clear and realistic. They must "prepare" the battlefield by integrating intelligence about weather, terrain and enemy objectives and capabilities. They must identify likely enemy courses of action and then determine the best way to deploy, attack or defend (figure 1).

There are reams of "how to" planning documents available to the corps commander.[1] But the essence of successful planning can be traced to the quality of available intelligence, the capabilities of opposing forces and the judgement of the commander.

Judgement and experience drive the tactical planning process. In many important respects, tactical planning is an art. Aspects of the planning process cannot always be taught unless the planner has had actual field experience. At the same time, this is not to suggest that parts of the process cannot be computerized via the implementation of some "scientific" procedures.

Good corps planning is iterative. Successful corps commanders are simultaneously creative and pragmatic. They are also good choreographers, required to balance the priorities of command against the realities of limited resources, imperfect intelligence and a formidable opponent.

The planning process could not be implemented without certain "props," such as clear maps, clear acetate, tactical symbols and grease pencils. In spite of frequent criticism about the use of "low technology," historically, it has been very difficult to improve upon—even with "high technology" fixes.

Attempts to develop computerized planning aids began about two decades ago, but significant progress has only been made during the past five to 10 years.[2] But even the recent aids suffer from a common problem—the forcefitting of specific analytical methods onto the planning process regardless of whether they were appropriate. Some planning aids, for example, use a theorem of conditional probabilities to calculate likely enemy courses of action. While the theorem is powerful, it forces the planner to consider likelihoods in ways that require him to ignore what he has been taught about tactical planning.

Other problems can be traced to the kind of interaction that many aids impose upon the planning process. One aid, for example, requires corps commanders to input hundreds of numeric scores to calculate the "best" concept of operations.[3]

Still others failed because they were simply too large to support anything but tactical training. Many were also too expensive to enjoy widespread distribution.

The challenge we faced a few years ago required us to determine if corps planning *should* be computerized. Could computers help, or would they add yet another layer of complexity upon a process already well understood and executed? Next, we faced the challenge of identifying the points in the planning process where an aid could make the best contribution. Were there enough to justify the investment our sponsor, ARI, planned to make? What about methods? Was the inventory large enough to perform critical tactical planning tasks? What about cost and portability?

The ultimate challenge, of course, was simple. Could we move significantly beyond acetate and grease?

TACPLAN was developed by International Information Systems, Inc., and Perceptronics, Inc., with support from ARI. The first step involved the conduct of a series of requirement analyses designed to determine exactly how corps commanders formulate tactical plans. In January 1984, we videotaped six expert planners as they formulated a concept of operations for a defensive Western European scenario (see box on the birth of an analytical aid). The planners, from the Army War

College's Center for Land Warfare, were divided into two groups and asked to develop a solution to the same tactical planning problem.

This data was supplemented with Field Manuals, officers' handbooks and general literature on planning. After we studied the data, we developed a taxonomy of planning tasks and sub-tasks and then identified the analytical methods likely to satisfy them.[4]

The first issue we faced required us to profile the role that we wanted the aid to play. Should the goal be to develop an aiding system or an automated planner?

Our requirements clearly suggested that the development of an automated planner was impossible, given the state-of-the-art of our technology—and undesirable, given what we were able to discover about tactical planning. We determined that the best way to proceed was to conceive of TACPLAN as an aid only and to require its behavior to be as unobtrusive as possible.

TACPLAN uses several conventional and unconventional methods to help corps commanders develop a tactical plan. First, it assumes that tactical planning is amenable to a divide-and-conquer strategy, where planning problems are broken down into sub-problems. It also assumes that the sub-problems should be solved in a specific order. It assumes, for example, that course-of-action assessments should not be made until area characteristics and relative combat capabilities have been thoroughly analyzed. It also suggests that planners define their primary and secondary goals before any analysis takes place. TACPLAN supports these assessments by a method known as multi-attribute, utility assessment (MAUA). MAUA is a technique that supports analysis by identifying, weighting and scoring criteria vis-a-vis courses of action, terrain features and other analytical considerations. The technique yields lists of the most likely courses, the most inhibiting terrain features, and the concept of operations most likely to satisfy the commander's goals.

TACPLAN also has "intelligence." It "knows" about terrain constraints, preferred doctrinal options, force structures and their interrelationships. Its knowledge is stored in planning rules that are consulted whenever a planner makes a judgment, designates a likely course of action, or makes an assumption about combat maneuver capabilities.

Remember that TACPLAN is an aid, not an automated expert system. It is intended to help planners, not replace them. Its intelligence is passive and unobtrusive. TACPLAN does not ask the planner what he wants to do and then do it for him; instead, the aid watches the planning process and only alerts the planner when something it knows about the process or about the problem at hand has been ignored or contradicted. It then alerts the planner to the problem. If the planner chooses to ignore TACPLAN's advice, then the process proceeds.

Figure 2 suggests how computer-aided tactical planning might occur. The planner manipulates data and information, tests alternative hypotheses about the best way to deploy his forces, and calls up different displays (terrain, order of battle, etc.) which appear to him as overlays on the computer screen. He can add or subtract overlays, while a set of rules about the tactical planning process observe his planning and alert him when a violation occurs.

The entire aid resides on an IBM PC/XT. The aiding interface is through the monochrome display and an interactive videodisc-based, graphic display system. This dual screen display system permits planners to interact alphanumerically and graphically within the context of the same problem within

The Military Planning Process



Figure 1



Figure 2

the same aid.

The monochrome display guides planners through the plan building process, asking a series of questions about the planning problem. Planners are asked to assess area characteristics, relative combat capabilities, enemy and friendly courses of action, and potential concepts of operations. While this is occurring, the video display is building the plan graphically. Planners can interact directly with the video display by adding, deleting or moving units around the map, by drawing courses of action directly onto the map, or by recalling and overlaying old plans onto a current problem.

The strength of the video display lies in its realism and the extent to which it improves upon the use of paper maps, clear acetate and grease pencils. TACPLAN's video display presents actual maps of corps areas of interest. Tactical symbols and courses of action are stored as overlays on the video map.

The maps are stored on videodiscs

The Birth of an

Before designing a computer-based aid of any kind it is necessary to conduct a series of requirements analyses to determine if the aid should be built and what tasks the aid can and should perform. TACPLAN R&D began with the identification of some expert planners willing to share their expertise. Six planners at the Army War College agreed in 1984, with the support of Gen. Healy, then commandant of the college, to participate in a two-day experiment. We used a War College scenario of an impending Warsaw Pact attack and asked the planners to form two groups and independently solve the defensive planning problem. Both sessions were prepared by setting up a four foot by eight foot tactical map of the situation, overlayed with acetate. Grease pencils were provided, and friendly and enemy forces were represented by magnetic symbols that could be moved as the simulation evolved.

The problem itself saw massive deployment of "Red" forces all along and to the east of the NATO/Pact boundary. "Blue" forces were relatively scattered and outnumbered.

The planners were videotaped as they formulated their concepts of operations. The suggestion to videotape was made by Dr. Robert M. Sasmor of ARI, who hypothesized that a great deal of information about planning could be captured not only from the conventional audiotaping of planning utterances but also from the observation of



Figure 3

Analytical Aid

actual motor behavior. The suggestion yielded enormous dividends. The videotape reference of the planning process enabled us to study tactical planning from a variety of perspectives.

From the experiments, we were able to characterize tactical planning as highly structured, sequential, doctrinal and integrated. We noted that tactical planning is by nature repetitive, mission-oriented and perhaps most importantly, inherently verbal, graphic and non-numeric.

These and other observations enabled us to design an aid that was consistent with the actual planning process. Our original design did not call for the use of an interactive graphic display interface. After observing the actual planning process, it was clear that if the aid were to satisfy any real operational requirements, it would need a video window of the planning situation. The results also suggested that analytical methods would have to be embedded into the aid unobtrusively, and that any method that required planners to cognitively "break" from the substance of the planning process would undermine the aiding process. Finally, observation of the videotape enabled us to construct a taxonomy of planning tasks and sub-tasks that was subsequently used to design all the interaction sequences that now operate in TACPLAN.

while the annotations are stored digitally. Since maps have been placed on the videodiscs at different scales and fields of view, planners have the capability to zoom in or out on the display. Since the digital overlays are computer controlled, they expand or contract depending on the planners' field of view.

TACPLAN permits planners to develop tactical plans in much the same way that they now develop plans, but with some important differences. First, the aid structures the process. Second, it integrates elements and sub-elements of the process. Third, it monitors and instructs the process by checking planning judgments against its own knowledge base. Fourth, it permits planners to work with the same medium—actual maps—that they use when developing tactical plans without the aid of a computer. Fifth, it permits them to annotate onto the map image (not unlike the way they annotate on acetate with grease pencils), store their annotations and recall them at will (capabilities that

acetate and grease pencils cannot match). Sixth, TACPLAN records the planning process for future study or application. In fact, it is possible to develop an inventory of corps plans that can be recalled and displayed whenever a similar problem is faced. Seventh, TACPLAN is flexible and adaptive. Over time, the rules that govern its behavior will be modified and the knowledge base will be expanded. If, for example, a particular piece of advice is consistently ignored by corps commanders, then the rule responsible for the advice can be changed. Since TACPLAN records the planning process it also records the disagreements, which can be used to make the aid more intelligent.

Finally, TACPLAN is inexpensive and transportable. Nearly all of its components can be purchased off-the-shelf. Special emphasis was placed on the design of an aid that would not consume huge resources in development or use. In fact, TACPLAN is in many respects a "rapid prototype" that can be modified easily, quickly and inexpensively.

TACPLAN is an aid that supports the development of tactical plans. But after a battle begins or after events or conditions change dramatically, commanders must revise their plans to some extent. We are currently in the process of developing an aid that will support plan evaluation and revision for the U.S. Army's Communications and Electronics Command's Center for Tactical Computer Systems' Computer Research Division (CECOM/CENTACS/CR). This aid—known as INTACVAL (Intelligent Tactical Plan Evaluation)—will be more intelligent than TACPLAN since it will respond to a variety of contingencies, help the planner decide whether to revise or completely rewrite his plan, and support the revision/replanning process. The aid must also be capable of displaying alternative plan outcomes on the video display, a capability which will require the aid to conduct "fast time simulations" in response to alternative repairs or new plans[5] (figures 3 and 4).

The INTACVAL architecture is flexible and supports the integration of the three aiding functions (plan formulation, plan evaluation and replanning) into a single system with the same dual screen display interface. The goal is to develop a computer-based "plan processor" that will support corps plan formulation, evaluation, execution, monitoring, revision and replanning. ★



Figure 4

Footnotes

1. **Sound Military Decision Making**, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Penn.: Army War College, 1983.
2. Stephen J. Andriole, ed., **Coursebook on Decision Aids for Command and Control**, Marshall, Va.:International Information Systems, Inc., 1984. Also see Andriole, ed., **Microcomputer Decision Support Systems**, Wellesley, Mass.: QED Information Sciences, Inc., 1986 and Andriole, **Interactive Computer-Based Systems Design and Development**,Princeton, N.J.: Petrocelli Books, Inc., 1983.
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The Dangerous Romance: Essay

The U. S. Army's Fascination with the Wehrmacht

by Capt. Ralph Peters

Our enduring fascination with the German Army of World War II and its flamboyant leaders is a historical anomaly whose closest parallel is the spell Napoleon cast over 19th century military men. Some of the latter, like Clausewitz, used the Napoleonic crucible to clarify the nature of war. For the majority, it was the easily digestible myth and the colorful trappings of the Napoleonic episode that proved irresistible.

For every Clausewitz, committed to the pain of hard thought, there were 1,000 McClellans, hand stuffed into the bib of the uniform as if to conceal their meager handful of abilities. The foolishness of Napoleon's less able disciples, stuff of easy satire in peacetime, proved sinister in war. His shadow darkened 100 years; the miseries of Balaklava, Mars-la-Tour, Antietam and Koeniggraetz flickered too briefly to shake its hold. Lulled by poets, a century slept . . . until it was shocked awake by the Great War. The distance between the bridge at Arcola and the wave attacks on the Somme was measured in a single military night.

Yet, even as we recoil from the uncontrolled slaughter of World War I, the persistence of the Napoleonic vision remains understandable in retrospect. The first Napoleon shaped a century, if only by the intensity of the reaction he inspired. He possessed military and political genius; to the muddleheaded philosophers of his age, his titanic stature seemed to transcend conceptions of good and evil. Not least, he fed our appetite for glamour to an extent movie stars and rock musicians can only envy. Napoleon . . . was interesting.

The Wehrmacht generals' inexhaustible appeal survives four decades after their professional extinction. They haunt our military publications, their names remain the small change of professional conversation, and our romanticized misconception of their accomplishment festers in our doctrine and routinely embarrasses attempts at its application.

Our stubborn romance with these men arises more from the image they have acquired in popular legend than from their factual military achievements. We choose not to regard objects of our professional affection in the hard light of morning: Although every officer knows the name Rommel, few can broadly outline his career. Rather, this fairly talented infantryman has become verbal shorthand for fast tanks. The two best known Wehrmacht generals, Rommel and Guderian, made their reputations fighting second-rate opponents; however, they failed when the going got tough. Neither proved able to accept personal failure with dignity but blamed the sun, moon and stars instead. Not they, but their gruesome master shaped their time. They were not even remotely glamorous until they were enhanced by adoring biographers. Rommel was a political sycophant, aching for Hitler's attention in the waning 1930s, and he remained absolutely loyal to Hitler until the day when he could no longer have his way. Guderian was a right-wing thug before Hitler made his first little mess in Munich. He was a willing member of the German Freikorps that murdered its way into history during the chaos that followed the Great War. The Freikorps was dedicated to a particularly brutal conception of the "old order" and to the merciless suppression of any sort of pluralism. In comparison, the Ku Klux Klan resembles the American Civil Liberties Union.

Far from transcending good and evil, these men simply ignored the difference. None of the Wehrmacht generals, whose mythic exploits we so uncritically revere, turned against Hitler while the going was good. They were military professionals of the most debased sort, mercenary in conscience, engaging in unjust wars of aggression with not the slightest interest in moral imperatives. To counter that these generals limited the excesses of the SS in their area of operations, is equivalent to praising a mass murderer for his table manners. And, as the clock of battle approached midnight, our idolized leaders did not even stand by the common soldiers who had served them so faithfully.

We uncritically accept that these men were in the finest traditions of the "German" officer corps. But this tradition, of which we so often and so ignorantly speak, was made of different stuff. Goethe was never a soldier. Yet his leading character in his most perfect novel, **Die Wahlverwandtschaften**, expressed the sentiment that, "The educated soldier disposes of the greatest advantages, not only in society, but in life in general." The Rommel-Guderian type would not have appealed to Goethe. They were as uneducated in the classical sense as they were morally undeveloped. *A sense of duty is no substitute for a fundamental sense of morality.* The German officer tradition bottomed out in the Hitler years. Not Rommel, winging away from the gored and bleeding soldiers of his North African formations, but von Paulus of Stalingrad, who stayed with his men to a pathetic close, would have appealed to the real "good Germans," all of whom had either perished or left town by 1939.

Even von Stauffenberg, locus of the officers' plot to bomb Hitler out of their way, was no champion of human rights or morality. The bomb plotters were primarily aristocracy concerned with the preservation of a comfortable social order after the war and with territorial possessions about to play host to the Red Army.

I am not certain such men are worthy of the enthusiasm with which we embrace their memory. I do not intend to totally deny the military competence of the Wehrmacht nor do I suggest passing over the German experience in the study of military history. What is necessary, however, is a more critical and less mythologized appraisal of performance and techniques and a more comprehensive approach to military studies.

The undeniable aptitude of the Germans for waging

war, between the 1740s and the 1940s, is a historical phenomenon that is not adequately explained by the average paperback's generalizations about the Blitzkrieg which was invented by Napoleon in the Jena-Auerstadt campaign. Nor is it explained by staff school references to a Germanic penchant for officer education and the birth of the modern general staff. Rather, it is a complex subject, the study of which involves an initial struggle against incorrect notions that have become institutionalized. Further, the subject is only rewarding to the officer who remembers that he is not a German and that the German soldier, whether of the Frederician or Nazi period, was a very different man than his modern American counterpart.

Consider, as examples, two of the most widely "studied" Wehrmacht campaigns: France in 1940 and North Africa. The streamlined retellings to which most of us are exposed extol a German mastery of war beyond even the most imaginative lieutenant's daydreams. And there is no doubt that the Germans, overall, were extremely competent by the prevalent standards, usually well trained and occasionally inspired. But the story of German success in northern France and of the interlude of Axis successes in North Africa is as much a tale of French and British ineptitude as of German genius.

If there ever was such a thing as a German genius for military operations, it lay less in the brilliance of a few generals than in the routine standards of professionalism demanded of the average officer and NCO and in the effect those standards had on the training and motivation of culturally well-disposed enlisted men. With the definite exception of Frederick the Great, and the possible exception of Moltke, German superiority was more systemic than heroic. The legacy of Scharnhorst's reforms in the field of military education was more important to German battlefield successes than were the actions of any commander. Further, the greatest German military successes punctuated passages of intense social dynamism in the Germanies, and those successes were wrung from opponents whose social order was in a clear state of decay—such as Austria in 1866 and France in 1870 and 1940. The one aspect of military endeavor in which the Germans truly excelled was neither blazing maneuver nor even competent staffwork but the psychological stage management of war—convincing less confident opponents that they were beaten early on.

The middle campaigns in the western desert were, on the British side, a tragic comedy of bad leadership. When examined in toto, the North African campaigns of World War II provide one of history's most clearcut examples of the relationship of good leadership and military professionalism to victory. The British, for all their endemic amateurism, were better led and more disciplined than Graziani's Italians, and the British won that round. Then the Germans arrived. More professional and more astutely led, as well as more accustomed to victory, the Germans almost scored a knockout. Perhaps the only thing that saved the British from total defeat was their remarkable and heroic inability as a people who know when they have been beaten.

Finally, the British fielded a commander, Montgomery, who was arguably the most thorough military professional in any army of his time—certainly more so than was his impulsive counterpart, Rommel. Montgomery led, trained, organized, planned—and won. To be fair to Rommel, he was probably the victim of the routine military tendency to promote officers beyond their competence. In the end, neither Panzer Army Africa nor its leaders exhibited the equal of British tenacity when the tables were turned. The Germans retreated in haste, struck a few bad-tempered blows at the not-yet-competent Americans, and surrendered in the hundreds of thousands.

Perhaps one of the keys to the American love affair with Rommel, Guderian and company lies in this last cited episode. At Kasserine we were thoroughly beaten, and the rest of our North African campaign was not quite so glorious as film and patriotic fantasy would make it. Rommel and his peers gave us a bad time of it. They did so again in Italy. By all common sense rules, they should have quit before they launched their Ardennes counteroffensive. In the final days of the war, the ragtag German defenders were astonished to see powerful U.S. forces retreating from the fight for Crailsheim.

From Gilgamesh to Giap, military experience has quickly been translated into myth. The veteran tells his misremembered tales, and the official historian is often slave to his chauvinism. Our glorification of the German generals is in the best traditions of the primitive hunter/warrior, exaggerating the numbers of the foe or the fearsomeness of the wild beast to his own aggrandizement. It was more satisfying when the Germans were 10 feet tall. It glorifies our own accomplishment in defeating them and is a better excuse for our frequent difficulties along the way. Another aspect of this is our continued unwillingness to recognize that the greatest German efforts and most of the German talent went to the Eastern Front.

As a people, we were more disposed to lionize German exploits than is generally realized. No success of Japanese, Chinese or Vietnamese commanders could ever strike the same chords. What German success rivals the Japanese coup de main at Singapore or the Red Chinese operations in November-December 1950 in Korea? Yet who among us can name the enemy generals commanding? There are more Americans who claim at least partial German ancestry than claim descent from any other single national or ethnic group. It seems forgotten that the first World War was heartbreaking for many German-American families, and our history books gloss over those Germans who worshipped Hitler under the banners of the German-American **Bund** in the 1930s. For many Americans, the German soldiers, especially in World War I, were not only "like us," they were more like us than were the French or even the British. Not every American proved ready to believe, even after the revelations of Dachau and Auschwitz, that Germany could have committed so much voluntary evil. Like the anemic "resistance" to Hitler, the German military achievements, neatly removed from their gruesome political and human frame, were almost bound to become respectable. The Germans had to have a good side, didn't they?

In any case, we glorified our erstwhile enemies, a psychologically natural thing to do and good for morale once the war had been won. But such virtue-transference becomes dangerous when it leads to an obsessive preoccupation with a single historical episode. Yes, some of the lessons of the Wehrmacht's experience of World War II *are* valuable—especially the less popular narratives of the German defeat at the hands of the Red Army. We are so busy studying the careers and preferred techniques of the Germans who turned victory into defeat that we have no time or interest left for the Zhukovs, Konyevs and Rokossovskis who turned seemingly irreversible defeat into a military and national triumph. None of these foreign experiences are necessarily more instructive than our own successes and failures in this century. All in all, S.L.A. Marshall has more to say to the American combat leader than do all of the apologist biographers of our broken opponents or even the Soviet memorialists, who too often spoil their remembrances with political juvenilia.

The lessons of World War II are not necessarily more pertinent than those drawn from the American Civil War. While cautious generalizing as to recurrent truths may hold some value, we draw specific how-to-make-war inferences from any bygone campaign at great peril.

Still, all the nonsense we print about the wisdom of the Wehrmacht prescriptions for victory would not be so bothersome if it were only consumed by armchair generals. But its effect is felt in the field. To compound the problem, we are so easily seduced by striking superficials that we do routine disservice to our own military ancestors. The most obvious example is Patton, an operational-level commander of genuine brilliance, whose insights and abilities have been buried beneath a simplified persona. Patton's most enduring legacy seems to have been a concern with superficials worthy of the Benito Mussolini School of Histrionics. And when you mix that misunderstood swagger with the magazine synopses of the Blitzkrieg, you produce the armor commander who consistently leaves his engineers and air defense attachments behind as the ARTEP pressure builds and struts about as though rude behavior were the sole prerequisite for military greatness.

Above all, our comic book reduction of Wehrmacht operations is appealing because, like the spirited but seriously flawed 1982 edition of FM 100-5, *Operations*, it seems to simplify the annoyingly complex art of war by reducing it to sure-fire gimmicks. Perhaps the final note on this aspect of the problem should be that the Germans did most poorly when the British and the Americans successfully coordinated their combined arms and air support.

Another abetting cause of our overestimation of the lessons to be learned from the Wehrmacht is our collective, superficial grasp of military history. The average U.S. Army officer does read, but he has never learned to discriminate between books that are worthwhile and those that should be suspect, and he doesn't read books that are hard. Colorful paperbacks rehashing the exploits of the Desert Fox, in a sort of ***National Enquirer*** approach to war, help keep the young staff duty officer awake in the pre-dawn hours, while more sincere and scholarly works do not.

Thankfully, there are quite a few men and women in our officer corps who are not content to be average. To them, I commend the serious study of the German military experience. But that study leads deep into the wilderness, down a tangled trail for more than two hundred years, to a Frederick not yet great, rashly leading his overdrilled army to Silesia on a campaign of conquest that ended in the ruins of Berlin in 1945. Along the way, the pilgrim may find that, by the Seven Years' War, German and Russian soldiers were behaving in patterns that would repeat themselves for more than two centuries.

To begin to understand the painstakingly acquired German capacity for clean staff work, we must travel to a defeated, humiliated Prussia and look at events over Scharnhorst's narrow shoulders and from behind Gneisenau's expanding paunch. There, in the wreckage of a state grown brittle, its once-great army decayed, young Clausewitz was formed and his core ideas never really changed in the later years of resurgence and victory. If suffering inspires great art, then military theory seems to gain its sharpest insight in defeat.

The German ability to assimilate and employ new technologies by 1939 could not have surprised anyone familiar with Moltke's Koeniggraetz campaign. Here, the Prussians rode to victory on the new railway net, communicating with Berlin by telegraph and employing breech-loading rifles to scythe the ranks of gallant Austrians whose commanders failed to understand that a new age had already begun. The search for the origins of the Blitzkrieg (and a properly educated officer corps) leads us back to the blustering incompetence of the Valmy campaign and to the ice-water shock of Jena-Auerstadt. The famed Prussian army failed, from top to bottom, in judgement and conduct. Napoleon moved faster than the moribund Prussians imagined possible,

surprised them, wrecked their army, and chased them back to the Baltic Sea in a matter of weeks. The lesson was not lost on the Germans; by the Franco-Prussian War, the Germans had fully assimilated the techniques of rapid mobilization and swift, well-organized movement, and it was France's turn to bow her head in surrender.

The German soldier who preferred a fight to the finish over surrender, whether in the Huertgen Forest or on the Oder, had his roots in the army that clung faithfully to Frederick. In an astonishing display of proto-nationalism, the tiny Prussian state fought to hold off the combined might of Austria, France, Russia, Sweden and the German states that today compose the Federal Republic. Here, the reality was drastically different than that presented in Anglo-Saxon retellings, where Frederick's army is composed of mercenary scum of the earth. There were many mercenaries, not all of them volunteers, in the Prussian army as the wars bled on, but the army's backbone remained the native Pomeranians and Brandenburgers. No purely mercenary army, no matter how fierce the discipline imposed upon it, would have held together after defeats such as Hochkirch and Kunersdorf. It was not genius alone that brought Frederick his victories.

Before over-glorifying the innate capacity of the German officer for efficient command and control, consider the Franco-Prussian War. Battle after battle got out of hand, developing unplanned, driven by low-level troop actions, mistakes and confusion. The field army commanders alternately disappointed and infuriated the lonely genius, Moltke, by their inability to execute his plan for an early envelopment of the French army. The road to Paris was littered with more German than French casualties.

Finally, if you cannot resist reading yet another book about the failed German generals of the 1940s, try copying the following quote on the flyleaf for a bit of balance. It is taken from a popular German play of the 1760s, "Minna von Barnhelm," (Act 3, Scene 7), by Lessing. The play is about a German officer that is different from the uniformed gangsters of the Wehrmacht. Maj. von Tellheim, the hero, is a Prussian caught in the reduction-in-force at the end of the Seven Years' War. He is overly proud but honorable. He is unmistakably a good man and certainly unlike the monocled fiend of Hollywood imaginings. Embarrassed by want of both money and opportunity, his future appears grim. At the low point in his fortunes, his loyal top sergeant, also mustered out, proposes to him that they travel to Persia where well-paid mercenary employment is available. Tellheim answers: "One becomes a soldier for his country or out of love for a just cause. But to wage war here today and there tomorrow, without moral justification, is to be nothing more than a travelling butcher's boy."

If such moralizing is not to the pragmatist's taste, there is one final reason for considering the Wehrmacht generals in a more critical light: They lost. ★

Capt. Ralph Peters' ancestors emigrated from Germany in the wake of the failed revolutions of 1848. Family members have served in the Army of the Potomac and the AEF. Shortly after two of them were wounded at the Battle of the Bulge, relatives who had remained in Germany went as refugees to Dresden, to escape the allied bombing campaign.

USAISD Notes

Consolidation of Cryptologic Morse Training

by Albert E. Lyle

The consolidation of Cryptologic Manual Morse Training became a reality on October 7, 1986, when the U.S. Air Force activated its 3485th School Squadron at the U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens, Mass. This transfer of training from Keesler Air Force Base, Miss., culminated a three-year planning effort to support the consolidation of all service Crypotologic Morse Training at Fort Devens under the Department of Defense Executive Agent Training Program.

The structure for undertaking such an effort is provided by the Interservice Training Organization (ITRO) and its governing regulations. ITRO is an organization within DOD which operates with the mutual consent of the military services to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of education and training programs. The ITRO is directed by an executive board consisting of the commander or designated representative from each service's training command. The operations of the ITRO are conducted through a structure of committees which function on an as needed basis. The ITRO does not have dedicated resources; it receives support from the military services. The ITRO makes recommendations to DOD based on the outcome of its studies. DOD promulgates its decision in the form of a regulation or program budget decision (PBD).

Although the services cannot disapprove an ITRO report, they can file separate reports if they feel more information needs to be reported. An ITRO study may be terminated at the end of any phase if the results do not contribute to more cost-efficient training.

The proposal to consolidate Morse training of all services began in the 1970s as a result of several program budget decisions concerning consolidation of cryptologic training. In 1977, Phase I and II ITRO studies were conducted to specifically address Morse training consolidation at one location. Those studies produced three feasible stationing alternatives, but a consensus among the services was never reached. In response to a National Security Agency (NSA) feasibility cost study conducted in 1982, the Army submitted a proposal for the training to be held at the U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens, Mass. (USAISD). Although Fort Devens proved to be a highly feasible stationing option, staffing with the other services again fell short of a consensus.

On October 20, 1983, the U.S. Navy introduced a request that the cryptologic manual Morse consolidation issue be made the subject of another ITRO study. The proposal was accepted by the steering committee and approved by the executive board. The following actions resulted:

A task group was formed during the next 30 days and NSA was invited to participate. The Army (DA, DCSOPS) was asked to conduct the effort and USAISD was selected to represent the Army in this effort.

The formal ITRO study started in November 1983.

All services met at Fort Devens in March 1984 to create a program of instruction for the common course. The course, based on a six-hour academic day, was approved by all services. Within two weeks, the ITRO subcommittees met again at Fort Devens to examine manpower requirements, determine facilities and perform a cost analysis for the consolidation at Fort Devens. It was determined that this consolidated course would cost DOD $1.2 million annually. In light of this outcome, another meeting was held at Keesler Air Force Base to resize the course on an eight-hour day, 20-week basis. All services agreed with the new course length and two cost-effective options were developed for consolidation by the ITRO steering committee and executive board. The first was an all service consolidation that would save DOD $.8 million annually while the second, an Army/Air Force consolidation, would save $1.5 million annually. The executive board decided to study the second option.

Concurrent with this ITRO effort, the director, NSA, recommended that all services consolidate for the Morse training at Fort Devens with the Army serving as executive agent. He felt that the complete consolidation would place emphasis on standardization and evaluation and would be in keeping with other cryptologic training consolidations. The assistant secretary of defense issued a decision memorandum April 5, 1985, in favor of the four-service consolidation at Fort Devens and named the Army as executive agent. The memo further stated that the ITRO Phase III study should proceed with the Air Force consolidation during the first quarter, FY 87 and the Navy and Marine Corps consolidation at Fort Devens by the end of FY 88. Given this guidance, the ITRO Task Group proceeded with the planning of consolidation for all services.

All documentation was completed on schedule for Army/Air Force consolidation and the first joint class commenced on October 9, 1986. In order to accomplish this consolidation, an Air Force technical training unit was established at Fort Devens. This unit, the 3485th School Squadron, is subordinate to the 3480th Technical Training Wing at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas. The unit's 24 permanent party personnel will support an Air Force annual student load of 462.

It was further agreed that USAISD and HQ, Fort Devens would provide most of the training and administrative support. However, certain administrative and financial support would be provided to the Air Force unit by nearby Hanscom Air Force Base.

The Navy Detachment at Fort Devens will be subordinate to the Naval Technical Training Center, Corry Station, Pensacola, Fla. Consisting of 21 personnel, it will support 350 students per year by the end of FY 88.

The Marine Corps Administrative detachment will be subordinate to Headquarters, United States Marine Corps (TPI), Washington, D.C. This eight person unit will support 92 students annually by the end of FY 88.

The annual Morse consolidated pro-

gram of instruction has a total of 829.5 academic hours: 700.5 hours are common core instruction and 129 hours are designated as service unique instruction.

The first phase of instruction of basic Morse will last approximately 14 weeks. This phase is dedicated to teaching typing, the International Morse Code (IMC), and learning to copy IMC at 20 groups per minute. The trainee will also qualify in cut numbers, intersperse and special characters unique to Morse Code transmissions.

The advanced Morse phase of training is approximately six weeks in duration and teaches the collection, analysis and servicing of Morse code traffic. Students will also be afforded the opportunity to develop skills unique to their service and projected follow-on duty assignments.

Since its inception in the 1970s, Morse Consolidation has improved considerably. With subject matter experts from all services under one roof, sharing ideas and methodology, the Department of Defense will gain Morse Intercept Operators second to none.

Branch Notes

International Army Programs Directorate

by Ann Keays

The International Army Programs Directorate (IAPD) at TRADOC headquarters might be described as a mini United Nations. Its 19 officers and civilians maintain an elaborate, multinational network of communication and army-to-army programs among nations allied to, or friendly with, the United States.

IAPD is organized under combat developments, TRADOC staff and directed by a colonel. IAPD is responsible for organizing and conducting the U.S. Army TRADOC's International Army Staff Talks Program.

The directorate is divided into two geographically oriented segments: the European branch and the Latin American/Asian Pacific branch. Program managers within each branch conduct army-to-army programs for specific countries. Other activities of the directorate include NATO, ABCA (America, Britain, Canada, Australia), and Senior National Representatives-Army (United Kingdom, France, Germany, United States) discussions.

The army-to-army programs and allied activities include bilateral staff talks with friendly and allied armies about doctrine, combat developments, training and materiel. The staff talks alternate between the participating countries and are designed to study ways to bring the individual armies closer together. The goal is to make progress in the ability to fight effectively together with a focus on rationalization, standardization and interoperability.

Between staff talks which occur on a 12 to 18 month basis, steering committees meet to finalize topics for upcoming talks. Other activities organized by IAPD include exchange visits of subject matter experts (SMEs), liaison officer exchanges, field visits and social gatherings.

The U.S. Army has the most extensive network of liaison officers of any army in the world. Their selection is approved by the TRADOC commander. There are also more than 70 liaison officers at TRADOC headquarters and in its branch schools who represent the various European, Latin American and Asian-Pacific countries involved in the international army program. Official staff talks began last year with the Italian army, and the two nations have now exchanged liaison officers. TRADOC recently sent a liaison officer to Canada for the first time.

SME exchanges help prevent misunderstanding and misperceptions when a lapse in official army-to-army contact occurs. For example, there are currently SMEs in Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Peru. These are all armies friendly to the U.S. although they have no treaty arrangements. They do, however, share separate Communist threats.

There have been many significant achievements under the International Army Staff Talks Program. Since talks began with Germany in 1975, 22 concept papers have been signed. Agreements cover everything from how to fight together under AirLand Battle doctrine to an agreement on a bilateral camouflage pattern for vehicles of each army.

Talks with the United Kingdom, since 1979, have emphasized doctrine and combat developments. Talks with the French have resulted in agreements on 13 initiatives.

IAPD may indeed be thought of as a mini United Nations, as it continues to host talks among nations of divergent cultures, traditions and national goals to seek a unity of purpose and understanding.

Writer's Award Nominee

In accordance with the guidelines for the ***Military Intelligence*** annual Writer's Award Program, published in the January-March 1986 issue, the magazine's editorial staff is pleased to announce that Capt. Charles Duch's article, "Developments in Soviet High Commands" will be the nominee for the third quarter. Nominees will be announced each quarter; the fourth quarter's nominee and the at-large nominee will be announced with the winner in the January-March 1987 issue.

Training Notes

LIC Update

The "Tactical Intelligence Process in Low Intensity Conflict" (TIPLIC), a tactical guide for intelligence in LIC, is being finalized and will soon be distributed. The Low Intensity Task Group (LITG) will issue the guide to the MI officers' advanced and basic courses. Copies will also be disseminated to 96B10, BNCOC and ANCOC students. Limited distribution will be made to the Army's LIC oriented elements for their use and comments.

A new methodology on intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) for LIC is now completed. This methodology adheres to IPB's overall principles and addresses new and added LIC requirements. Currently in draft, IPB in LIC is part of the TIPLIC.

LITG is designing a new course for soldiers either currently working in or being assigned to LIC environments or to units with LIC missions. The course will be taught over a three-week period, will be practical exercise (PE) oriented, and will include insurgency analysis, insurgency PE, intelligence in LIC concentrated studies, and a challenging, week-long, final exercise. The course goal is to provide professional instruction to MI personnel involved in LIC beyond that currently presented at USAICS. LITG, Department of Tactical Intelligence and Military Science (DTIMS) has proponency for the course. The Department of Human Intelligence (DHI) and Department of Surveillance and Systems Maintenance (DSSM) are providing input and instruction to the course, making it a cooperative, all-source venture that should serve the field well. Announcement of the course schedule and instructions for enrollment will be published when available.

Questions or comments on IPB in LIC or the LIC course can be directed to Capt. Levesque or Capt. Wilson by calling AVN 879-3355/3925 or writing to Commander, USAICS, ATSI-TI-ST (LITG), Fort Huachuca, Ariz. 85613-7000.

Ambush and the Trap Map

by Capt. Raymond W. Levesque

In Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), the ambush is one of the insurgent's favorite tactics. One study showed that 60 percent to 70 percent of insurgent combat actions included ambushes. It is low risk, low cost and can cause counterinsurgent (COIN) force casualties proportionately larger than the size of the ambushing force. For this reason, the S2 includes likely ambush locations on the trap map so he can plan coverage of these areas.

In areas with an insurgent threat the entire operational area is vulnerable; however, the S2 can specify the more likely areas for a potential, significant ambush. The enemy will implement his ambush on carefully chosen ground where he can inflict casualties, often at close range. Potential targets include military columns, police or off duty soldiers.

The S2's first step is a map analysis of likely ambush points. He must identify lines of communication (LOC) in the operational area and examine terrain that dominates the LOCs. He should closely study areas with a dramatic change in vegetation, as well as areas where insurgents could fire from long range; though not as effective, long range fire can harass a unit. He must also consider areas where the insurgent can establish roadblocks.

If time allows, the S2 or a patrol should conduct ground reconnaissance to verify the map analysis. Walking on possible ambush sites and looking for routes of ingress and egress will add insight into the likelihood of the insurgent's use of the area.

Another S2 consideration is intelligence that pinpoints potential ambush sites. Pattern analysis identifies areas where insurgents habitually carry out ambushes. Considering the local insurgent group's tactics and capabilities will determine where and how they are most likely to attack. The S2's terrain analysis and threat evaluation identifies areas of potential and actual insurgent support or control in the proximity of ambush points.

The S2 also considers friendly operations which may increase the odds of an insurgent ambush. The COIN force's use of the area's LOC gives the insurgent a target. Road convoys outside controlled areas are vulnerable to attack. Convoys in support of offensive operations can attract large-scale ambushes.

Insurgents also incorporate ambushes into other actions. For example, when insurgents attack a town, ambushes are normally established along the COIN force's possible avenues of approach. In fact, at times the insurgents' primary objective is to ambush the relief force, using the attack as a lure.

Once all data is collected, the S2 plots the likely ambush areas on the trap map during the IPB process. These areas become named areas of interest (NAI) when COIN forces move within the area or along relevant LOCs. The S2 can focus collection on these points with patrols or sensors prior to or during a convoy movement.

Throughout the process, the S2 plots all reports of enemy activity in the area on the incident map. Insurgent sightings near a potential ambush area could indicate an imminent ambush and further collection may be needed to confirm or deny the possibility.

The importance of dissemination cannot be overstressed. Prior to a COIN force moving through an area, the S2 should brief the unit on where likely ambush areas are and whether there is information that indicates an insurgent presence in the area; the friendly unit must be warned immediately.

These actions will increase the possibility that the S2 will detect an insurgent presence near an ambush area. The S2 can then forewarn friendly units that there is a greater chance of ambush units and to increase their security or act against the threat. The S2 can also better focus his collection against those areas with a higher threat overall or during specific operations. Unfortunately, insurgent hasty ambushes cannot be predicted; however, the S2 may be able to create a situation where COIN forces can be proactive and ambush the enemy while he's moving into position or is on the site.

Army Needs Polygraph Examiners

Following a recent Department of the Army decision allowing enlisted counterintelligence agents, military occupational specialty 97B, to become polygraph examiners, the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) is now soliciting information from qualified enlisted special agents.

INSCOM's polygraph mission will expand significantly in the next five years, based on a decision made by the chief of staff of the Army in February 1986. Expansion will be primarily in the area of counterintelligence-screening polygraph examinations.

Soldiers must meet the following requirements to qualify for training as a polygraph examiner:

- Be a U.S. citizen.
- Be at least 25 years of age.
- Be a graduate of an accredited four-year college (or equivalent) with two years of investigative experience. Experience must have been with a U.S. government or other law enforcement agency.
- Be screened through a background investigation.
- Be willing to undergo a polygraph examination.
- A soldier accepted into the program will attend a 24-week course at the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute at Fort McClellan, Ala. Assignment to an INSCOM polygraph unit in Korea, Germany or Fort Meade, Md., will follow.

Enlisted special agents should indicate their interest and may obtain additional information by writing to:

Commander
USAINSCOM
ATTN: IAOPS-CI-PG/Mr. Thurber
Arlington Hall Station
Arlington, Va. 22212-5000

The letter should include the applicant's military background, investigative experience, date eligible for rotation and a telephone number at which the applicant can be reached during duty hours.

Intelligence Training Courses Update

Our July-September issue listed numerous training courses available to military intelligence professionals. The following update modifies that list.

The basic Amphibious Officer Course and Marine Amphibious Intelligence Officer Course have been combined. The new title is the Landing Force Intelligence Officer Course. Additionally, the listed Amphibious Intelligence courses are no longer offered at LFTCLant. They are now available at the Navy/Marine Intelligence Training Center (NMITC), Dam Neck, Va.

The Amphibious Intelligence Resource Management Course, Remote Sensor Specialist Course and the Intelligence Research Officer Technician Course are no longer available. The MI Officer Course Phase II (Counterintelligence/CI Assistant) and Tactical Intelligence Staff Officers Course are no longer active component courses. Also note that the correct title of the Soviet Threat Awareness course is Soviet Military Power. It is offered at Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C.

On Tactical Intelligence at NTC

by Capt. Brian R.E. Miller

The 1/18 Infantry and 1/63 Armor Battalions of the 1st Infantry Division (MECH) were the first units to "fight" the fully organized National Training Center opposing forces (NTC OPFOR). The lessons learned concentrate on the OPFOR and tactical intelligence issues at the battalion S-2 level and are still valid. The information presented has been updated by interviews with personnel who have participated in recent NTC training.

The handling of prisoners of war (POWs) is not yet strongly emphasized during NTC iterations. The evaluator/controller (E/C) may present several prisoners to a unit to evaluate correct processing procedures. Solid POW training will assure proficiency in this area.

- The OPFOR are well trained and well versed in Soviet tactics. Forces include three motorized rifle battalions, one tank battalion, one battery of 122mm self-propelled Howitzers, one battery of ZSU-23-4s, one reconnaissance company (BRDMs and motorcycles) and a military intelligence detachment with a jamming, intercept and direction finding (DF) capability. They employ a mix of actual and simulated Soviet equipment and outnumber a U.S. mechanized battalion by a force ratio of 3:1.
- The OPFOR did not exercise effective communications security (COMSEC) measures and were exploited by U.S. intercept and DF sites.
- The OPFOR utilize extensive reconnaissance, especially at night. Ground surveillance radar (GSR) can be used effectively for counter-reconnaissance.
- While on the offensive, the OPFOR will use smoke extensively, both to obscure their own vehicles and as artillery missions on U.S. positions.
- The OPFOR is now equipped with UH-1s modified to resemble MI-24 HIND helicopters; they are used for armed reconnaissance and anti-armor/anti-personnel attacks. The addition of over 100 dismounted infantry troops is another new development. These soldiers are used for dismounted attacks and aggressive reconnaissance.

The terrain at Fort Irwin, a high desert environment, is characterized by wide valleys separated by impassa-

ble rocky ridges. Vegetation will not adequately conceal tactical vehicles. Desert camouflage nets will conceal vehicles; woodland camouflage nets (winter side) are barely efficient.

Wadis/depressions provide some cover and concealment from ground observation and flat trajectory weapons. They can be used for full defilade positions, maneuvering unobserved by the enemy, and ambush positions. Wadis can also be used to a good advantage by dismounted tank killer teams. The OPFOR has difficulty acquiring dismounted infantry in well prepared positions.

U.S. battalions sustained 50 percent to 75 percent vehicle casualties in defense/delay scenarios, due to lack of adequate cover and concealment.

Navigation is difficult, especially at night. The Fort Irwin special maps do not depict many wadis and depressions that will conceal tanks and APCs. Train soldiers in the use of intersection and resection to locate positions. If at all possible, leaders should conduct ground reconnaissance prior to tactical operations; map reconnaissance is a poor substitute.

The battalion S-2 must develop a close working relationship with the supporting MI platoon leader. CEWI platoon support effectiveness is increased when the platoon leader is colocated with the battalion S-2 at the tactical operations center (TOC). Open communications facilitate emplacement of assets and troop control.

GSR teams should establish communications with the battalion scout platoon. Scouts can provide security for GSR teams and reconnoiter areas that GSRs cannot (e.g. dead spaces, bases of ridgelines, etc.). This coordination becomes particularly important during the live fire phase for vehicle identification purposes. Accurate and timely reconnaissance is essential to verify inteiligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) estimates.

GSR teams should also establish a communications link with the fire support officer (FSO). GSR targets can be called in as artillery targets through MILES and during the live fire phase. The S-2 must be fully aware of friendly locations when calling artillery on these targets.

Plan for extensive employment of GSRs throughout the sector to support the entire scheme of maneuver. Site GSRs to take full advantage of their maximum effective range in the desert. This provides excellent early warning to the battalion. Also, supply the GSR teams with night vision devices (NVDs) during periods of limited visibility. This will enhance the radars' surveillance capability.

U.S. Army photo by Armando Carrasco

The use of MILES at the National Training Center provides a realistic training environment. (U.S. Army photo)

The S-2 must work closely with the S-3 to coordinate the surveillance plan with anti-armor ambushes, counter-reconnaissance patrols and scout screening missions. Ensure companies send out listening post/observation posts (LP/OPs) with NVDs. At least 25 percent night security must be maintained, since the OPFOR conducts effective mounted and dismounted night reconnaissance patrols.

Keep the brigade S-2 informed of the current enemy situation. The S-2 should track enemy losses and send in battle damage reports to the brigade at least twice daily and at the conclusion of missions. Send in timely requests for intelligence support. The brigade S-2 will thus be better able to assist in timely IPB.

The NTC acts as the division G-2 and therefore, interfaces with the brigade. The intelligence they provide can be misleading. The OPFOR has proven to be aggressive. Occasionally OPFOR subordinate elements demonstrate initiative and consequently, take actions that do not fit the scenario. Friendly elements should be flexible and expect attacks and ambushes. The battalion S-2 should work through the brigade S-2 and the NTC S-2 controller to solve any doctrinal problems that arise. Gen-

erally, OPFOR tactics are portrayed realistically.

OPSEC, to include the importance of noise and light discipline, needs to be emphasized. Headlights, reflective windshields and mirrors can be seen from a 15 to 20 mile distance.

Staff coordination between the S-2/S-3/FSO needs to be stressed. The S-3 should act as the central point for this communication process and demand input from the S-2 and FSO.

The OPFOR will utilize jamming and deception. Units need to rehearse their SIGSEC and COMSEC procedures and employ them effectively to maintain critical FM communications. Excessive transmission time by radio operators also enabled the OPFOR to DF friendly positions.

Units must train extensively using MILES before deploying to the NTC. The OPFOR are experts at using MILES. Knowledge of effective ranges is critical during force-on-force operations, since range estimation is difficult in the desert. Gunner training, target identification and range estimation are critical at the NTC, especially since many engagements can occur at maximum effective ranges.

During live fire exercises, unit movements, fire commands and target identification must be carefully coordinated. The S2/S3/FSO relationship is therefore critical to a safe, successful iteration at the NTC.

U. S. Army photo by J. L. Fetig

The Fort Irwin terrain allows many opportunities for OPFOR vehicles to conceal and evade friendly forces. (U. S. Army photo)

Russian Translation Software for IBM-Compatible Personal Computers

The U.S. Army Intelligence Agency's Foreign Science and Technology Center (FSTC) has recently completed a major research and production enhancement effort to provide FSTC analysts some degree of personal translation capability. It has also yielded a versatile product that may have utility outside the organization. Intended to provide scientific, technical and military staff with a computerized, user-friendly Russian translation capability, a new software package titled "RUSKII" has been developed. It enables those unfamiliar with the printed Russian language to quickly translate documents such as table and figure headings, tables of contents, titles, key phrases, nomenclature, abstracts and short paragraphs.

Developed by a team of FSTC analysts for use with IBM-compatible personal computers, RUSKII provides users with a 17,600 word vocabulary through a menu-driven format. The data base can be readily expanded to over 22,000 words.

Based on direct or transliterated Cyrillic entries and using an incorporated, software-based, Russian keyboard, individual words can be translated with minimal hands-on training. Additionally, the program is capable of saving translated material in the computer memory for later use.

The complete package, "RUSKII: A Russian Translation Catalyst," consists of two double-density, double-sided, 5-1/4 inch floppy disks and a hard-copy booklet. Depending on specific needs, RUSKII is available in two versions. The original Basic version (1.0) can operate in any IBM-compatible system. The improved and more advanced Pascal version (2.0) requires a minimum of 512 kbytes RAM to operate in any IBM-compatible system. The distribution of RUSKII is limited to U.S. government agencies.

If you would like to receive a copy of version 1.0 or 2.0, please forward correspondence through normal command channels to the following address:

Commander
U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center
ATTN: AIAST-RA-ST3/Capt. Serino/RUSKII
Charlottesville, Va. 22901-5396

As of this writing, copies of RUSKII have been requested by, and issued to, diverse government organizations. In addition, because of the uniqueness of the program and the capabilities that may be afforded to the future users of RUSKII, work has begun on expanding this PC-level, machine-assisted, translation capability to the German, French, Polish and Czech languages. For additional information, contact either Capt. Robert Serino at AUTOVON 274-7417 or Dr. Leroy Moyer at AUTOVON 274-7427.

Values in the Soviet Military

by Michael Biddle

The values of Russian soldiers are similar to ours with a few key differences. Two Soviet military experts agree that the effect on the Soviets' ability to wage war leads to one indisputable conclusion for American soldiers: Never underestimate the enemy.

The question of values is not a simple one. Dr. Ilana Kass, a professor of national security in the Department of Military Strategy at the National War College, Fort McNair, D.C., explained that since we know what they're taught but not what they retain, we need to address the kinds of values Soviet leaders try to impart to their soldiers.

She lists Soviet values as:

- Discipline and obedience . . . Carry out orders regardless . . . Don't ask questions. This value is probably most important.
- Courage and self-sacrifice . . . The individual is not important; what is important is the greater good.
- Self-sufficiency . . . Don't wait for supplies; press on.
- Hatred . . . Probably the key difference from what we teach our soldiers. Hate the motherland's enemies. That is beyond any universal soldierly value.

Kass said another key difference between American and Soviet military values is the inception and duration of their education.

The process, termed military patriotic education, begins in kindergarten and continues throughout the education system.

Their hatred is reinforced by controlled media. In the Soviet view, patriotism is impossible without hatred and a perception of constant threat from their enemy.

According to Soviet Union defector, Alexander Ushakov, patriotism is used as another potent tool with Marxist-Leninist theories.

Ushakov, author of four books and now a language instructor at the Foreign Service Institute in Rosslyn, Va., fled the Soviet Union less than three years ago. Prior to his escape, he served as a Soviet soldier in a strategic rocket unit, as an artillery officer and as a naval associate professor. Because some of his studies conflicted with the party line, he was sentenced by the KGB to 12 years in Siberia. Shortly thereafter, he escaped.

Ushakov personally experienced an early indoctrination of being exposed to the mixing of patriotism and communist ideology. So did his daughter, who as a kindergarten student told him that her grandfather was Lenin.

While a military instructor, Ushakov attempted to separate the two concepts for his students. He stated that young draftees accept the party line because it is difficult to assimilate these abstractions at such a young age.

Ushakov agreed with Kass' list of values and added that Soviet soldiers practice more discipline than their American counterparts. The average Soviet soldier will spend his entire two year obligation in garrison, except for short annual field exercises. His guaranteed 10 days of leave are used for outprocessing. If the soldier is truly outstanding, he may receive special trips, such as a ride in the back of a truck to the nearest war memorial for a lecture.

The Soviets also train more rigorously. Their extremely regimented training day lasts from 6 a.m. until 10 p.m., six days a week, with Sunday reserved for organized athletics and equipment maintenance. Of this period, six hours a day would meet the American definition of training time. The remainder is spent in political lectures or maintenance, plus 15 minutes of free time at the end of the day. Soldiers also conduct physical training daily before breakfast.

Ushakov gave an example of the Soviets' realistic weapons training: "One day I was in regiment training. Every year, the regiment had to fire its real rockets without the nuclear warhead. Our target was more than 2,000 kilometers away. We hit it in the central 200 by 500 meter ellipse. This is a good result. That day was very, very cold with a hard snow. It was not easy to prepare, but we did."

The Soviet value of self-reliance affects training and weapons. Soviet officers can also repair their weapons. "I can dismantle the AK-47 assault rifle in 40 seconds without light or tools," said Ushakov. To reach this level of expertise, Ushakov and other officers practiced twice a week for six months.

Ushakov confirmed that the Soviets build simple, dependable and sturdy weapons. Unlike American officers, Soviet officers are taught to repair rifles, engines and transmissions.

Another difference in training is the Soviet lack of emphasis on initiative. According to Kass, they believe in tactical rigidity and flexibility at the operational level to carry out the order. The training is based on mechanical repetition, a necessary trait in wartime. Despite this lack of emphasis on initiative, both experts discounted the popular notion that Soviet soldiers are cogs in a machine and not leaders. They believe that leadership is the ability to carry out orders. The concept that all Soviet soldiers adhere to one approach even if doomed to failure is wrong. They judge by results.

Ushakov differentiated between formal and informal leaders. He explained that the formal leader is a good servant and acceptable to the ruling class. The informal leader, very popular within a group, can take a risk and have his own opinion; he can take responsibility for decision making in a tough situation and can communicate well.

Potential leaders who are selected for promotion can be trained in a formal school or appointed to a position based on proven competence.

According to Ushakov, the Communist Party promotes officers according to their loyalty to the party. Every unit has political officers who preach the Communist line, but their status is very low. The higher officers promote the best professionals, choosing soldiers competent in their field.

In closing, Ushakov completely agreed with Kass' final statement:

DO NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE ENEMY.

FEEDBACK

(Continued from page 5)

Dear Editor:

Several recent events have prompted me to write this letter, particularly a recent article about Gen. Wagner's criticism of both the reserve system and the training of the active forces through the year 2000.

In the last decade, the conduct of intelligence operations in World War II, during Vietnam, and after, has been well documented. Criticism of the intelligence operations in Vietnam is at times unfair. Prior to 1962, there was no military intelligence branch. Related duties were performed by people who were "just passing through." There was no real professionalism, though there were some truly outstanding professionals. With the establishment of the Military Intelligence branch and with 25 years of experience and the hindsight of our past conflicts, the establishment of the CEWI battalion has gone a long way toward rectifying past mistakes. One is tempted to ask, "What took so long?" The answer is, all too often, lack of time and experience and in many cases, lack of command interest. With the establishment of the Red Thrust Detachment, the FORSCOM Intelligence Training Detachment, the III Corps OPFOR Detachment, the National Training Center and the 7th Army Training Center, the need for intelligence has been vividly demonstrated to the combat elements.

With the establishment of Reserve Component CEWI, the intelligence effort has been expanded to the Reserves, but it has not had the necessary impact to gain the required support. Considerable effort went into establishing the maneuver area commands, the maneuver training commands and selection of sites for the consolidated training facilities, but the effort was not coordinated. Little thought was given to providing technical intelligence support to any of these units.

The maneuver training commands are the only contact with both intelligence and OPFOR for some reserve units. The MI branch must exert its influence and support the organizations which will be able to train these people in peacetime, so that if a conflict breaks out, instantly deployed and follow-on troops will be capable of reporting what they encountered in combat.

One of the major obstacles to effective intelligence training of non-intelligence units has been the organization of the reserve system. The maneuver training commands of the Army reserve have the potential of being able to "export" intelligence and OPFOR to the field but they have been severely handicapped by having been placed under the administrative control of a training division. The few unclassified studies and reports which are available are frequently short-stopped by the training division and seldom get to the training commands. There is also conflict between maneuver area commands as those officers develop a limited understanding of the intelligence system. While various training courses are available (and some do an excellent job), once back to the unit, it is limited vision as usual.

The Reserve Component CEWI units, especially the Corps CEWI, offer a possible means to eliminate the problems associated with the system as it is currently organized.

In summary, the problems have been well documented in the histories of three major conflicts and the partial solutions are in the process of being implemented. Yet, there are still a few areas where progress is slow. Security considerations have almost always precluded the open discussion of the problems and potential solutions. This too is changing, as technical intelligence has expanded. It takes almost 20 years to see the results, but the payoff is considerably improved weapons, training and intelligence analysis.

William L. Howard
Lt. Col., Armor, USAR

A Short History of E

by Dr. Bruce Saunders

While imagery intelligence (IMINT) gained its greatest support and well-deserved reputation during and after World War II, its antecedents may be traced back to the Mexican War. Hot air balloons had been perfected during the late 18th century in Europe and experiments had been conducted with them in England in the 1820s. John Wise, an American experimenter and "father" of American ballooning, was one of the first men to realize the military implications of the balloon. In 1846, Wise wrote to the War Department and suggested that a tethered balloon floating high above the Mexican fort at Veracruz could serve as a tactical aerial platform that could drop small bombs, as well as observe the enemy fortifications while remaining out of range of Mexican guns. The War Department was unimpressed with his proposal and rejected it. Only three years later, the value of the Wise concept was validated when the Austrian Army used balloons equipped with 30 pound bombs in an attack on the city of Venice.

Years later the noted American balloonist, Thaddeus S.C. Lowe, demonstrated the potential of the balloon when he lifted off at Cincinnati, Ohio, in the **Enterprise** in April 1861. He landed at Unionville, S.C. several days later and was arrested as a Union spy. After convincing Confederate authorities that he was on a scientific mission, he gained his



Early American Aerial Observation Balloons

release and appeared in Washington, D.C., in June 1861 to urge the Union to consider balloons as observation platforms. To demonstrate the capabilities of the balloon, Lowe transported an electric telegraphic key aloft with him on a flight and transmitted the first air-to-ground message

to President Abraham Lincoln on June 18, 1861. Lowe had convinced the Union leadership of the potential value of the balloon as an observation device and a small balloon corps was authorized and staffed in late 1861. Wise, still attempting to play a role in the development of American balloons, demonstrated his abilities in a series of test flights near the nation's capital in the summer of 1861.

Another noted pioneer, John La Mountain, became an "aerial observer" for Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler at Fort Monroe, Va., in the summer of 1861. At an altitude of 1,400 feet La Mountain discovered that the reported Confederate attack could not be mounted from either location. La Mountain was the first American balloonist to operate his tethered platform over water. He used a small arms transport ship in the harbor as his anchor. He later reported to the Washington, D.C. area where he was assigned to the Army of the Potomac as an "aeronaut" under the direction of Gen. McClellan.

In the fall of 1861, La Mountain completed several daring, highly successful, untethered reconnaissance flights along the Potomac River. However, Lowe was still active in the area; he and La Mountain clashed both personally and professionally until McClellan dismissed La Mountain from the Army in February 1862 and assigned the entire balloon corps to Lowe. Under his direction, the corps continued to produce timely and accurate intelligence in the northern Virginia area, but numerous administrative problems, disagreements over command authority, and personality clashes forced Lowe to resign. Without its leader, the balloon corps was disbanded in June 1863 and the first American experiment with aerial intelligence ended two years before the final conclusion of the Civil War.

Despite the numerous problems and handicaps associated with the novel ballooning experiments, the U.S. Army used early aerial platforms to gather intelligence. The Confederate States of America (CSA) attempted to use this new technology also; however, they produced only one useable balloon which was created from silk dresses donated by thousands of southern women. Tethered to a small steamer, it ran aground on the York River and later was captured by the Union.

While aerial photographs were taken of Boston from a balloon in October 1860, there is no surviving evidence that aerial photographs were attempted from any of the balloons that were used in the Civil War. It may be quite instructive to study the efforts of Wise, La Mountain and Lowe and consider the proposed tethered aerial platforms that are currently being constructed for the defense of our southern borders.

Information for this article was derived from the following sources: Bruce Bidwell, ***Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff, 1775-1941*** *(Frederick, Md., University Publications of America, Inc., 1986, pp. 35-38);* ***American Heritage, The American Heritage History of Flight*** *(Washington American Heritage Publishing Co., 1962, pp. 38-39, 64-65, 75-76); and Frederick S. Haydon,* ***Aeronatics in the Union and Confederate Armies*** *(Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1941, Vol. 1, Chapters 1-6, especially Chapter 3 on Wise, Chapter 4 on La Mountain, and Chapter 5 on Lowe, pp. 1-227).*

POLAND

(Continued from page 16)

Wozniak, another economist and committed supporter of Jaruzelski. These changes only provide further evidence that the military faction within the PCP continues to wield the real power in Poland and the civilian PCP faction is still going through internal housecleaning measures.

The rise of the military in Poland has introduced a new model of East European, civil-military relations which defies long accepted and established norms of communist government. As one Defense Intelligence Agency analyst has aptly stated, "Poland today is a martial law state without a state of martial law."[20] However, the real issue for the long term is whether the Polish model could be imposed in other communist societies. The next stage (or the ultimate stage) in communist development could be "militaucracy," at least the initial stages of which can be observed in Poland. Only the future will determine whether the *Communists in uniform* stagnate or whether they prove to be a variation of the communist model which offers some hope of reform. At present, and for the immediately foreseeable future, however, they are indeed "in charge" in Poland. ★

Footnotes

1. Extremely helpful for background on the Polish situation is Neal Ascherson's **The Polish August: The Self-Limiting Revolution** (New York: The Viking Press, 1982). Ascherson witnessed much of what occurred in Poland as a correspondent for several British newspapers during the period.
2. Adam Bromke, "The Political Crisis in Poland 1980-82: Implications for East-West Relations," ***Conflict Quarterly*** (Fall, 1982), pp. 40-41.
3. A. Ross Johnson, **Poland in Crisis** (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, July, 1982), p. 30.
4. ***The New York Times***, 10 June 1982, p. 10. These remarks were apparently made by Suslov to Czyrek during Czyrek's official visit to Moscow in January 1982 shortly after the institution of martial law.
5. "Generals Still Call the Tune in Poland," ***The New York Times***, 18 September 1983, p. 3.
6. Statement by Maj. Mike O'Hara, Defense Intelligence Agency Analyst, in a personal telephone interview, Washington, D.C., 30 August 1985.
7. FBIS, "Poland: Provincial Defense Committees Wield Broad Powers," ***Foreign Press Note***, FB PN 85-058 (9 May 1985), pp. 1-2.
8. Ibid.
9. FBIS, "WKO Meeting in Sieradz," ***East Europe Report: Political, Sociological and Military Affairs*** (6 August 1985), p. 93 and "WKO Meetings in Szczecin, Lublin, Lodz and Suwalki"(6 September 1985), pp. 96-97.
10. George C. Malcher, "Poland's Politicized Army: Communists in Uniform" (New York: Praeger, 1984), p. 38.
11. Ibid., p. 40.
12. Ibid.
13. Jan de Weydenthal, "Martial Law and the Reliability of the Polish Military," **Soviet Allies: The Warsaw Pact and the Issue of Reliability** (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), p. 239.
14. Excerpt from a taped speech delivered by Jaruzelski at a meeting on 24 January 1971. Transcribed and published by Ewa Wacowska, ed., **Rewolta Szczecinska i jej znaczenie** (Paris, 1971), p. 135 as cited in de Weydenthal, pp. 239-40.
15. General of Arms Jozef Baryla, ***Zolnierz Wolnosci***, 5-8 April 1985, p. 3 as cited in FBIS, Joint Publications Research Service, 6 May 1985, p. 73.
16. For a more detailed conclusion, see Malcher, pp. 235-37.
17. "Jaruzelski Steps Up, Down and Sideways," ***The New York Times***, 7 November 1985, p. 3.
18. ***London Times***, 8 November 1985, p. 9.
19. ***The News and Observer*** (Raleigh, N.C.), 13 November 1985, p. 3A.
20. O'Hara interview, 30 August 1985.

Maj. Ralph L. Longmire has served in intelligence assignments with the 82nd Airborne Division, 5th Special Forces Group, Special Warfare Center, Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe and the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School. His advanced military education includes the Postgraduate Intelligence Course at DIA, the Defense Language Institute and the Foreign Area Officer Course. Additionally, he holds master's degrees in European diplomatic history and economics (HRM). Longmire is currently assigned to the Morocco-U.S. Liaison Office, U.S. Embassy, Rabat, Morocco.

PSYCHOTRONICS

(Continued from page 21)

Midwest PSI Research Inst., Chicago, Ill.; Mind Science Foundation, San Antonio, Texas; Parapsychology Foundation, N.Y.; Psychical Research Foundation, Durham, N.C.; Psychophysical Research Labs, Princeton, N.J.; Science Unlimited Research Foundation, San Antonio, Texas; SRI International, Menlo Park, Calif.; also note the oldest—Society for Psychical Research, London.

9. Julian Isaacs, "Mass Screening Techniques for Locating PKMB Agents," ***Psychoenergetic Systems***, Vol. 4, 1981, Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, Inc., United Kingdom, pp. 125-58.
10. Drs. Hal E. Puthoff and Russell Targ, "A Perceptual Channel for Information Transfer Over Kilometer Distances: Historical Perspective and Recent Research," ***Proceedings of the IEEE***, Vol. 64, Number 3, March 1976, pp. 329-54.
11. Ibid.
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16. Ibid., p. 36.
17. Ibid., pp. 25-26.
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19. Lt. Col. John B. Alexander, "The New Mental Battlefield: 'Beam Me Up, Spock'," ***Military Review***, Vol. LX, No. 12, December 1980, p. 51.
20. Bray, pp. 15-16.
21. La Mothe, pp. 27, 40.
22. Bray, p. 13.
23. Roger A. Beaumont, "Cnth?: On the Strategic Potential of ESP," ***Signal***, Vol. 36, No. 5, January 1982, p. 43.
24. Ibid., p. 44.
25. Thomas E. Bearden, **Excalibur Briefing**, copyright 1980, Strawberry Hill Press, 2594 15th Ave., San Francisco, Calif., p. 197.

Capt. Richard Groller, an Army intelligence officer, is currently assigned as the SIGINT requirements officer, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, HQ Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Ga. A graduate of the Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course, he has a master of science degree in electronic warfare systems technology from the Naval Postgraduate School, and a master's degree in business administration from Western New England College. His previous assignments include chief, Advanced Electronic Maintenance Division, U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens and assistant G2 operations officer, 7th Infantry Division, Fort Ord. Groller has been published previously in ***Field Artillery Journal*** *and* ***Military Intelligence.***

PROFESSIONAL READER

The Terrorist Classic: Manual of the Urban Guerrilla by Carlos Marighella, translated and edited by Gene Z. Hanrahan, Chapel Hill, S. C.: Documentary Publications, 1985, 110 pages.

Carlos Marighella died in a police ambush on the streets of Sao Paulo, Brazil on November 29, 1969, less than a week before his 59th birthday. A notorious communist terrorist leader and theoretician, Marighella had just published his masterpiece, **Manual of the Urban Guerrilla**. Although his violent death signalled the passing of large-scale, urban communist terrorism in Brazil, his manual assured his place in the modern, international, terrorist pantheon alongside such personalities as Lenin, Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara. Translated into dozens of languages and circulated in scores of countries, Marighella's manual has become a significant force shaping the doctrines and tactics of virtually every major contemporary terrorist organization.

Although there have been innumerable translations of varying quality of Marighella's manual, Gene Z. Hanrahan's, **The Terrorist Classic: Manual of the Urban Guerrilla**, is the best treatment of the subject to date. While Hanrahan's translation has errors, such as presenting only six of "The Seven Sins of the Urban Guerrilla" (Hanrahan omits the second, concerning the boasting about actions the guerrilla has completed), the overall flow is smooth and very readable. Adding to clarity and understanding, Hanrahan has included with his translation a 21-page essay about the life and beliefs of Marighella and a six-page Marighella bibliography.

Hanrahan's book is worthwhile reading for any intelligence or special operations soldier with an interest in how hard-core terrorists think, organize and act in an urban environment. While the book is, in essence, a case study of Marighella, the dogmatic communist extremist, it is also an expose of basic terrorist doctrine and tactics. For the new student of terrorism counteraction it is an excellent primer on urban guerrilla strategy (including Marighella's version of the principles of war), logistics, finance, tactics, intelligence, counterintelligence, psychological operations (PSYOP) and many other facets of urban insurgency. For those with more than a passing interest in terrorism and low intensity conflict (LIC), Hanrahan's book is excellent comparative material in the threat evaluation phase of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).

For those with a more generalized interest in terrorism, Hanrahan's book is, above all, a warning. It shows the level to which terrorist operational art can be raised by a single, intelligent monomaniac with a mission. Although Marighella had only limited technical understanding of military operations (his manual reflects such basic errors in unconventional warfare strategy as the belief that a successful insurgency can develop in the cities before it develops in the countryside and that guerrilla cells should initiate their own actions without superior command and control), his work is impressive in its breadth and depth. Marighella's attention to detail includes exhortations that the urban guerrilla should take every chance to practice shooting, even using amusement park arcades, recommendations for the use of black and gray PSYOP and deception, and advice that horse-mounted police are vulnerable to ropes strung across narrow streets and marbles strewn on roadways. Marighella's manual is testimony that refinements in modern terrorism are limited only by the imagination of the terrorists and their dedication to their beliefs.

Capt. William H. Burgess III
Fort Richardson, Alaska

Leadership in Organization by the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership, New York: West Point Academy, 1985, 568 pages.

This is essentially a book of essays whose contributing authors are U.S. Army officers. It appears, at first glance, to be just another of the all too many compilations on themes that can be played without too much risk to one's professional reputation. First impressions are not always deceiving.

Indeed, we are informed that this is a text for a required course on military leadership. The rationale for the book is that there was little available literature "which addressed the phenomenon of leadership in formal organization in a comprehensive way." An interesting comment, for a recent bibliography on leadership I happened across ran in excess of 13 pages of single-spaced typewritten entries. My brief acquaintance with the field leads me to believe that in this area, rather than suffering a paucity, scholars suffer from a plethora of materials from which to select.

The preface promises "the best possible mix of theory and leadership applications." This mix is provided by authors seeking "to build a scientific approach to the study of leadership," an admirable task. As one reads the text something appears to be missing. It finally occurred to me that the book is a monument to what Morris Janowitz in his work, **The Professional Soldier**, 1960, described as a struggle within the military between the "heroic leaders" and the "military managers." In this case, the authors appear to favor the corporate-managerial model for West Point cadets to study, further exacerbating confusion between management and leadership.

With today's high technology, the Army clearly needs those who provide the supplies, the communications and other vital support required on today's battlefields. These managers are essential. I submit that equally important is "old fashioned" leadership. The problem lies in clearly separating the twin concepts of management and leadership.

Former Army vice chief of staff, Walter J. Kerwin, Jr., warned in 1978 that, "leadership and management are not the same (for) the factors for which soldiers are willing to sacrifice their lives . . . cannot be quantified. Personal leadership is as necessary on today's battlefield as in any time in history. *While wars can be lost through lack of management, they can only be won through leadership.*"

As a text for a required undergraduate course in military leadership (note military), **Leadership in Organization** would seem to be slightly off mark. Less ponderous publications exist that would be more beneficial to the cadets in their studies of this particular subject matter. FM 22-100, **Military Leadership**, and **Small Unit Leadership: a Common Sense Approach** by Col. Dandridge M. Malone are examples of some alternate publications currently available that would seem more appropriate for the stated goal.

For the general audience, to include the academician, the book has some utility. Much of the essentially descriptive material that is a necessary adjunct to such topics as experimental design, statistical analysis, executive stress and the leader as a counselor, is presented clearly.

In sum, **Leadership in Organization** is well written. This is a real virtue, given the rather specialized, even esoteric nature of many of the topics. The contributors are authoritative in the presentation of their materials. For a not-so-quick dip into the intricacies of management thought in general and leadership in particular, this book probably has some socially redeeming value. Otherwise, it serves as a wonderful addition to the reference library.

Mr. William S. Wojsko
Fort Huachuca, Ariz.

The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy by Dr. Robert Jervis, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1984, 203 pages.

Professor Jervis' book is recommended not only to military intelligence officers with an interest in strategic questions but to anyone who wishes to examine the foundations of our present nuclear strategy. This book should be read and thoroughly critiqued by all those attending the War Colleges. Not because Jervis presents the case well for the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine, which he favors, but rather because he brings into question so much of what has become conventional wisdom. Professor Jervis clearly advocates the MAD doctrine and devotes the book to discrediting the countervailing/flexible response doctrine. While he does not prove his thesis that the countervailing/flexible response theories are incoherent and contradictory, he does cast serious doubt on their credibility. Jervis substantiates that strategic thinkers and policy makers have been both incoherent and contradictory in their statements and in the implementation of strategic weapons programs. The fact that people advocate a particular doctrine which is not consistent with their statements and actions does not prove that the doctrine is incoherent and inconsistent.

Jervis postulates MAD as the correct strategy, contending that it is both inescapable and more potent than often believed. He asserts that: "Cities are vulnerable and can be destroyed not only in mindless retaliation but also as the result of a series of actions not fully under the control of either side. This strongly inhibits either superpower from challenging the vital interests of the

other." He further states in the preface, "History is filled with cases in which small wars escalated either because of accidents or because of explicit decisions." And, "Irrational as it may be, the chance of devastation has made our world unusually safe." Thus, he implies that even small confrontations between the major powers pose the risk that they can escalate into a central war, and that even these must therefore be avoided. History only partially supports this assertion. While it is true that direct confrontations have been limited, the Soviets have successfully used surrogates when there was a significant risk of confrontation with the United States. This use of surrogates has allowed the Soviets to continue their aggression while at the same time separating themselves from such confrontations. Thus, they have effectively negated this alleged benefit of MAD. On the other hand, as Jervis states, the costs of a central war are so high that the threat of going to that level of conflict is simply not credible unless critical national interests are at stake and may not be credible even then. It is this dilemma that caused the search for implementable or at least believable options and the countervailing strategy. He states further: "A rational strategy for the employment of nuclear weapons is a contradiction in terms. To argue that any nuclear doctrine must be at least partly irrational does not mean that all doctrines are equally at odds with the reality they try to reflect and shape." Jervis postulates no way out of the dilemma except making use of the risk of war and world government. He has rejected out of hand both active and passive defense. This is not a very satisfactory solution, and it weakens his case for MAD.

The doctrine of MAD, which Jervis embraces, makes no sense on other grounds as well, it has no fail-safe or graceful degradation features and is a particularly bad policy for the United States because it is not mutual. The Soviet Union does not accept it. They have a strong air defense, a very good civil defense program and can be expected to have a good ABM system in the near future. No nuclear doctrine becomes more irrational than MAD when one party decides not to accept it and risk a high level of violence. Deterrence through a MAD or a countervailing doctrine without a defense is of little value if even a few missiles are on their way.

In his closing remarks, Jervis quotes G.K. Chesterson who said, "I have seen the truth and it makes no sense." This book will not show you **the** truth, however it does have some truth in it and some sense in it, and it does examine very critical issues.

Howard L. Christensen
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Northrop Electronics Division

The Heroes Who Fell From Grace by Charles T. Patterson and G. Lee Tippin, Canton, Ohio: Daring Books, 1985, 235 pages.

The topic of MIA/POWs has been a difficult one for Americans. Many believe that several MIAs are still being held hostage somewhere in Indo-China while others believe there isn't any evidence to show that this is true. Still, in Southeast Asian refugee camps and around cups of dark and thick coffee, someone always claims they have made a sighting. The U.S. Government, who maintains it makes a thorough investigation of each claim, says there is little proof; others argue that politics keep the truth from becoming known.

For those who believe that there are missing GIs still being held in S.E. Asia against their will,



there is a strong desire to do something to free them. **The Heroes Who Fell From Grace** is the story of several people, American and Asian, who believed there was a location where some MIA/POWs were being held and that their rescue would put an end to the issue. They intended to penetrate Laos and rescue them. An operation called LAZARUS was mounted and did go into Laos. This book is about the failure of that attempt (the authors claim the idea is valid but the execution was the failure).

Many of the members of Operation LAZARUS ended up in a courtroom in Nakhon Phano, Thailand. Charles Patterson was not among those being tried as he left for the United States earlier and was not caught. Originally enthusiastic over the concept of going into Laos and attempting to free American MIA/POWs, he became disillusioned over time with LAZARUS' prospects of success and the leadership by its organizer, James G. "Bo" Gritz, a former lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army's Special Forces.

LAZARUS is Patterson's story in its entirety. There are chapter headings that provide quotes about the perfidy of the Communist negotiators. There are also little vignettes spiced throughout the book in darker type to show or disprove some "official" involvement in the operation. The quotes and vignettes do not distract but add to the basic story. Patterson's recruitment by Gritz, the equipping, training, movement, intelligence, interaction with the Asian contacts and penetration into Laos are all described. From cover to cover, the entire book "reeks" of impending disaster.

If you like an armchair conspiracy, **The Heroes Who Fell From Grace** has it all. The contacts with government officials, those purporting to represent someone, the monied backers, ex-members of various bodies, the various liberation front players, etc., are all here. Some denied contact while others admitted to it. The reader is left wondering if Gritz's operation LAZARUS was legitimate or whether he had an ulterior motive. Yet, there is just enough doubt cast to keep the MIA/POW issue fermenting. The book answers nothing.

Peter C. Unsinger
San Jose State University

The Militarists: The Rise of Japanese Militarism Since World War II by Edwin P. Hoyt, New York: Donald I. Fine, Inc., 1985.

The term Militarism connotes the predominance of the military in the administration or policy of the state, the primary importance of military preparedness to that state or, to a lesser degree, the glorification of the ideals of a professional military class. Edwin P. Hoyt in **The Militarists** observes that there has been some return in Japanese society to acknowledging past Japanese material heritage, particularly the samurai tradition under the old imperial system. And he notes that Japan with prompting from the United States, has begun to abandon the ideals of their post war constitution of a totally pacific country by increasing and professionalizing the defense force. While these trends may be present, the author uses a very loose definition for militarism. The book lacks any rigorous analysis that demonstrates convincingly a predominance in government or primary concern for the military and rearmament.

Edwin P. Hoyt's list of past books is impressive. By 1967 he had written over a dozen books when he turned his prolific writing to military subjects. He has written on such varied topics as the Czechoslovakian Legion in the Russian Civil War, pacific battles in World War II and the Korean War, to name a few. His success as a writer is due to his enviable ability to relate exciting, fascinating stories in a very easy, fast-moving prose. The serious student of military history is never quite sure when the mundane, relevant facts are traded for the more sensational aspects of the story. Hoyt does not demonstrate how he uses his sources through footnotes or other methods of documentation. He relies on secondary and tertiary sources indicating he overlooks primary documentation. Working through other interpretations or accounts and given his broad range of past subjects, Hoyt cannot be characterized as an expert in Japanese military affairs. Therefore, for a significant observation on Japanese militarism, one should want a substantive accounting.

While he has written in military history, a military historian Hoyt is not. His is the stuff of pop journalism. He offers easy, entertaining military history for the casual reader. For the military intelligence professional, there are many more profitable and useful readings available, and this reviewer will wait for a more serious study on the possible rise of Japanese militarism since World War II.

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502nd Military Intelligence Battalion



The coat of arms is designed from the battalion's heritage and service in the Republic of Korea. The shield consists of three beacon fires which represent the traditional system of sending messages in Korea until 1885. It also alludes to the three battle honors awarded to the unit for services in the Korean War. The center beacon is depicted on an oriental blue background with a silver border around its gold flame. The two flanking beacons are depicted on a silver background with gold flames. The colors are those of Military Intelligence: blue for loyalty and vigilance and silver for tenacity. The gold of the flames commemorates unit decorations. The motto, "Freedom By Vigilance" is derived from the continuous watch of the enemy and the use of beacon fires to signal friendly forces.

The 502nd Military Intelligence Battalion, comprised of five separate MI service platoons, was activated at Tagegu, Korea, on September 1, 1952, and assigned to the Far East Command. The battalion was instrumental in providing vital and timely intelligence in support of the Korean War. For its efforts in providing United Nations forces with valuable tactical intelligence gained from interrogators, order of battle analysts, and photo interpreters, the battalion was awarded a Meritorious Unit Commendation and a Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation. Upon cessation of hostilities the battalion was inactivated on January 20, 1955.

On March 25, 1961 the battalion was reactivated at Yongsan, Korea, as field Army battalion assigned to the U.S. Army Pacific Command and subsequently assigned to the Eighth U.S. Army. From 1961 to 1978, the 502nd was the only military intelligence battalion assigned in the Republic of Korea. During this period the battalion provided key analytical research on the developing North Korean Army. The battalion was reorganized in April 1977 and assigned to the Intelligence and Security Command. It was later inactivated on January 1, 1978.

The 502nd Mi Bn (Operations), reactivated on October 1, 1986, represents the nucleus of I Corps' intelligence support and will provide the foundation on which the 201st MI Brigade will be formed during FY 87-88.

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